Abstract: We used European starlings, Sturnus vulgaris, to investigate the relationship between the cost paid to obtain food rewards and preference between stimuli associated with the resulting rewards. In no-choice trials either 16 1-m flights (high effort) or four 1-m flights (low effort) gave access to differently coloured keys. Pecking at these keys resulted in identical food rewards. When subjects were given choices between the coloured keys in choice trials without having paid any effort, the majority preferred the coloured key that was paired with the higher level of work in no-choice trials. We relate our findings to results in animal behaviour, psychology and economics, and give a theoretical account that has implications for phenomena variously recognized as the `sunk cost fallacy' (the tendency to invest more in something after much has already been invested), `work ethics' (valuing an option more as a result of physical effort), `cognitive dissonance' (making mental effort to overlook or re-evaluate information that does not accord with a dominant internal representation) and the `Concorde Fallacy' (the readiness to forego more fitness for something that has been responsible for greater fitness compromise in the past).

Abstract: Recent studies have used labels such as `work ethics', `sunk costs' and `state-dependent preferences' for apparent anomalies in animals' choices. They suggest that preference between options relates to the options' history, rather than depending exclusively on the expected payoffs. For instance, European starlings, Sturnus vulgaris, trained to obtain identical food rewards from two sources while in two levels of hunger preferred the food source previously associated with higher hunger, regardless of the birds' state at the time of testing. We extended this experimentally and theoretically by studying starlings choosing between sources that differed not only in history but also in the objective properties (delay until reward) of the payoffs they delivered. Two options (PF and H) were initially presented in single-option sessions when subjects were, respectively, prefed or hungry. While option PF offered a delay until reward of 10 s in all treatments, option H delivered delays of 10, 12.5, 15 and 17.5 s in four treatments. When training was completed, we tested preference between the options. When delays in both options were equal (10 s), the birds strongly preferred H. When delay in H was 17.5 s, the birds were indifferent, with intermediate results for intermediate treatments. Preference was not mediated by disrupted knowledge of the delays. Thus, preferences were driven by past state-dependent gains, rather than by the joint effect of the birds' state at the time of choice and knowledge of the absolute properties of each alternative, as assumed in state-dependent, path-independent models of optimal choice.

Abstract: We present an experiment showing that New Caledonian crows are able to choose tools of the appropriate size for a novel task, without trial-and-error learning. This species is almost unique amongst all animal species (together with a few primates) in the degree of use and manufacture of polymorphic tools in the wild. However, until now, the flexibility of their tool use has not been tested. Flexibility, including the ability to select an appropriate tool for a task, is considered to be a hallmark of complex cognitive adaptations for tool use. In experiment 1, we tested the ability of two captive birds (one male, one female), to select a stick (from a range of lengths provided) matching the distance to food placed in a horizontal transparent pipe. Both birds chose tools matching the distance to their target significantly more often than would be expected by chance. In experiment 2, we used a similar task, but with the tools placed out of sight of the food pipe, such that the birds had to remember the distance of the food before selecting a tool. The task was completed only by the male, who chose a tool of sufficient length significantly more often than chance but did not show a preference for a matching length.

Abstract: Previous observations of a New Caledonian crow (Corvus moneduloides) spontaneously bending wire and using it as a hook [Weir et al. (2002) Science 297:981] have prompted questions about the extent to which these animals 'understand' the physical causality involved in how hooks work and how to make them. To approach this issue we examine how the same subject (“Betty”) performed in three experiments with novel material, which needed to be either bent or unbent in order to function to retrieve food. These tasks exclude the possibility of success by repetition of patterns of movement similar to those employed before. Betty quickly developed novel techniques to bend the material, and appropriately modified it on four of five trials when unbending was required. She did not mechanically apply a previously learned set of movements to the new situations, and instead sought new solutions to each problem. However, the details of her behaviour preclude concluding definitely that she understood and planned her actions: in some cases she probed with the unmodified tools before modifying them, or attempted to use the unmodified (unsuitable) end of the tool after modification. Gauging New Caledonian crows' level of understanding is not yet possible, but the observed behaviour is consistent with a partial understanding of physical tasks at a level that exceeds that previously attained by any other non-human subject, including apes.