Aureli, F., Cords, M., & van Schaik, C. P. (2002). Conflict resolution following aggression in gregarious animals: a predictive framework. Anim. Behav., 64(3), 325–343.
Abstract: Knowledge of how animals manage their conflicts is critical for understanding the dynamics of social systems. During the last two decades research on gregarious animals, especially primates, has focused on the mechanisms of conflict management, mainly on friendly postconflict reunions (also called `reconciliation') in which former opponents exchange affiliative behaviour soon after an aggressive conflict. Our aim in this paper is to present a framework in which the costs and benefits of friendly postconflict reunions, both for each individual opponent and for their mutual relationship, are used to predict the patterning of postconflict resolution mechanisms in other gregarious animals. The framework predicts the occurrence of postconflict reunions in species that live in stable social units, have individualized relationships, and experience postconflict hostility, but especially in those in which intragroup aggression disrupts valuable relationships. The critical issue is whether aggressive conflicts occur between cooperative partners and whether the level of aggression is sufficient to jeopardize the benefits associated with such valuable relationships. We conclude by proposing four research priorities to evaluate the role of friendly reunions in negotiating relationships and the way they are themselves influenced by asymmetries in partner value and biological market effects. Copyright 2002 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Noë, R., van Schaik, C. P., & van Hooff, J. A. R. A. M. (1991). The Market Effect: an Explanation for Pay-off Asymmetries among Collaborating Animals. Ethology, 87(1-2), 97–118.
Abstract: Abstract * 1Animals can derive leverage over others from (a) resource holding power, based for instance on fighting ability or dominance, and (b) the possession of commodities, such as special skills and resources that cannot be taken away by force. * 2We contend that power based on the possession of commodities strongly depends on the level of supply and demand for that commodity, a phenomenon we call the ‘market effect’. * 3Several theoretical and empirical examples are given of social systems in which animals belong to two distinct classes that offer two different kinds of commodities. * 4The relative frequency of occurrence of the two classes is shown to determine the relative power of their members. * 5We consider the theoretical properties of bargaining processes by which relative power is converted into corresponding pay-off distributions. * 6We propose coalition games, a class of games with more than two players and in which bargaining is possible, as suitable paradigms for collaboration among members of social units.
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van Schaik, C. P. (2010). Social learning and culture in animals. In P. Kappeler (Ed.), Animal Behaviour: Evolution and Mechanisms (pp. 623–653). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Abstract: Most animals must learn some of the behaviours in their repertoire, and some must learn most. Although learning is often thought of as an individual exercise, in nature much learning is social, i.e. under the influence of conspecifics. Social learners acquire novel information or skills faster and at lower cost, but risk learning false information or useless skills. Social learning can be divided into learning from social information and learning through social interaction. Different species have different mechanisms of learning from social information, ranging from selective attention to the environment due to the presence of others to copying of complete motor sequences. In vertical (or oblique) social learning, naïve individuals often learn skills or knowledge from parents (or other adults), whereas horizontal social learning is from peers, either immatures or adults, and more often concerns eavesdropping and public information use. Because vertical social learning is often adaptive, maturing individuals often have a preference for it over individual exploration. The more cognitively demanding social learning abilities probably evolved in this context, in lineages where offspring show long association with parents and niches are complex. Because horizontal learning can be maladaptive, especially when perishable information has become outdated, animals must decide when to deploy social learning. Social learning of novel skills can lead to distinct traditions or cultures when the innovations are sufficiently rare and effectively transmitted socially. Animal cultures may be common but to date taxonomic coverage is insufficient to know how common. Cultural evolution is potentially powerful, but largely confined to humans, for reasons currently unknown. A general theory of culture is therefore badly needed.
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Van Schaik, C. P., & Burkart, J. M. (2011). Social learning and evolution: the cultural intelligence hypothesis. Philos Trans R Soc B, 366.
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Van Schaik, C. P., Isler, K., & Burkart, J. M. (2012). Explaining brain size variation: from social to cultural brain. Trends Ecol Evol, 16.
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von Rohr, C. R., Koski, S. E., Burkart, J. M., Caws, C., Fraser, O. N., Ziltener, A., et al. (2012). Impartial Third-Party Interventions in Captive Chimpanzees: A Reflection of Community Concern. PLoS ONE, 7(3), e32494 EP -.
Abstract: <p>Because conflicts among social group members are inevitable, their management is crucial for group stability. The rarest and most interesting form of conflict management is policing, i.e., <italic>impartial interventions by bystanders</italic>, which is of considerable interest due to its potentially moral nature. Here, we provide descriptive and quantitative data on policing in captive chimpanzees. First, we report on a high rate of policing in one captive group characterized by recently introduced females and a rank reversal between two males. We explored the influence of various factors on the occurrence of policing. The results show that only the alpha and beta males acted as arbitrators using manifold tactics to control conflicts, and that their interventions strongly depended on conflict complexity. Secondly, we compared the policing patterns in three other captive chimpanzee groups. We found that although rare, policing was more prevalent at times of increased social instability, both high-ranking males and females performed policing, and conflicts of all sex-dyad combinations were policed. These results suggest that the primary function of policing is to increase group stability. It may thus reflect prosocial behaviour based upon “community concern.” However, policing remains a rare behaviour and more data are needed to test the generality of this hypothesis.</p>
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Whiten, A., & van Schaik, C. P. (2007). The evolution of animal 'cultures' and social intelligence. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci, 362(1480), 603–620.
Abstract: Decades-long field research has flowered into integrative studies that, together with experimental evidence for the requisite social learning capacities, have indicated a reliance on multiple traditions ('cultures') in a small number of species. It is increasingly evident that there is great variation in manifestations of social learning, tradition and culture among species, offering much scope for evolutionary analysis. Social learning has been identified in a range of vertebrate and invertebrate species, yet sustained traditions appear rarer, and the multiple traditions we call cultures are rarer still. Here, we examine relationships between this variation and both social intelligence-sophisticated information processing adapted to the social domain-and encephalization. First, we consider whether culture offers one particular confirmation of the social ('Machiavellian') intelligence hypothesis that certain kinds of social life (here, culture) select for intelligence: 'you need to be smart to sustain culture'. Phylogenetic comparisons, particularly focusing on our own study animals, the great apes, support this, but we also highlight some paradoxes in a broader taxonomic survey. Second, we use intraspecific variation to address the converse hypothesis that 'culture makes you smart', concluding that recent evidence for both chimpanzees and orang-utans support this proposition.
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