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Osthaus, B., Proops, L., Hocking, I., & Burden, F. (2013). Spatial cognition and perseveration by horses, donkeys and mules in a simple A-not-B detour task. Animal Cognition, 16(2), 301–305.
Abstract: We investigated perseveration and detour behaviour in 36 equids (Equus caballus, E. asinus, E. caballus × E. asinus) and compared these data to those of a previous study on domestic dogs (Canis familiaris). The animals were required to make a detour through a gap at one end of a straight barrier in order to reach a visible target. After one, two, three or four repeats (A trials), the gap was moved to the opposite end of the barrier (B trials). We recorded initial deviations from the correct solution path and the latency to crossing the barrier. In the A trials, mules crossed the barrier significantly faster than their parental species, the horses and donkeys. In the B trials, following the change of gap location, all species showed a reduction in performance. Both dogs and horses exhibited significant spatial perseveration, going initially to the previous gap location. Donkeys and mules, however, performed at chance level. Our results suggest that hybrid vigour in mules extends to spatial abilities.
Keywords: Equids; Donkeys; Horses; Mules; Dogs; Detour; Spatial reasoning; A-not-B; Perseveration
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Osthaus, B., Marlow, D., & Ducat, P. (2010). Minding the gap: spatial perseveration error in dogs. Anim. Cogn., 13(6), 881-885.
Abstract: We investigated a combination of perseveration and detour behaviour in 50 domestic dogs (Canis familiaris). They were required to make a detour through a gap at one end of a straight barrier in order to reach a target. After one, two, three or four repeats, the gap was moved to the opposite end of the barrier, and the detour behaviour of the dogs was recorded. Although the dogs could solve simple detour tasks (80% correct in the first trial), they committed a perseveration error of following the previously learned route despite the clearly visible change in the location of the gap. This ‘misbehaviour’ occurred in 29 of 30 dogs after only two learning trials. They never reached a 100% correct performance level again even after four runs through the second gap location. The results suggest that dogs are reluctant to unlearn acquired spatial motor responses and reinforced navigation, which has important implications for experimental design, everyday dog training and our understanding of their mental capacities.
Keywords: Biomedical and Life Sciences
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Proops, L., Burden, F., & Osthaus, B. (2009). Mule cognition: a case of hybrid vigour? Anim. Cogn., 12(1), 75–84.
Abstract: Abstract: This study compares the behaviour of the mule (Equus asinus x Equus caballus) with that of its parent species to assess the effects of hybridization on cognition. Six mules, six ponies (E. caballus) and six donkeys (E. asinus) were given a two choice visual discrimination learning task. Each session consisted of 12 trials and pass level was reached when subjects chose the correct stimulus for at least 9 out of the 12 trials in three consecutive sessions. A record was made of how many pairs each subject learnt over 25 sessions. The mules" performance was significantly better than that of either of the parent species (Kruskal-Wallis: Hx = 8.11, P = 0.017). They were also the only group to learn enough pairs to be able to show a successive reduction in the number of sessions required to reach criterion level. This study provides the first empirical evidence that the improved characteristics of mules may be extended from physical attributes to cognitive function.
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Osthaus, B., Lea, S. E. G., & Slater, A. M. (2005). Dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) fail to show understanding of means-end connections in a string-pulling task. Anim. Cogn., 8(1), 37–47.
Abstract: Domestic dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) were tested in four experiments for their understanding of means-end connections. In each of the experiments, the dogs attempted to retrieve a food treat that could be seen behind a barrier and which was connected, via string, to a within-reach wooden block. In the experiments, either one or two strings were present, but the treat was attached only to one string. Successful retrieval of the treat required the animals to pull the appropriate string (either by pawing or by grasping the wooden block in their jaws) until the treat emerged from under the barrier. The results showed that the dogs were successful if the treat was in a perpendicular line to the barrier, i.e. straight ahead, but not when the string was at an angle: in the latter condition, the typical response was a proximity error in that the dogs pawed or mouthed at a location closest in line to the treat. When two strings that crossed were present, the dogs tended to pull on the wrong string. The combined results from the experiments show that, although dogs can learn to pull on a string to obtain food, they do not spontaneously understand means-end connections involving strings.
Keywords: Animals; *Association Learning; *Cognition; Dogs/*psychology; *Problem Solving
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Lea, S. E. G., Goto, K., Osthaus, B., & Ryan, C. M. E. (2006). The logic of the stimulus. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 247–256.
Abstract: This paper examines the contribution of stimulus processing to animal logics. In the classic functionalist S-O-R view of learning (and cognition), stimuli provide the raw material to which the organism applies its cognitive processes-its logic, which may be taxon-specific. Stimuli may contribute to the logic of the organism's response, and may do so in taxon-specific ways. Firstly, any non-trivial stimulus has an internal organization that may constrain or bias the way that the organism addresses it; since stimuli can only be defined relative to the organism's perceptual apparatus, and this apparatus is taxon-specific, such constraints or biases will often be taxon-specific. Secondly, the representation of a stimulus that the perceptual system builds, and the analysis it makes of this representation, may provide a model for the synthesis and analysis done at a more cognitive level. Such a model is plausible for evolutionary reasons: perceptual analysis was probably perfected before cognitive analysis in the evolutionary history of the vertebrates. Like stimulus-driven analysis, such perceptually modelled cognition may be taxon-specific because of the taxon-specificity of the perceptual apparatus. However, it may also be the case that different taxa are able to free themselves from the stimulus logic, and therefore apply a more abstract logic, to different extents. This thesis is defended with reference to two examples of cases where animals' cognitive logic seems to be isomorphic with perceptual logic, specifically in the case of pigeons' attention to global and local information in visual stimuli, and dogs' failure to comprehend means-end relationships in string-pulling tasks.
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