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Cuthill, I. C., Kacelnik, A., Krebs, J. R., Haccou, P., & Iwasa, Y. (1990). Starlings exploiting patches: the effect of recent experience on foraging decisions. Anim. Behav., 40(4), 625–640.
Abstract: Laboratory and field experiments have shown that, as predicted by the marginal value model, starlings, Sturnus vulgaris, stay longer in a food patch when the average travel time between patches is long. A laboratory analogue of a patchy environment was used to investigate how starlings respond to rapidly fluctuating changes in travel time in order to find out the length of experience over which information is integrated. When there was a progressive increase in the amount of work required to obtain successive food items in a patch (experiment 1), birds consistently took more prey after long than after short travel times; travel experience before the most recent had no effect on the number of prey taken. Such behaviour does not maximize the rate of energy intake in this environment. The possibility that this is the result of a simple constraint on crop capacity is rejected as, when successive prey were equally easy to obtain up until a stepwise depletion of the patch (experiment 2), birds took equal numbers of prey per visit after long and short travel times: the rate-maximizing behaviour. A series of models are developed to suggest the possible constraints on optimal behaviour that affect starlings in the type of environment mimicked by experiment 1.
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Ohtsuki, H., Iwasa, Y., & Nowak, M. A. (2009). Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment. Nature, 457(7225), 79–82.
Abstract: Indirect reciprocity1, 2, 3, 4, 5 is a key mechanism for the evolution of human cooperation. Our behaviour towards other people depends not only on what they have done to us but also on what they have done to others. Indirect reciprocity works through reputation5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17. The standard model of indirect reciprocity offers a binary choice: people can either cooperate or defect. Cooperation implies a cost for the donor and a benefit for the recipient. Defection has no cost and yields no benefit. Currently there is considerable interest in studying the effect of costly (or altruistic) punishment on human behaviour18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25. Punishment implies a cost for the punished person. Costly punishment means that the punisher also pays a cost. It has been suggested that costly punishment between individuals can promote cooperation. Here we study the role of costly punishment in an explicit model of indirect reciprocity. We analyse all social norms, which depend on the action of the donor and the reputation of the recipient. We allow errors in assigning reputation and study gossip as a mechanism for establishing coherence. We characterize all strategies that allow the evolutionary stability of cooperation. Some of those strategies use costly punishment; others do not. We find that punishment strategies typically reduce the average payoff of the population. Consequently, there is only a small parameter region where costly punishment leads to an efficient equilibrium. In most cases the population does better by not using costly punishment. The efficient strategy for indirect reciprocity is to withhold help for defectors rather than punishing them.
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Uehara, T., Yokomizo, H., & Iwasa, Y. (2005). Mate-choice copying as Bayesian decision making. Am Nat, 165(3), 403–410.
Abstract: Mate-choice copying by females has been reported in fishes (e.g., guppies) and lekking birds. Presumably, females assess males' quality using both information from direct observation of males and information acquired by observing other females' choices. Here, we study mathematically the conditions under which mate-choice copying is advantageous on the basis of Bayesian decision theory. A female may observe the mate choice of another female, called the model female, who has performed an optimal choice based on her own judgment. The conditions required for the focal female to choose the same mate as that chosen by the model female should depend on the male's appearance to her, the reliability of her own judgment of male quality, and the reliability of the model females. When three or more females are involved, the optimal mate choice critically depends on whether multiple model females make decisions independently or they themselves copy the choices of others. If two equally reliable females choose different males, the choice of the second female, made knowing the choice of the first, should have a stronger effect on the choice of the third (focal) female. This “last-choice precedence” should be tested experimentally.
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