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Shultz, S., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2006). Both social and ecological factors predict ungulate brain size. Proc Biol Sci, 273(1583), 207–215.
Abstract: Among mammals, the members of some Orders have relatively large brains. Alternative explanations for this have emphasized either social or ecological selection pressures favouring greater information-processing capacities, including large group size, greater foraging efficiency, higher innovation rates, better invasion success and complex problem solving. However, the focal taxa for these analyses (primates, carnivores and birds) often show both varied ecological competence and social complexity. Here, we focus on the specific relationship between social complexity and brain size in ungulates, a group with relatively simple patterns of resource use, but extremely varied social behaviours. The statistical approach we used, phylogenetic generalized least squares, showed that relative brain size was independently associated with sociality and social complexity as well as with habitat use, while relative neocortex size is associated with social but not ecological factors. A simple index of sociality was a better predictor of both total brain and neocortex size than group size, which may indicate that the cognitive demands of sociality depend on the nature of social relationships as well as the total number of individuals in a group.
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Joffe, T. H., & Dunbar, R. I. (1997). Visual and socio-cognitive information processing in primate brain evolution. Proc Biol Sci, 264(1386), 1303–1307.
Abstract: Social group size has been shown to correlate with neocortex size in primates. Here we use comparative analyses to show that social group size is independently correlated with the size of non-V1 neocortical areas, but not with other more proximate components of the visual system or with brain systems associated with emotional cueing (e.g. the amygdala). We argue that visual brain components serve as a social information 'input device' for socio-visual stimuli such as facial expressions, bodily gestures and visual status markers, while the non-visual neocortex serves as a 'processing device' whereby these social cues are encoded, interpreted and associated with stored information. However, the second appears to have greater overall importance because the size of the V1 visual area appears to reach an asymptotic size beyond which visual acuity and pattern recognition may not improve significantly. This is especially true of the great ape clade (including humans), that is known to use more sophisticated social cognitive strategies.
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Barrett, L., & Henzi, P. (2005). The social nature of primate cognition. Proc Biol Sci, 272(1575), 1865–1875.
Abstract: The hypothesis that the enlarged brain size of the primates was selected for by social, rather than purely ecological, factors has been strongly influential in studies of primate cognition and behaviour over the past two decades. However, the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis, also known as the social brain hypothesis, tends to emphasize certain traits and behaviours, like exploitation and deception, at the expense of others, such as tolerance and behavioural coordination, and therefore presents only one view of how social life may shape cognition. This review outlines work from other relevant disciplines, including evolutionary economics, cognitive science and neurophysiology, to illustrate how these can be used to build a more general theoretical framework, incorporating notions of embodied and distributed cognition, in which to situate questions concerning the evolution of primate social cognition.
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Whiten, A. (2000). Social complexity and social intelligence. In Novartis Foundation Symposium (Vol. 233, pp. 185–96; discussion pp. 196–201).
Abstract: When we talk of the 'nature of intelligence', or any other attribute, we may be referring to its essential structure, or to its place in nature, particularly the function it has evolved to serve. Here I examine both, from the perspective of the evolution of intelligence in primates. Over the last 20 years, the Social (or 'Machiavellian') Intelligence Hypothesis has gained empirical support. Its core claim is that the intelligence of primates is primarily an adaptation to the special complexities of primate social life. In addition to this hypothesis about the function of intellect, a secondary claim is that the very structure of intelligence has been moulded to be 'social' in character, an idea that presents a challenge to orthodox views of intelligence as a general-purpose capacity. I shall outline the principal components of social intelligence and the environment of social complexity it engages with. This raises the question of whether domain specificity is an appropriate characterization of social intelligence and its subcomponents, like theory of mind. As a counter-argument to such specificity I consider the hypothesis that great apes exhibit a cluster of advanced cognitive abilities that rest on a shared capacity for second-order mental representation.
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Alexander, B. K., & Bowers, J. M. (1969). Social organization of a troop of Japanese monkeys in a two-acre enclosure. Folia Primatol (Basel), 10(3), 230–242.
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Mori, U. (1979). Ecological and sociological studies of gelada baboons. Unit formation and the emergence of a new leader. Contrib Primatol, 16, 155–181.
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Mori, U. (1979). Ecological and sociological studies of gelada baboons. Inter-unit relationships. Contrib Primatol, 16, 83–92.
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Mori, U. (1979). Ecological and sociological studies of gelada baboons. Individual relationships within a unit. Contrib Primatol, 16, 93–124.
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Levin, L. E., & Grillet, M. E. (1988). [Diversified leadership: a social solution of problems in schools of fish]. Acta Cient Venez, 39(2), 175–180.
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Amé, J. - M., Halloy, J., Rivault, C., Detrain, C., & Deneubourg, J. L. (2006). Collegial decision making based on social amplification leads to optimal group formation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 103(15), 5835–5840.
Abstract: Group-living animals are often faced with choosing between one or more alternative resource sites. A central question in such collective decision making includes determining which individuals induce the decision and when. This experimental and theoretical study of shelter selection by cockroach groups demonstrates that choices can emerge through nonlinear interaction dynamics between equal individuals without perfect knowledge or leadership. We identify a simple mechanism whereby a decision is taken on the move with limited information and signaling and without comparison of available opportunities. This mechanism leads to optimal mean benefit for group individuals. Our model points to a generic self-organized collective decision-making process independent of animal species.
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