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Gácsi, M., Kara, E., Belényi, B., Topál, J., & Miklósi, Á. (2009). The effect of development and individual differences in pointing comprehension of dogs. Anim. Cogn., 12(3), 471–479.
Abstract: In spite of the rather different procedures actually used in comparative studies to test the ability of different species to rely on the human pointing gesture, there is no debate on the high performance of dogs in such tasks. Very little is known, however, on the course through which they acquire this ability or the probable factors influencing the process. Important developmental questions have remained unsolved and also some methodological concerns should be addressed before we can convincingly argue for one interpretation or another. In this study we tested 180 dogs of different age (from 2 months to adults) to investigate their performance in the human distal momentary pointing gesture. The results, analyzed at both the group and the individual levels, showed no difference in the performance according to age, indicating that in dogs the comprehension of the human pointing may require only very limited and rapid early learning to fully develop. Interestingly, neither the keeping conditions nor the time spent in active interaction with the owner, and not even some special (agility) training for using human visual cues, had significant effect on the success and explained individual differences. The performance of the dogs was rather stable over time: during the 20 trials within a session and even when subsamples of different age were repeatedly tested. Considering that in spite of the general success at the group level, more than half of the dogs were not successful at the individual level, we revealed alternative “decision-making rules” other than following the pointing gesture of the experimenter.
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Paukner, A., Anderson, J. R., & Fujita, K. (2006). Redundant food searches by capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella): a failure of metacognition? Anim. Cogn., 9(2), 110–117.
Abstract: This study investigated capuchin monkeys' understanding of their own visual search behavior as a means to gather information. Five monkeys were presented with three tubes that could be visually searched to determine the location of a bait. The bait's visibility was experimentally manipulated, and the monkeys' spontaneous visual searches before tube selection were analyzed. In Experiment 1, three monkeys selected the baited tube significantly above chance; however, the monkeys also searched transparent tubes. In Experiment 2, a bent tube in which food was never visible was introduced. When the bent tube was baited, the monkeys failed to deduce the bait location and responded randomly. They also continued to look into the bent tube despite not gaining any pertinent information from it. The capuchin monkeys' behavior contrasts with the efficient employment of visual search behavior reported in humans, apes and macaques. This difference is consistent with species-related variations in metacognitive abilities, although other explanations are also possible.
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Moses, S. N., Villate, C., & Ryan, J. D. (2006). An investigation of learning strategy supporting transitive inference performance in humans compared to other species. Neuropsychologia, 44(8), 1370–1387.
Abstract: Generalizations about neural function are often drawn from non-human animal models to human cognition, however, the assumption of cross-species conservation may sometimes be invalid. Humans may use different strategies mediated by alternative structures, or similar structures may operate differently within the context of the human brain. The transitive inference problem, considered a hallmark of logical reasoning, can be solved by non-human species via associative learning rather than logic. We tested whether humans use similar strategies to other species for transitive inference. Results are crucial for evaluating the validity of widely accepted assumptions of similar neural substrates underlying performance in humans and other animals. Here we show that successful transitive inference in humans is unrelated to use of associative learning strategies and is associated with ability to report the hierarchical relationship among stimuli. Our work stipulates that cross-species generalizations must be interpreted cautiously, since performance on the same task may be mediated by different strategies and/or neural systems.
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Call, J. (2006). Inferences by exclusion in the great apes: the effect of age and species. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 393–403.
Abstract: This study investigated the ability of chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and bonobos to make inferences by exclusion using the procedure pioneered by Premack and Premack (Cognition 50:347-362, 1994) with chimpanzees. Thirty apes were presented with two different food items (banana vs. grape) on a platform and covered with identical containers. One of the items was removed from the container and placed between the two containers so that subjects could see it. After discarding this item, subjects could select between the two containers. In Experiment 1, apes preferentially selected the container that held the item that the experimenter had not discarded, especially if subjects saw the experimenter remove the item from the container (but without seeing the container empty). Experiment 3 in which the food was removed from one of the containers behind a barrier confirmed these results. In contrast, subjects performed at chance levels when a stimulus (colored plastic chip: Exp. 1; food item: Exp. 2 and Exp. 3) designated the item that had been removed. These results indicated that apes made inferences, not just learned to use a discriminative cue to avoid the empty container. Apes perceived and treated the item discarded by the experimenter as if it were the very one that had been hidden under the container. Results suggested a positive relationship between age and inferential ability independent of memory ability but no species differences.
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Pepperberg, I. M. (2006). Grey parrot numerical competence: a review. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 377–391.
Abstract: The extent to which humans and nonhumans share numerical competency is a matter of debate. Some researchers argue that nonhumans, lacking human language, possess only a simple understanding of small quantities, generally less than four. Animals that have, however, received some training in human communication systems might demonstrate abilities intermediate between those of untrained nonhumans and humans. Here I review data for a Grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus) that has been shown to quantify sets of up to and including six items (including heterogeneous subsets) using vocal English labels, to comprehend these labels fully, and to have a zero-like concept. Recent research demonstrates that he can also sum small quantities. His success shows that he understands number symbols as abstract representations of real-world collections, and that his sense of number compares favorably to that of chimpanzees and young human children.
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Henderson, J., Hurly, T. A., & Healy, S. D. (2006). Spatial relational learning in rufous hummingbirds (Selasphorus rufus). Anim. Cogn., 9(3), 201–205.
Abstract: There is increasing evidence that animals can learn abstract spatial relationships, and successfully transfer this knowledge to novel situations. In this study, rufous hummingbirds (Selasphorus rufus) were trained to feed from either the lower or the higher of two flowers. When presented with a test pair of flowers, one of which was at a novel height, they chose the flower in the appropriate spatial position rather than the flower at the correct height. This response may also have been influenced by a preference for taller flowers as acquisition of the task during experimental training occurred more readily when the reward flower was the taller of the pair. Thus, it appears that although learning abstract relationships may be a general phenomenon across contexts, and perhaps across species, the ease with which they are learned and the context in which they are subsequently used may not be the same.
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Halsey, L. G., Bezerra, B. M., & Souto, A. S. (2006). Can wild common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) solve the parallel strings task? Anim. Cogn., 9(3), 229–233.
Abstract: Patterned string tasks are a test of perceptual capacity and the understanding of means-end connections. Primates can solve complex forms of this task in laboratories. However, this may not indicate the level of such cognition that is commonly employed in the wild, where decision-making time is often short and distractions such as predator avoidance and competition between conspecifics are often prevalent. The current study tests whether wild common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) can successfully complete the simplest form of the patterned string task, parallel strings, while in their natural environment. Although 12 out of 13 marmosets could successfully complete the task, in previous laboratory-based studies on primates, the errors at this task by all primate species tested were consistently lower than in the present study. This is probably explained by the added difficulties imposed by the natural setting of the task in the present study, exemplified by a significant increase in observed vigilance behaviour by subject animals prior to attempts at the task that were unsuccessful. The undertaking of such tasks by common marmosets in situ probably provides a more reasonable representation of the levels of cognitive capacity expressed by this species in the wild than do laboratory-based studies of the task.
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Katz, J. S., & Wright, A. A. (2006). Same/different abstract-concept learning by pigeons. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(1), 80–86.
Abstract: Eight pigeons were trained and tested in a simultaneous same/different task. After pecking an upper picture, they pecked a lower picture to indicate same or a white rectangle to indicate different. Increases in the training set size from 8 to 1,024 items produced improved transfer from 51.3% to 84.6%. This is the first evidence that pigeons can perform a two-item same/different task as accurately with novel items as training items and both above 80% correct. Fixed-set control groups ruled out training time or transfer testing as producing the high level of abstract-concept learning. Comparisons with similar experiments with rhesus and capuchin monkeys showed that the ability to learn the same/different abstract concept was similar but that pigeons require more training exemplars.
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Horner, V., & Whiten, A. (2005). Causal knowledge and imitation/emulation switching in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and children (Homo sapiens). Anim. Cogn., 8(3), 164–181.
Abstract: This study explored whether the tendency of chimpanzees and children to use emulation or imitation to solve a tool-using task was a response to the availability of causal information. Young wild-born chimpanzees from an African sanctuary and 3- to 4-year-old children observed a human demonstrator use a tool to retrieve a reward from a puzzle-box. The demonstration involved both causally relevant and irrelevant actions, and the box was presented in each of two conditions: opaque and clear. In the opaque condition, causal information about the effect of the tool inside the box was not available, and hence it was impossible to differentiate between the relevant and irrelevant parts of the demonstration. However, in the clear condition causal information was available, and subjects could potentially determine which actions were necessary. When chimpanzees were presented with the opaque box, they reproduced both the relevant and irrelevant actions, thus imitating the overall structure of the task. When the box was presented in the clear condition they instead ignored the irrelevant actions in favour of a more efficient, emulative technique. These results suggest that emulation is the favoured strategy of chimpanzees when sufficient causal information is available. However, if such information is not available, chimpanzees are prone to employ a more comprehensive copy of an observed action. In contrast to the chimpanzees, children employed imitation to solve the task in both conditions, at the expense of efficiency. We suggest that the difference in performance of chimpanzees and children may be due to a greater susceptibility of children to cultural conventions, perhaps combined with a differential focus on the results, actions and goals of the demonstrator.
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Call, J., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2005). Copying results and copying actions in the process of social learning: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo sapiens). Anim. Cogn., 8(3), 151–163.
Abstract: There is currently much debate about the nature of social learning in chimpanzees. The main question is whether they can copy others' actions, as opposed to reproducing the environmental effects of these actions using their own preexisting behavioral strategies. In the current study, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo sapiens) were shown different demonstrations of how to open a tube-in both cases by a conspecific. In different experimental conditions, demonstrations consisted of (1) action only (the actions necessary to open the tube without actually opening it); (2) end state only (the open tube, without showing any actions); (3) both of these components (in a full demonstration); or (4) neither of these components (in a baseline condition). In the first three conditions subjects saw one of two different ways that the tube could open (break in middle; caps off ends). Subjects' behavior in each condition was assessed for how often they opened the tube, how often they opened it in the same location as the demonstrator, and how often they copied the demonstrator's actions or style of opening the tube. Whereas chimpanzees reproduced mainly the environmental results of the demonstrations (emulation), human children often reproduced the demonstrator's actions (imitation). Because the procedure used was similar in many ways to the procedure that Meltzoff (Dev Psych 31:1, 1995) used to study the understanding of others' unfulfilled intentions, the implications of these findings with regard to chimpanzees' understanding of others' intentions are also discussed.
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