Abstract: The value of behavioral techniques in assessing animal welfare, and in particular assessing the psychological well being of animals, is reviewed. Using cats and horses as examples, 3 behavioral methods are presented: (1) comparison of behavior patterns and time budgets; (2) choice tests; and (3) operant conditioning. The behaviors of intact and declawed cats were compared in order to determine if declawing led to behavioral problems or to a change in personality. Apparently it did not. The behavior of free ranging horses was compared with that of stabled horses. Using two-choice preference tests, the preference of horses for visual contact with other horses and the preference for bedding were determined. Horses show no significant preference for locations from which they can make visual contact with other horses, but they do prefer bedding, especially when lying down. Horses will perform an operant response in order to obtain light in a darkened barn or heat in an outside shed. These same techniques can be used to answer a variety of questions about an animal's motivation for a particular attribute of its environment.

Abstract: The distinction between psychology and praxics provides a clear answer to the question of animal cognition. As Griffin and others have noted, the kinds of behavioral phenomena that lead psychologists to speak of cognition in humans are also observed in nonhuman animals, and therefore those who are convinced of the legitimacy of psychology should not hesitate to speak of and to attempt to study animal cognition. The behavior of organisms is also a legitimate subject matter, and praxics, the study of behavior, has led to significant advances in our understanding of the kinds of behaviors that lead psychologists to speak of cognition. Praxics is a biological science; the attempt by students of behavior to appropriate psychology has been misguided. Generativity theory is an example of a formal theory of behavior that has proved useful both in the engineering of intelligent performances in nonhuman animals and in the prediction of intelligent performances in humans.

Abstract: Rossano (Cognition 89:207, 2003) proposes expertise as an indicator of consciousness in humans and other animals. Since there is strong evidence that the development of expertise requires deliberate practice (Ericsson in The road to excellence: the acquisition of expert performance in the arts and sciences, sports and games 1996), and deliberate practice appears to be outside of the bounds of unconscious processing, then any signs of expertise development in an animal are indicators of consciousness. Rossano's argument may lead to an unsolvable debate about animal consciousness while causing researchers to overlook the underlying reality of animal expertise. This article provides evidence indicative of animals meeting each of the three definitions of expertise established in the scientific literature: expertise as a social construction, expertise as exceptional performance, and expertise as knowledge. In addition, cases of deliberate practice by non-human animals are offered. Acknowledging some animals as experts, regardless of consciousness, is warranted by the research findings and would prove useful in solving many issues remaining in the human expertise literature.