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Byrne, R. W. (2000). How monkeys find their way: leadership, coordination, and cognitive maps of African baboons. In S. Boinski, & P. A. Garber (Eds.), On the Move: How and Why Animals Travel in Groups (pp. 491–518). Chicago: Chicago University Press.
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Byrne, R. W. (1999). Imitation without intentionality. Using string parsing to copy the organization of behaviour. Anim. Cogn., 2(2), 63–72.
Abstract: A theory of imitation is proposed, string parsing, which separates the copying of behavioural organization by observation from an understanding of the cause of its effectiveness. In string parsing, recurring patterns in the visible stream of behaviour are detected and used to build a statistical sketch of the underlying hierarchical structure. This statistical sketch may in turn aid the subsequent comprehension of cause and effect. Three cases of social learning of relatively complex skills are examined, as potential cases of imitation by string parsing. Understanding the basic requirements for successful string parsing helps to resolve the conflict between mainly negative reports of imitation in experiments and more positive evidence from natural conditions. Since string parsing does not depend on comprehension of the intentions of other agents or the everyday physics of objects, separate tests of these abilities are needed even in animals shown to learn by imitation.
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Byrne, R. W., Corp, N., & Byrne, J. M. (2001). Manual dexterity in the gorilla: bimanual and digit role differentiation in a natural task. Anim. Cogn., 4(3), 347–361.
Abstract: The manipulative actions of mountain gorillas Gorilla g. beringei were examined in the context of foraging on hard-to-process plant foods in the field, in particular those used in tackling thistle Carduus nyassanus. A repertoire of 72 functionally distinct manipulative actions was recorded. Many of these actions were used in several variants of grip, finger(s) and movement path, both by different individuals and by the same individual at different times. The repertoire appears somewhat greater than that observed in comparable studies of monkeys, but a far more striking difference is found in the use of differentiated actions in concert. Mountain gorillas routinely and frequently deal with problems that involve: (1) bimanual role differentiation, with the two hands taking different roles but synchronized in time and space, and (2) digit role differentiation, with independent control of parts of the same hand used for separate purposes at the same time. The independent control that allows these abilities, so crucial to human manual constructional ability, is apparently general in African great apes. Role differentiation, between and within the hand, is evidently a primitive characteristic in the human arsenal of skills.
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Bates, L. A., Sayialel, K. N., Njiraini, N. W., Poole, J. H., Moss, C. J., & Byrne, R. W. (2008). African elephants have expectations about the locations of out-of-sight family members. Biol Lett, 4(1), 34–36.
Abstract: Monitoring the location of conspecifics may be important to social mammals. Here, we use an expectancy-violation paradigm to test the ability of African elephants (Loxodonta africana) to keep track of their social companions from olfactory cues. We presented elephants with samples of earth mixed with urine from female conspecifics that were either kin or unrelated to them, and either unexpected or highly predictable at that location. From behavioural measurements of the elephants' reactions, we show that African elephants can recognize up to 17 females and possibly up to 30 family members from cues present in the urine-earth mix, and that they keep track of the location of these individuals in relation to themselves.
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Held, S., Baumgartner, J., Kilbride, A., Byrne, R. W., & Mendl, M. (2005). Foraging behaviour in domestic pigs (Sus scrofa): remembering and prioritizing food sites of different value. Anim. Cogn., 8(2), 114–121.
Abstract: This experiment investigated whether domestic pigs can remember the locations of food sites of different relative value, and how a restricted retrieval choice affects their foraging behaviour. Nine juvenile female pigs were trained to relocate two food sites out of a possible eight in a spatial memory task. The two baited sites contained different amounts of food and an obstacle was added to the smaller amount to increase handling time. On each trial, a pig searched for the two baited sites (search visit). Once it had found and eaten the bait, it returned for a second (relocation) visit, in which the two same sites were baited. Baited sites were changed between trials. All subjects learnt the task. When allowed to retrieve both baits, the subjects showed no preference for retrieving a particular one first (experiment 1). When they were allowed to retrieve only one bait, a significant overall preference for retrieving the larger amount emerged across subjects (experiment 2). To test whether this preference reflected an avoidance of the obstacle with the smaller bait, 15 choice-restricted control trials were conducted. In control trials obstacles were present with both baits. Pigs continued to retrieve the larger bait, indicating they had discriminated between the two food sites on the basis of quantity or profitability and adjusted their behaviour accordingly when the relocation choice was restricted. This suggests for the first time that domestic pigs have the ability to discriminate between food sites of different relative value and to remember their respective locations.
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Topál, J., Byrne, R. W., Miklósi, Á., & Csányi, V. (2006). Reproducing human actions and action sequences: “Do as I Do!” in a dog. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 355–367.
Abstract: We present evidence that a dog (Philip, a 4-year-old tervueren) was able to use different human actions as samples against which to match his own behaviour. First, Philip was trained to repeat nine human-demonstrated actions on command ('Do it!'). When his performance was markedly over chance in response to demonstration by one person, testing with untrained action sequences and other demonstrators showed some ability to generalise his understanding of copying. In a second study, we presented Philip with a sequence of human actions, again using the 'Do as I do' paradigm. All demonstrated actions had basically the same structure: the owner picked up a bottle from one of six places; transferred it to one of the five other places and then commanded the dog ('Do it!'). We found that Philip duplicated the entire sequence of moving a specific object from one particular place to another more often than expected by chance. Although results point to significant limitations in his imitative abilities, it seems that the dog could have recognized the action sequence, on the basis of observation alone, in terms of the initial state, the means, and the goal. This suggests that dogs might acquire abilities by observation that enhance their success in complex socio-behavioural situations.
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Held, S., Mendl, M., Devereux, C., & Byrne, R. W. (2001). Studies in Social Cognition: From Primates to Pigs. Animal Welfare, 10, 209–217.
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Whiten, A., & Byrne, R. W. (1988). Tactical deception in primates. Behav. Brain Sci., 11(02), 233–244.
Abstract: ABSTRACT Tactical deception occurs when an individual is able to use an “honest” act from his normal repertoire in a different context to mislead familiar individuals. Although primates have a reputation for social skill, most primate groups are so intimate that any deception is likely to be subtle and infrequent. Published records are sparse and often anecdotal. We have solicited new records from many primatologists and searched for repeating patterns. This has revealed several different forms of deceptive tactic, which we classify in terms of the function they perform. For each class, we sketch the features of another individual's state of mind that an individual acting with deceptive intent must be able to represent, thus acting as a “natural psychologist.” Our analysis will sharpen attention to apparent taxonomic differences. Before these findings can be generalized, however, behavioral scientists must agree on some fundamental methodological and theoretical questions in the study of the evolution of social cognition.
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Byrne, R. W., & Bates, L. A. (2006). Why are animals cognitive? Curr Biol, 16(12), R445–8.
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Cochet, H., & Byrne, R. W. (2013). Evolutionary origins of human handedness: evaluating contrasting hypotheses. Animal Cognition, 16(4), 531–542.
Abstract: Variation in methods and measures, resulting in past dispute over the existence of population handedness in nonhuman great apes, has impeded progress into the origins of human right-handedness and how it relates to the human hallmark of language. Pooling evidence from behavioral studies, neuroimaging and neuroanatomy, we evaluate data on manual and cerebral laterality in humans and other apes engaged in a range of manipulative tasks and in gestural communication. A simplistic human/animal partition is no longer tenable, and we review four (nonexclusive) possible drivers for the origin of population-level right-handedness: skilled manipulative activity, as in tool use; communicative gestures; organizational complexity of action, in particular hierarchical structure; and the role of intentionality in goal-directed action. Fully testing these hypotheses will require developmental and evolutionary evidence as well as modern neuroimaging data.
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