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Dugatkin, L. A. (1998). A comment on Lafleur et al.'s re-evaluation of mate-choice copying in guppies. Anim. Behav., 56(2), 513–514.
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Wilson, D. S., & Dugatkin, L. A. (1996). A reply to Lombardi & Hurlbert. Anim. Behav., 52(2), 423–425.
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Chase, I. D., Bartolomeo, C., & Dugatkin, L. A. (1994). Aggressive interactions and inter-contest interval: how long do winners keep winning? Anim. Behav., 48(2), 393–400.
Abstract: Abstract. Considerable evidence across many taxa demonstrates that prior social experience affects the outcome of subsequent aggressive interactions. Although the 'loser effect', in which an individual losing one encounter is likely to lose the next, is relatively well understood, studies of the 'winner effect', in which winning one encounter increases the probability of winning the next, have produced mixed results. Earlier studies differ concerning whether a winner effect exists, and if it does, how long it lasts. The variation in results, however, may arise from different inter-contest intervals and procedures for selecting contestants employed across previous studies. These methodological differences are addressed through a series of experiments using randomly selected winners and three different inter-contest intervals in the pumpkinseed sunfish, Lepomis gibbosus. The results indicate that a winner effect does in fact exist in pumpkinseed sunfish, but that it only lasts between 15 and 60 min. Based on these results, predictions about the behavioural dynamics of hierarchy formation are discussed, and it is suggested that it may be impossible, in principle, to predict the outcome of dominance interactions between some individuals before they are actually assembled to form a group. Finally, the possible mechanisms underlying the winner effect are explored.
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Dugatkin, L. A. (2002). Animal cooperation among unrelated individuals. Naturwissenschaften, 89(12), 533–541.
Abstract: The evolution of cooperation has long been a topic near and dear to the hearts of behavioral and evolutionary ecologists. Cooperative behaviors run the gamut from fairly simple to very complicated and there are a myriad of ways to study cooperation. Here I shall focus on three paths that have been delineated in the study of intraspecific cooperation among unrelated individuals: reciprocity, byproduct mutualism, and group selection. In each case, I attempt to delineate the theory underlying each of these paths and then provide examples from the empirical literature. In addition, I shall briefly touch upon some recent work that has attempted to examine (or re-examine) the role of cognition and phylogeny in the study of cooperative behavior. While empirical and theoretical work has made significant strides in the name of better understanding the evolution and maintenance of cooperative behavior in animals, much work remains for the future. “From the point of view of the moralist, the animal world is on about the same level as the gladiator's show. The creatures are fairly well treated, and set to fight; whereby the strongest, the swiftest and the cunningest live to fight another day. The spectator has no need to turn his thumb down, as no quarter is given em leader the weakest and the stupidest went to the wall, while the toughest and the shrewdest, those who were best fitted to cope with their circumstances, but not the best in any other way, survived. Life was a continuous free fight, and em leader a war of each against all was the normal state of existence.” (Huxley 1888)
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Dugatkin, L. A., Mesterton-Gibbons, M., & Houston, A. I. (1992). Beyond the prisoner's dilemma: Toward models to discriminate among mechanisms of cooperation in nature. Trends Evol. Ecol., 7, 202–205.
Abstract: The iterated prisoner's dilemma game, or IPD, has now established itself as the orthodox paradigm for theoretical investigations of the evolution of cooperation; but its scope is restricted to reciprocity, which is only one of three categories of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Even within that category, a cooperative encounter has in general three phases, and the IPD has nothing to say about two of them. To distinguish among mechanisms of cooperation in nature, future theoretical work on the evolution of cooperation must distance itself from economics and develop games as a refinement of ethology's comparative approach.
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Dugatkin, L. A. (1998). Breaking up fights between others: a model of intervention behaviour. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B, 265(1394), 433–437.
Abstract: To examine when and why animals break up fights between others in their group, I modelled whether ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ effects might be one element driving the evolution of intervention behaviour. I considered one particular type of intervention: when the intervener simply breaks up fights between two others, but does not favour either party in so doing. When victories at time T + 1 are more likely given a victory at time T (i.e. winner effects), intervention is often favoured. Intervention is favoured in these circumstances because the intervening party in essence stops others from ‘getting on a roll’ and climbing up any hierarchy that exists. However, when loser effects alone are at work (defeats at time T + 1 are more likely given a defeat at time T), breaking up fights between others is never selected. If both winner and loser effects are operating simultaneously, then the likelihood of intervention behaviour evolving is a function of the relative strength of these two effects. The greater the winner effect relative to the loser effect, the more likely intervention behaviour is to evolve.
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Dugatkin, L. A. (2001). Bystander effects and the structure of dominance hierarchies. Behav. Ecol., 12(3), 348–352.
Abstract: Prior modeling work has found that pure winner and loser effects (i.e., changing the estimation of your own fighting ability as a function of direct prior experience) can have important consequences for hierarchy formation. Here these models are extended to incorporate “bystander effects.” When bystander effects are in operation, observers (i.e., bystanders) of aggressive interactions change their assessment of the protagonists' fighting abilities (depending on who wins and who loses). Computer simulations demonstrate that when bystander winner effects alone are at play, groups have a clear omega (bottom-ranking individual), while the relative position of other group members remains difficult to determine. When only bystander loser effects are in operation, wins and losses are randomly distributed throughout a group (i.e., no discernible hierarchy). When pure and bystander winner effects are jointly in place, a linear hierarchy, in which all positions (i.e., {alpha} to {delta} when N = 4) are clearly defined, emerges. Joint pure and bystander loser effects produce the same result. In principle one could test the predictions from the models developed here in a straightforward comparative study. Hopefully, the results of this model will spur on such studies in the future.
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Dugatkin, L. A., & Wilson, D. S. (1994). Choice experiments and cognition: a reply to Lamprecht & Hofer. Anim. Behav., 47(6), 1459–1461.
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Johnstone, R. A., & Dugatkin, L. A. (2000). Coalition formation in animals and the nature of winner and loser effects. Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci., 267(1438), 17–21.
Abstract: Coalition formation has been documented in a diverse array of taxa, yet there has been little formal analysis of polyadic interactions such as coalitions. Here, we develop an optimality model which examines the role of winner and loser effects in shaping coalition formation. We demonstrate that the predicted patterns of alliances are strongly dependent on the way in which winner and loser effects change with contestant strength. When winner and loser effects decrease with the resource-holding power (RHP) of the combatants, coalitions will be favoured between the strongest members of a group, but not between the weakest. If, in contrast, winner and loser effects increase with RHP, exactly the opposite predictions emerge. All other things being equal, intervention is more likely to prove worthwhile when the beneficiary of the aid is weaker (and its opponent is stronger), because the beneficiary is then less likely to win without help. Consequently, intervention is more probable when the impact of victory on the subsequent performance of a combatant increases with that individual's strength because this selects for intervention in favour of weaker combatants. The published literature on hierarchy formation does not reveal how winner and loser effects actually change with contestant strength and we therefore hope that our model will spur others to collect such data; in this light we suggest an experiment which will help to elucidate the nature of winner and loser effects and their impact on coalition formation in animals.
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Dugatkin, L. A., & Mesterton-Gibbons, M. (1996). Cooperation among unrelated individuals: reciprocal altruism, by-product mutualism and group selection in fishes. Biosystems, 37(1-2), 19–30.
Abstract: Cooperation among unrelated individuals can evolve not only via reciprocal altruism but also via trait-group selection or by-product mutualism (or some combination of all three categories). Therefore the (iterated) prisoner's dilemma is an insufficient paradigm for studying the evolution of cooperation. We replace this game by the cooperator's dilemma, which is more versatile because it enables all three categories of cooperative behavior to be examined within the framework of a single theory. Controlled studies of cooperation among fish provide examples of each category of cooperation. Specifically, we describe reciprocal altruism among simultaneous hermaphrodites that swap egg parcels, group-selected cooperation among fish that inspect dangerous predators and by-product mutualism in the cooperative foraging of coral-reef fish.
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