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Fragaszy, D., Johnson-Pynn, J., Hirsh, E., & Brakke, K. (2003). Strategic navigation of two-dimensional alley mazes: comparing capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees. Anim. Cogn., 6(3), 149–160.
Abstract: Planning is an important component of cognition that contributes, for example, to efficient movement through space. In the current study we presented novel two-dimensional alley mazes to four chimpanzees and three capuchin monkeys to identify the nature and efficiency of planning in relation to varying task parameters. All the subjects solved more mazes without error than expected by chance, providing compelling evidence that both species planned their choices in some manner. The probability of making a correct choice on mazes designed to be more demanding and presented later in the testing series was higher than on earlier, simpler mazes (chimpanzees), or unchanged (capuchin monkeys), suggesting microdevelopment of strategic choice. Structural properties of the mazes affected both species' choices. Capuchin monkeys were less likely than chimpanzees to take a correct path that initially led away from the goal but that eventually led to the goal. Chimpanzees were more likely to make an error by passing a correct path than by turning onto a wrong path. Chimpanzees and one capuchin made more errors on choices farther in sequence from the goal. Each species corrected errors before running into the end of an alley in approximately 40% of cases. Together, these findings suggest nascent planning abilities in each species, and the prospect for significant development of strategic planning capabilities on tasks presenting multiple simultaneous or sequential spatial relations. The computerized maze paradigm appears well suited to investigate movement planning and spatial perception in human and nonhuman primates alike.
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Johnson-Pynn, J., & Fragaszy, D. M. (2001). Do apes and monkeys rely upon conceptual reversibility? Anim. Cogn., 4(3), 315–324.
Abstract: The ability to seriate nesting cups as a sensorimotor task has posed interesting questions for cognitive scientists. Greenfield et al. [(1972) Cognit Psychol 3:291–310] found parallels between children's combinatorial activity with nesting cups and patterns of phonological and grammatical constructions. The parallels suggested the possibility of a neurally based developmental homology between language and instrumental action [Greenfield (1991) Behav Brain Sci 14:531–595]. Children who predominantly used subassembly, a hierarchical method of combining cups, succeeded at seriating nesting cups more often than those who did not. Greenfield and others [e.g., Piaget and Inhelder (1969) The psychology of the child. Basic Books, New York; DeLoache et al. (1985) Child Dev 56:928–939] argued that success in seriation reflects the child's growing recognition of a reversible relationship: a particular element in a series is conceived of as being smaller than the previous element and larger than the subsequent element. But is a concept of reversibility or a hierarchical form of object manipulation necessary to seriate cups? In this article, we review studies with very young children and nonhuman primates to determine how individuals that do not evidence conceptual reversibility manage the seriation task. We argue that the development of skill in seriation is experientially, rather than conceptually, driven and that it may be unnecessary to link seriation with cognitive conceptions of reversibility or linguistic capacities. Rather, in ordering a set of objects by size, perceptual-motor learning may enable contemplative refinement.
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