Abstract: Many species show considerable variation in behaviour among individuals. We show that some behaviours are largely deterministic and predictable with mathematical models. We propose a general differential equation model of behaviour in field populations and use the methodology to explain and predict the dynamics of sleep and colony attendance in seabirds as a function of environmental factors. Our model explained over half the variability in the data to which it was fitted, and it predicted the dynamics of an independent data set. Differential equation models may provide new approaches to the study of behaviour in animals and humans.

Abstract: Newborn rabbits, Oryctolagus cuniculus, discriminate between different categories of adult conspecifics on the basis of their abdominal odour cues. Whether these cues can support the development of filial preferences has not been adequately tested. Using a two-choice paradigm, we assessed the ability of 3-8-day-old pups to orient selectively to the mother versus an unfamiliar female, either spontaneously or after odour conditioning. In experiment 1, nonconditioned pups roamed indifferently over the mother and an unfamiliar female. In experiment 2, pups conditioned to a neutral odorant while nursing or with the mammary pheromone became attracted by the odorant. In experiment 3, pups that had learned the odorant while nursing oriented for longer to any female carrying it, but the unscented mother and a scented unfamiliar female were equally attractive. Finally, in experiment 4, pups that had learned the odorant paired with the mammary pheromone showed a preference for their scented mother, but not systematically for a scented unfamiliar female; furthermore, they were equally attracted by the unscented mother and a scented unfamiliar female. In sum, pups did not spontaneously evince an olfactory preference for the mother when opposed to an unfamiliar female, although they seemed able to detect individual maternal odours. In fact, they appeared to react to both species-specific cues and individual cues that they had learned, and their responses depended on their degree of familiarity with the cues and on the context. The mammary pheromone by itself might act as both a releasing and a reinforcing signal in these early socially oriented behaviours.

Abstract: A theoretical analysis is made of the evolution of behavioural strategies in contest situations. It is assumed that behaviour will evolve so as to maximize individual fitness. If so, a population will evolve an [`]evolutionarily stable strategy', or ESS, which can be defined as a strategy such that, if all members of a population adopt it, no [`]mutant' strategy can do better. A number of simple models of contest situations are analysed from this point of view. It is concluded that in [`]symmetric' contests the ESS is likely to be a [`]mixed' strategy; that is, either the population will be genetically polymorphic or individuals will be behaviourally variable. Most real contests are probably asymmetric, either in pay-off to the contestants, or in size or weapons, or in some [`]uncorrelated' fashion; i.e. in a fashion which does not substantially bias either the pay-offs or the likely outcome of an escalated contest. An example of an uncorrelated asymmetry is that between the [`]discoverer' of a resource and a [`]late-comer'. It is shown that the ESS in asymmetric contests will usually be to permit the asymmetric cue to settle the contest without escalation. Escalated contests will, however, occur if information to the contestants about the asymmetry is imperfect.

Abstract: One of the big challenges for group-living animals is to find out who in a group has pertinent information (regarding food or predators) at any moment in time, because informed individuals may not be obviously recognizable to other group members. We found that individuals in human groups were capable of identifying those with information, and this identification increased group performance: the speed and accuracy of groups in reaching a target. Using video analysis we found how informed individuals might have been identified by other group members by means of inadvertent social cues (such as starting order, time spent following and group position). Furthermore, we were able to show that at least one of these cues, the group position of informed individuals, was indeed correlated with group performance. Our final experiment confirmed that leadership was even more efficient when the group members were given the identity of the leader. We discuss the effect of information status regarding the presence and identity of leaders on collective animal behaviour.

Abstract: It was formerly argued that alternative evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) are possible for animal contests characterized by some asymmetry that can be perceived with perfect accuracy. Where roles A and B refer to the asymmetry between opponents, ESSs are: [`]fight when A, retreat when B', and vice versa. Either can be an ESS, but only if the [`]reserve strategy' (=what an animal does when it fights) is sufficiently damaging. We examine the [`]war of attrition' (winner = opponent that persists longer). In a population at either ESS, reserve strategy is never normally shown; it is therefore subject to drift unless the selective action of rare individuals which break the convention is considered. These could arise either by mutation or by mistakes in role assessment. When mutations and mistakes simply specify that occasionally an animal fights when it [`]should' retreat, selection adjusts reserve strategy to a level where only one ESS (the [`]commonsense' ESS) is possible, if the asymmetry is relevant to payoff. Thus for asymmetries in fighting ability or resource value, the individual with the lower score will retreat. However, we are particularly concerned with cases where both payoff-relevant aspects (fighting ability and resource value) are asymmetric. If opponents sustain contest costs at rates KA and KB, and their resource values are VA and VB, an [`]optimal assessor' strategy defined by the interaction between the two asymmetries, is a unique ESS. It obeys the rule [`]fight on estimating role A, where VA/KA>VB/KB; retreat in B'. If mistakes can occur in both roles, but are very rate, the ESS is not fundamentally altered though there will be infinitesimal tendencies for persisting in role B. Selection to improve assessment abilities intensifies as abilities improve, but is weak if roles A and B are rather similar. Over a range of similarity between roles, an [`]owner wins' convention may be adopted if ownership correlates positively with role A and an individual cannot tell when it would otherwise pay him to break the convention. We also examine a contest in which information about roles can be acquired only during a contest itself, and at a cost. Much depends on the rate at which information is acquired relative to the rate at which costs are expended, and on whether contests normally escalate in intensity, remain at the same level, or de-escalate. Selection favours short contests when costs are high relative to resource value, where the outcome of a round contains much information about fighting ability, and where the actual disparity in fighting ability is large.