|
|
Danchin, E., Giraldeau, L. - A., Valone, T. J., & Wagner, R. H. (2004). Public information: from nosy neighbors to cultural evolution. Science, 305(5683), 487–491.
Abstract: Psychologists, economists, and advertising moguls have long known that human decision-making is strongly influenced by the behavior of others. A rapidly accumulating body of evidence suggests that the same is true in animals. Individuals can use information arising from cues inadvertently produced by the behavior of other individuals with similar requirements. Many of these cues provide public information about the quality of alternatives. The use of public information is taxonomically widespread and can enhance fitness. Public information can lead to cultural evolution, which we suggest may then affect biological evolution.
|
|
|
|
Giraldeau, L. - A., Valone, T., J., & Templeton, J., J. (2002). Potential disadvantages of using socially acquired information. Phil. Trans. Biol. Sci., 357(1427), 1559–1566.
Abstract: The acquisition and use of socially acquired information is commonly assumed to be profitable. We challenge this assumption by exploring hypothetical scenarios where the use of such information either provides no benefit or can actually be costly. First, we show that the level of incompatibility between the acquisition of personal and socially acquired information will directly affect the extent to which the use of socially acquired information can be profitable. When these two sources of information cannot be acquired simultaneously, there may be no benefit to socially acquired information. Second, we assume that a solitary individual's behavioural decisions will be based on cues revealed by its own interactions with the environment. However, in many cases, for social animals the only socially acquired information available to individuals is the behavioural actions of others that expose their decisions, rather than the cues on which these decisions were based. We argue that in such a situation the use of socially acquired information can lead to informational cascades that sometimes result in sub-optimal behaviour. From this theory of informational cascades, we predict that when erroneous cascades are costly, individuals should pay attention only to socially generated cues and not behavioural decisions. We suggest three scenarios that might be examples of informational cascades in nature.
|
|
|
|
Valone, T. J. (1989). Group foraging, public information, and patch estimation. Oikos, 56(3), 357–363.
Abstract: Public information is information about the quality of a patch that can be obtained by observing the foraging success of other individuals in that patch. I examine the influence of the use of public information on patch departure and foraging efficiency of group members. When groups depart a patch with the first individual to leave, the use of public information can prevent the underutilization of resource patches.
|
|
|
|
Valone, Thomas J., & Templeton, J. J. (2002). Public information for the assessment of quality: a widespread social phenomenon. Phil. Trans. Biol. Sci., 357(1427), 1549–1557.
Abstract: We propose that the use of public information about the quality of environmental resources, obtained by monitoring the sampling behaviour of others, may be a widespread social phenomenon allowing individuals to make faster, more accurate assessments of their environment. To demonstrate this (i) we define public information and distinguish it from other kinds of social information; (ii) we review empirical work demonstrating the benefits and costs of using public information to estimate food patch quality; (iii) we examine recent work showing that individuals may also be using public information to improve their estimates of the quality of such disparate environmental parameters as breeding patches, opponents and mates; and finally (iv) we suggest avenues of future work to better understand the nature of public information use and when it might be used or ignored. Such work should lead to a more complete understanding of the behaviour of individuals in social aggregations.
|
|
