Custance, D., Whiten, A., & Fredman, T. (1999). Social learning of an artificial fruit task in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). J. Comp. Psychol., 113(1), 13–23.
Abstract: Social learning in 11 human-raised capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) was investigated using an artificial fruit that was designed as an analogue of natural foraging problems faced by primates. Each subject observed a human model open each of 3 principal components on the fruit in 1 of 2 alternative ways (“morphs”). The capuchin monkeys reproduced, to differing extents, the alternative techniques used for opening 1 component of the task (poking vs. pulling while twisting out a pair of smooth plastic bolts) but not the other 2. From the subjects' actions on the bolt latch, independent coders could recognize which morph they had witnessed, and they observed a degree of matching to the demonstrator's act consistent with simple imitation or object movement reenactment (A learns from watching B how an object, or parts of an object, move). Thus, these capuchins were capable of more complex social learning than has been recently ascribed to monkeys. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
|
|
Whiten, A. (1998). Imitation of the sequential structure of actions by chimpanzees. J Comp Psychol, 11.
|
|
Byrne, R. W., & Whiten, A. (1990). Tactical deception in primates: the 1990 database (Vol. 27). German Primate Center.
|
Whiten, A., & Byrne, R. W. (1988). Tactical deception in primates. Behav. Brain Sci., 11(02), 233–244.
Abstract: ABSTRACT Tactical deception occurs when an individual is able to use an “honest” act from his normal repertoire in a different context to mislead familiar individuals. Although primates have a reputation for social skill, most primate groups are so intimate that any deception is likely to be subtle and infrequent. Published records are sparse and often anecdotal. We have solicited new records from many primatologists and searched for repeating patterns. This has revealed several different forms of deceptive tactic, which we classify in terms of the function they perform. For each class, we sketch the features of another individual's state of mind that an individual acting with deceptive intent must be able to represent, thus acting as a “natural psychologist.” Our analysis will sharpen attention to apparent taxonomic differences. Before these findings can be generalized, however, behavioral scientists must agree on some fundamental methodological and theoretical questions in the study of the evolution of social cognition.
|
|
Whiten, A., & Ham, R. (1992). On the nature and evolution of imitation in the animal kingdom: reappraisal of a century of research. Adv. Study Behav., 21, 239–283.
|
Byrne, R. W., Whiten, A., & Henzi, S. P. (1990). Social relationships of mountain baboons: Leadership and affiliation in a non-female-bonded monkey. Am. J. Primatol., 20(4), 313–329.
Abstract: Abstract 10.1002/ajp.1350200409.abs Instead of close and differentiated relationships among adult females, the accepted norm for savanna baboons, groups of Drakensberg mountain baboons (Papio ursinus) showed strong affiliation of females towards a single male. The same male was usually the decision-making animal in controlling group movements. Lactating or pregnant females focused their grooming on this “leader” male, producing a radially patterned sociogram, as in the desert baboon (P. hamadryas); the leader male supported young animals in the group against aggression and protected them against external threats. Unlike typical savanna baboons, these mountain baboons rarely displayed approach-retreat or triadic interactions, and entirely lacked coalitions among adult females. Both groups studied were reproductively one-male; male-female relationships in one were like those in a unit of a hamadryas male at his peak, while the other group resembled the unit of an old hamadryas male, who still leads the group, with a male follower starting to build up a new unit and already monopolizing mating. In their mountain environment, where the low population density suggests conditions as harsh for baboons as in deserts, adults in these groups kept unusually large distances apart during ranging; kin tended to range apart, and spacing of adults was greatest at the end of the dry, winter season. These facts support the hypothesis that sparse food is responsible for convergence with hamadryas social organization. It is suggested that all baboons, though matrilocal, are better categorized as “cross-sex-bonded” than “female bonded”.
|
Barton, R. A., & Whiten, A. (1993). Feeding competition among female olive baboons, Papio anubis. Anim. Behav., 46(4), 777–789.
Abstract: Abstract. Competition for food is thought to play a key role in the social organization of group-living female primates, leading to the prediction that individual foraging success will be partly regulated by dominance relationships. Among adult females in a group of free-ranging olive baboons, dominance rank was significantly correlated with nutrient acquisition rates (feeding rates and daily intakes), but not with dietary diversity or quality, nor with activity budgets. The mean daily food intake of the three highest-ranking females was 30% greater than that of the three lowest-ranking females, providing an explanation for relationships between female rank and fertility found in a number of other studies of group-living primates. The intensity of feeding competition, as measured by supplant rates and spatial clustering of individuals, increased during the dry season, a period of low food availability, seemingly because foods eaten then were more clumped in distribution than those eaten in the wet season. Implications for models of female social structure and maximum group size are discussed.
|
Custance, D., Whiten, A., Sambrook, T., & Galdikas, B. (2001). Testing for social learning in the “artificial fruit” processing of wildborn orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), Tanjung Puting, Indonesia. Anim. Cogn., 4(3), 305–313.
Abstract: Social learning about actions, objects and sequencing was investigated in a group of 14 wildborn orangutans (four adult females and ten 3- to 5-year-old juveniles). Human models showed alternative methods and sequences for dismantling an artificial fruit to groups of participants matched by gender and age. Each participant received three to six 2-min trials in which they were given access to the artificial fruit for manipulation. Independent coders, who were unaware of which method each participant had seen, gave confidence ratings and collected action frequencies from watching video recordings of the experimental trials. No significant differences were found between groups in terms of the coders' confidence ratings, the action frequencies or the sequence of manipulations. These negative results may at least partly reflect the immaturity of a large proportion of the participants. A positive correlation was found between age and the degree of matching to the method shown. Although none of the juveniles succeeded in opening the “fruit”, two out of the four adults did so and they also seemed to match more closely the sequence of elements touched over successive trials. The results are compared with similar data previously collected from human children, chimpanzees, gorillas, capuchin monkeys and common marmosets.
|
Caldwell, C. A., & Whiten, A. (2002). Evolutionary perspectives on imitation: is a comparative psychology of social learning possible? Anim. Cogn., 5(4), 193–208.
Abstract: Studies of imitation in animals have become numerous in recent times, but do they contribute to a comparative psychology of social learning? We review this burgeoning field to identify the problems and prospects for such a goal. Difficulties of two main kinds are identified. First, researchers have tackled questions about social learning from at least three very different theoretical perspectives, the “phylogenetic”, “animal model”, and “adaptational”. We examine the conflicts between them and consider the scope for integration. A second difficulty arises in the methodological approaches used in the discipline. In relation to one of these – survey reviews of published studies – we tabulate and compare the contrasting conclusions of nine articles that together review 36 studies. The basis for authors' disagreements, including the matters of perceptual opacity, novelty, sequential structure, and goal representation, are examined. In relation to the other key method, comparative experimentation, we identify 12 studies that have explicitly compared species' imitative ability on similar tasks. We examine the principal problems of comparing like with like in these studies and consider solutions, the most powerful of which we propose to be the use of a systematic range of task designs, rather than any single “gold standard” task.
|
Whiten, A. (2000). Social complexity and social intelligence. In Novartis Foundation Symposium (Vol. 233, pp. 185–96; discussion pp. 196–201).
Abstract: When we talk of the 'nature of intelligence', or any other attribute, we may be referring to its essential structure, or to its place in nature, particularly the function it has evolved to serve. Here I examine both, from the perspective of the evolution of intelligence in primates. Over the last 20 years, the Social (or 'Machiavellian') Intelligence Hypothesis has gained empirical support. Its core claim is that the intelligence of primates is primarily an adaptation to the special complexities of primate social life. In addition to this hypothesis about the function of intellect, a secondary claim is that the very structure of intelligence has been moulded to be 'social' in character, an idea that presents a challenge to orthodox views of intelligence as a general-purpose capacity. I shall outline the principal components of social intelligence and the environment of social complexity it engages with. This raises the question of whether domain specificity is an appropriate characterization of social intelligence and its subcomponents, like theory of mind. As a counter-argument to such specificity I consider the hypothesis that great apes exhibit a cluster of advanced cognitive abilities that rest on a shared capacity for second-order mental representation.
|
