Abstract: A group of animals can only move cohesively, if group members “somehow” reach a consensus about the timing (e.g., start) and the spatial direction/destination of the collective movement. Timing and spatial decisions usually differ with respect to the continuity of their cost/benefit distribution in such a way that, in principle, compromises are much more feasible in timing decision (e.g. median preferred time) than they are in spatial decisions. The consequence is that consensus costs connected to collective timing decisions are usually less skewed amongst group members than are consensus costs connected to spatial decisions. This, in turn, influences the evolution of decision sharing: sharing in timing decisions is most likely to evolve when conflicts are high relative to group cohesion benefits, while sharing in spatial decisions is most likely to evolve in the opposite situation. We discuss the implications of these differences for the study of collective movement decisions.

Abstract: Groups of animals often need to make communal decisions, for example about which activities to perform, when to perform them and which direction to travel in; however, little is known about how they do so. Here, we model the fitness consequences of two possible decision-making mechanisms: 'despotism' and 'democracy'. We show that under most conditions, the costs to subordinate group members, and to the group as a whole, are considerably higher for despotic than for democratic decisions. Even when the despot is the most experienced group member, it only pays other members to accept its decision when group size is small and the difference in information is large. Democratic decisions are more beneficial primarily because they tend to produce less extreme decisions, rather than because each individual has an influence on the decision per se. Our model suggests that democracy should be widespread and makes quantitative, testable predictions about group decision-making in non-humans.