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Zentall TR, & Levine JM. (1972). Observational learning and social facilitation in the rat. Science, 178, 1220.
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Zajonc, R. B. (1965). Social Facilitation. Science, 149(3681), 269–274.
Abstract: 300 Multiple ChoicesThis is a pdf-only article and there is no markup to show you.full-text.pdf
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Wood, J. N., Glynn, D. D., Phillips, B. C., & Hauser, M. D. (2007). The Perception of Rational, Goal-Directed Action in Nonhuman Primates. Science, 317(5843), 1402–1405.
Abstract: Humans are capable of making inferences about other individuals' intentions and goals by evaluating their actions in relation to the constraints imposed by the environment. This capacity enables humans to go beyond the surface appearance of behavior to draw inferences about an individual's mental states. Presently unclear is whether this capacity is uniquely human or is shared with other animals. We show that cotton-top tamarins, rhesus macaques, and chimpanzees all make spontaneous inferences about a human experimenter's goal by attending to the environmental constraints that guide rational action. These findings rule out simple associative accounts of action perception and show that our capacity to infer rational, goal-directed action likely arose at least as far back as the New World monkeys, some 40 million years ago.
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Wood, J. N., Glynn, D. D., Phillips, B. C., & Hauser, M. D. (2007). online material (Vol. 317).
Abstract: Humans are capable of making inferences about other individuals' intentions and goals by evaluating their actions in relation to the constraints imposed by the environment. This capacity enables humans to go beyond the surface appearance of behavior to draw inferences about an individual's mental states. Presently unclear is whether this capacity is uniquely human or is shared with other animals. We show that cotton-top tamarins, rhesus macaques, and chimpanzees all make spontaneous inferences about a human experimenter's goal by attending to the environmental constraints that guide rational action. These findings rule out simple associative accounts of action perception and show that our capacity to infer rational, goal-directed action likely arose at least as far back as the New World monkeys, some 40 million years ago.
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Williams, N. (1997). Evolutionary psychologists look for roots of cognition (Vol. 275).
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Weir, A. A. S., Chappell, J., & Kacelnik, A. (2002). Shaping of hooks in New Caledonian crows. Science, 297(5583), 981.
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Vlajkoviç, S., Nikoliç, V., Nikoliç, A., Milanoviç, S. žA., & Jankoviç, B. D. (1994). Asymmetrical Modulation of Immune Reactivity in Left- and Right-Biased Rats After Ipsilateral Ablation of the Prefrontal, Parietal and Occipital Brain Neocortex. International Journal of Neuroscience, 78(1-2), 123–134.
Abstract: We report here on the lateralized brain immunomodulation in male Wistar rats, a phenomenon related to the rotational bias of animal and the site of cortical lesion. Rats assigned to left- and right-rotators in a cylindrical Plexiglass rotometer were subjected to the ablation of the ipsilateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), parietal cortex (PC) and occipital cortex (OC) and sensitized with bovine serum albumin (BSA) in complete Freund's adjuvant. Intact and sham-lesioned left-biased animals demonstrated increased Arthus and delayed hypersensitivity skin reactions and antibody production to BSA in comparison with corresponding right-biased animals. PFC ablation decreased humoral and cellular immune responses to BSA in left- but increased in right-biased rats. Lesioning of PC decreased humoral immune reactions in left- but increased in right-rotating animals. OC ablation failed to produce immunological abnormalities, These results suggest that immunopotentiation is associated with the left neocortex, and immunosuppression with the right neocortex. The prefrontal cortex appears to be particularly associated with immune reactions.
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van Breda, E. (2006). A non-natural head-neck position (rollkur) during training results in less acute stress in elite trained dressage horses. Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science, 9(1), 59–64.
Abstract: This study measured parameters of stress in recreational, trained horses (REC; n = 7) and elite (International Grand Prix level) trained, dressage horses (DRES; n = 5). The training of the DRES horses uses an unnatural head?neck position (Rollkur), whereas in the REC horses such training techniques are not common. The study measured stress by using heart rate variability analysis for 30 min postfeeding in the morning and 30 min postexercise after a morning training session. The study found no significant difference at rest between the REC and DRES horses. During the posttraining measurements, however, the DRES horses showed, among others, a less sympathetic and increased parasympathetic dominance. These results suggest that DRES horses tend to have less acute stress than do REC horses postexercise. The findings of this study suggest maintaining the health and well-being of DRES horses despite nonnatural, biomechanical positions.
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Thornton, A., & McAuliffe, K. (2006). Teaching in wild meerkats. Science, 313(5784), 227–229.
Abstract: Despite the obvious benefits of directed mechanisms that facilitate the efficient transfer of skills, there is little critical evidence for teaching in nonhuman animals. Using observational and experimental data, we show that wild meerkats (Suricata suricatta) teach pups prey-handling skills by providing them with opportunities to interact with live prey. In response to changing pup begging calls, helpers alter their prey-provisioning methods as pups grow older, thus accelerating learning without the use of complex cognition. The lack of evidence for teaching in species other than humans may reflect problems in producing unequivocal support for the occurrence of teaching, rather than the absence of teaching.
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Subiaul, F., Cantlon, J. F., Holloway, R. L., & Terrace, H. S. (2004). Cognitive imitation in rhesus macaques. Science, 305(5682), 407–410.
Abstract: Experiments on imitation typically evaluate a student's ability to copy some feature of an expert's motor behavior. Here, we describe a type of observational learning in which a student copies a cognitive rule rather than a specific motor action. Two rhesus macaques were trained to respond, in a prescribed order, to different sets of photographs that were displayed on a touch-sensitive monitor. Because the position of the photographs varied randomly from trial to trial, sequences could not be learned by motor imitation. Both monkeys learned new sequences more rapidly after observing an expert execute those sequences than when they had to learn new sequences entirely by trial and error.
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