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Allen, C., & Bekoff, M. (2007). Animal Minds, Cognitive Ethology, and Ethics. The Journal of Ethics, 11, 299–317.
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Bekoff, M. (2006). Animal Passions And Beastly Virtues: Cognitive Ethology As The Unifying Science For Understanding The Subjective, Emotional, Empathic, And Moral Lives Of Animals. Zygon, 41, 71–104.
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Bekoff, M. (1994). Cognitive Ethology and the Treatment of Non-Human Animals: How Mati'ers of Mind Inform Mati'ers of Welfare. Animal Welfare, 3, 75–96.
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Daniels, T. J., & Bekoff, M. (1989). Feralization: The making of wild domestic animals. Behav. Process., 19(1-3), 79–94.
Abstract: The widely accepted viewpoint that feralization is the reverse of domestication requires that the feralization process be restricted to populations of animals and, therefore, cannot occur in individuals. An alternative, ontogenetic approach is presented in which feralization is defined as the process by which individual domestic animals either become desocialized from humans, or never become socialized, and thus behave as untamed, non-domestic animals. Feralization will vary among species and, intraspecifically, will depend upon an individual's age and history of socialization to humans. Because feralization is not equated with morphological change resulting from evolutionary processes, species formation is not an accurate indicator of feral condition.
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Dugatkin, L. A., & Bekoff, M. (2003). Play and the evolution of fairness: a game theory model. Behav. Process., 60(3), 209–214.
Abstract: Bekoff [J. Consci. Stud. 8 (2001) 81] argued that mammalian social play is a useful behavioral phenotype on which to concentrate in order to learn more about the evolution of fairness. Here, we build a game theoretical model designed to formalize some of the ideas laid out by Bekoff, and to examine whether `fair' strategies can in fact be evolutionarily stable. The models we present examine fairness at two different developmental stages during an individual's ontogeny, and hence we create four strategies--fair at time 1/fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/fair at time 2. Our results suggest that when considering species where fairness can be expressed during two different developmental stages, acting fairly should be more common than never acting fairly. In addition, when no one strategy was evolutionarily stable, we found that all four strategies we model can coexist at evolutionary equilibrium. Even in the absence of an overwhelming database from which to test our model, the general predictions we make have significant implications for the evolution of fairness.
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