Abstract: This paper aims to review a long-term research project exploring the chimpanzee mind within historical and ecological contexts. The Ai project began in 1978 and was directly inspired by preceding ape-language studies conducted in Western countries. However, in contrast with the latter, it has focused on the perceptual and cognitive capabilities of chimpanzees rather than communicative skills between humans and chimpanzees. In the original setting, a single chimpanzee faced a computer-controlled apparatus and performed various kinds of matching-to-sample discrimination tasks. Questions regarding the chimpanzee mind can be traced back to Wolfgang Koehler's work in the early part of the 20th century. Yet, Japan has its unique natural and cultural background: it is home to an indigenous primate species, the Japanese snow monkey. This fact has contributed to the emergence of two previous projects in the wild led by the late Kinji Imanishi and his students. First, the Koshima monkey project began in 1948 and became famous for its discovery of the cultural propagation of sweet-potato washing behavior. Second, pioneering work in Africa, starting in 1958, aimed to study great apes in their natural habitat. Thanks to the influence of these intellectual ancestors, the present author also undertook the field study of chimpanzees in the wild, focusing on tool manufacture and use. This work has demonstrated the importance of social and ecological perspectives even for the study of the mind. Combining experimental approaches with a field setting, the Ai project continues to explore cognition and behavior in chimpanzees, while its focus has shifted from the study of a single subject toward that of the community as a whole.

Abstract: In general, codes that have been designed to safeguard the welfare of animals emphasize the importance of providing an environment that will ensure good health and a normal physiological and physical state, that is, they emphasize the animals' physical needs. If mental needs are mentioned, they are always relegated to secondary importance. The argument is put forward here that animal welfare is dependent solely on the cognitive needs of the animals concerned. In general, if these cognitive needs are met, they will protect the animals' physical needs. It is contended that in the few cases in which they do not safeguard the physical needs, it does not matter from a welfare point of view. The human example is given of being ill. It is argued that welfare is only adversely affected when a person feels ill, knows that he or she is ill, or even thinks that he or she is ill, all of which processes are cognitive ones. The implications for welfare of animals possessing certain cognitive abilities are discussed. For example, the extent to which animals are aware of their internal state while performing behavior known to be indicative of so-called states of suffering, such as fear, frustration, and pain, will determine how much they are actually suffering. With careful experimentation it may be possible to determine how negative they feel these states to be. Similarly, the extent to which animals think about items or events absent from their immediate environment will determine how frustrated they are in the absence of the real item or event but in the presence of the cognitive representation.

Abstract: The field of animal cognition is strongly rooted in the philosophy of mind and in the theory of evolution. Despite these strong roots, work during the most famous and active period in the history of our science-the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s-may have diverted us from the very questions that were of greatest initial interest to the comparative analysis of learning and behavior. Subsequently, the field has been in steady decline despite its increasing breadth and sophistication. Renewal of the field of animal cognition may require a return to the original questions of animal communication and intelligence using the most advanced tools of modern psychological science. Reclaiming center stage in contemporary psychology will be difficult; planning that effort with a host of strategies should enhance the chances of success.

Abstract: It is possible that non-specialised cues transmitted by conspecifics guide animals' food search provided they have the cognitive abilities needed to read these cues. Macaques often check the mouth of their group-mates by olfactory and/or visual inspection. We investigated whether Tonkean macaques ( Macaca tonkeana) can find the location of distant food on the basis of cues conveyed by group-mates. The subjects of the study were two 6-year-old males, who belonged to a social group of Tonkean macaques raised in semi-free-ranging conditions. In a first experiment, we tested whether the subject can choose between two sites after having sniffed a partner who has just eaten food corresponding to one of the sites. We found that both subjects were able to choose the matching site significantly above the chance level. This demonstrated that Tonkean macaques are capable of delayed olfactory matching. They could associate a food location with an odour conveyed by a partner. In a second experiment, the same subjects were allowed to see their partner through a Plexiglas window. Both subjects were still able to choose the matching site, demonstrating they could rely on visual cues alone. Passive recruitment of partners appears possible in macaques. They can improve their foraging performances by finding the location of environmental resources from olfactory or visual cues conveyed by group-mates.