Abstract: Non-human animals vary in their ability to make and use tools. The goal of the present study was to further explore what, if anything, differs between tool-users and non-tool-users, and whether these differences lie in the conceptual or motor domain. We tested two species that typically do not use tools-cotton top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) and vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops)-on problems that mirrored those designed for prolific tool users such as chimpanzees. We trained subjects on a task in which they could choose one of two canes to obtain an out-of-reach food reward. After training, subjects received several variations on the original task, each designed to examine a specific conceptual aspect of the pulling problem previously studied in other tool-using species. Both species recognized that effective pulling tools must be made of rigid materials. Subsequent conditions revealed significant species differences, with vervets outperforming tamarins across many conditions. Vervets, but not tamarins, had some recognition of the relationship between a tool's orientation and the position of the food reward, the relationship between a tool's trajectory and the substance that it moves on, and that tools must be connected in order to work properly. These results provide further evidence that tool-use may derive from domain-general, rather than domain-specific cognitive capacities that evolved for tool use per se.

Abstract: Humans, chimpanzees, capuchins and aye-ayes all display an unusually high degree of encephalization and diverse omnivorous extractive foraging. It has been suggested that the high degree of encephalization in aye-ayes may be the result of their diverse, omnivorous extractive foraging behaviors. In combination with certain forms of tool use, omnivorous extractive foraging has been hypothesized to be linked to higher levels of sensorimotor intelligence (stages 5 or 6). Although free-ranging aye-ayes have not been observed to use tools directly in the context of their extractive foraging activities, they have recently been reported to use lianas as tools in a manner that independently suggests that they may possess stage 5 or 6 sensorimotor intelligence. Although other primate species which display diverse, omnivorous extractive foraging have been tested for sensorimotor intelligence, aye-ayes have not. We report a test of captive aye-ayes' comprehension of tool use in a situation designed to simulate natural conditions. The results support the view that aye-ayes do not achieve stage 6 comprehension of tool use, but rather may use trial-and-error learning to develop tool-use behaviors. Other theories for aye-aye encephalization are considered.

Abstract: When we talk of the 'nature of intelligence', or any other attribute, we may be referring to its essential structure, or to its place in nature, particularly the function it has evolved to serve. Here I examine both, from the perspective of the evolution of intelligence in primates. Over the last 20 years, the Social (or 'Machiavellian') Intelligence Hypothesis has gained empirical support. Its core claim is that the intelligence of primates is primarily an adaptation to the special complexities of primate social life. In addition to this hypothesis about the function of intellect, a secondary claim is that the very structure of intelligence has been moulded to be 'social' in character, an idea that presents a challenge to orthodox views of intelligence as a general-purpose capacity. I shall outline the principal components of social intelligence and the environment of social complexity it engages with. This raises the question of whether domain specificity is an appropriate characterization of social intelligence and its subcomponents, like theory of mind. As a counter-argument to such specificity I consider the hypothesis that great apes exhibit a cluster of advanced cognitive abilities that rest on a shared capacity for second-order mental representation.