|
Tomasello, M., & Call, J. (2004). The role of humans in the cognitive development of apes revisited. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 213–215.
|
|
Tomasello, M., & Call, J. (2006). Do chimpanzees know what others see ? or only what they are looking at? In M. Nudds, & S. Hurley (Eds.), Rational Animals? (pp. 371–384). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
|
|
Hare, B., Rosati, A., Kaminski, J., Bräuer, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2010). The domestication hypothesis for dogs' skills with human communication: a response to Udell et al. (2008) and Wynne et al. (2008). Anim Behav, 79.
|
|
Tennie, C., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2012). Untrained chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii) fail to imitate novel actions. PLoS One, 7.
|
Call, J. (2002). A fish-eye lens for comparative studies: broadening the scope of animal cognition. Anim. Cogn., 5(1), 15–16.
Abstract: ? is the article no longer available?
|
Kaminski, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2004). Body orientation and face orientation: two factors controlling apes' behavior from humans. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 216–223.
Abstract: A number of animal species have evolved the cognitive ability to detect when they are being watched by other individuals. Precisely what kind of information they use to make this determination is unknown. There is particular controversy in the case of the great apes because different studies report conflicting results. In experiment 1, we presented chimpanzees, orangutans, and bonobos with a situation in which they had to request food from a human observer who was in one of various attentional states. She either stared at the ape, faced the ape with her eyes closed, sat with her back towards the ape, or left the room. In experiment 2, we systematically crossed the observer's body and face orientation so that the observer could have her body and/or face oriented either towards or away from the subject. Results indicated that apes produced more behaviors when they were being watched. They did this not only on the basis of whether they could see the experimenter as a whole, but they were sensitive to her body and face orientation separately. These results suggest that body and face orientation encode two different types of information. Whereas face orientation encodes the observer's perceptual access, body orientation encodes the observer's disposition to transfer food. In contrast to the results on body and face orientation, only two of the tested subjects responded to the state of the observer's eyes.
|
Mersmann, D., Tomasello, M., Call, J., Kaminski, J., & Taborsky, M. (2011). Simple Mechanisms Can Explain Social Learning in Domestic Dogs (Canis familiaris). Ethology, 117(8), 675–690.
Abstract: Abstract Recent studies have suggested that domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) engage in highly complex forms of social learning. Here, we critically assess the potential mechanisms underlying social learning in dogs using two problem-solving tasks. In a classical detour task, the test dogs benefited from observing a demonstrator walking around a fence to obtain a reward. However, even inexperienced dogs did not show a preference for passing the fence at the same end as the demonstrator. Furthermore, dogs did not need to observe a complete demonstration by a human demonstrator to pass the task. Instead, they were just as successful in solving the problem after seeing a partial demonstration by an object passing by at the end of the fence. In contrast to earlier findings, our results suggest that stimulus enhancement (or affordance learning) might be a powerful social learning mechanism used by dogs to solve such detour problems. In the second task, we examined whether naïve dogs copy actions to solve an instrumental problem. After controlling for stimulus enhancement and other forms of social influence (e.g. social facilitation and observational conditioning), we found that dogs’ problem solving was not influenced by witnessing a skilful demonstrator (either an unknown human, a conspecific or the dog’s owner). Together, these results add to evidence suggesting that social learning may often be explained by relatively simple (but powerful) mechanisms.
|
Call, J. (2003). Beyond learning fixed rules and social cues: abstraction in the social arena. Phil. Trans. Biol. Sci., 358(1435), 1189–1196.
Abstract: Abstraction is a central idea in many areas of physical comparative cognition such as categorization, numerical competence or problem solving. This idea, however, has rarely been applied to comparative social cognition. In this paper, I propose that the notion of abstraction can be applied to the social arena and become an important tool to investigate the social cognition and behaviour processes in animals. To make this point, I present recent evidence showing that chimpanzees know about what others can see and about what others intend. These data do not fit either low-level mechanisms based on stimulus-response associations or high-level explanations based on metarepresentational mechanisms such as false belief attribution. Instead, I argue that social abstraction, in particular the development of concepts such as seeing in others, is key to explaining the behaviour of our closest relative in a variety of situations.
|
Hare, B., Addessi, E., Call, J., Tomasello, M., & Visalberghi, E. (2003). Do capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella, know what conspecifics do and do not see? Anim. Behav., 65(1), 131–142.
Abstract: Capuchin monkeys were tested in five experiments in which two individuals competed over food. When given a choice between retrieving a piece of food that was visible or hidden from the dominant, subordinate animals preferred to retrieve hidden food. This preference is consistent with the hypotheses that either (1) the subordinate knew what the dominant could and could not see or (2) the subordinate was monitoring the behaviour of the dominant and avoiding the piece of food that it approached. To test between these alternatives, we released subordinates with a slight head start forcing them to make their choice (between a piece of food hidden or visible to the dominant) before the dominant entered the area. Unlike chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, subordinates that were given a head start did not preferentially approach hidden pieces of food first. Therefore, our experiments provide little support for the hypothesis that capuchin monkeys are sensitive to what another individual does or does not see. We compare our results with those obtained with chimpanzees in the same paradigm and discuss the evolution of primate social cognition. Copyright 2003 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
|
Bräuer, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Chimpanzees do not take into account what others can hear in a competitive situation. Anim. Cogn., 11(1), 1435–9448.
Abstract: Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) know what others can and cannot see in a competitive situation. Does this reflect a general understanding the perceptions of others` In a study by Hare et al. (2000) pairs of chimpanzees competed over two pieces of food. Subordinate individuals preferred to approach food that was behind a barrier that the dominant could not see, suggesting that chimpanzees can take the visual perspective of others. We extended this paradigm to the auditory modality to investigate whether chimpanzees are sensitive to whether a competitor can hear food rewards being hidden. Results suggested that the chimpanzees did not take what the competitor had heard into account, despite being able to locate the hiding place themselves by the noise.
|
