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Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2002). What are big brains for? Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 99(7), 4141–4142.
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Jansen, T., Forster, P., Levine, M. A., Oelke, H., Hurles, M., Renfrew, C., et al. (2002). Mitochondrial DNA and the origins of the domestic horse. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 99(16), 10905–10910.
Abstract: The place and date of the domestication of the horse has long been a matter for debate among archaeologists. To determine whether horses were domesticated from one or several ancestral horse populations, we sequenced the mitochondrial D-loop for 318 horses from 25 oriental and European breeds, including American mustangs. Adding these sequences to previously published data, the total comes to 652, the largest currently available database. From these sequences, a phylogenetic network was constructed that showed that most of the 93 different mitochondrial (mt)DNA types grouped into 17 distinct phylogenetic clusters. Several of the clusters correspond to breeds and/or geographic areas, notably cluster A2, which is specific to Przewalski's horses, cluster C1, which is distinctive for northern European ponies, and cluster D1, which is well represented in Iberian and northwest African breeds. A consideration of the horse mtDNA mutation rate together with the archaeological timeframe for domestication requires at least 77 successfully breeding mares recruited from the wild. The extensive genetic diversity of these 77 ancestral mares leads us to conclude that several distinct horse populations were involved in the domestication of the horse.
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Amé, J. - M., Halloy, J., Rivault, C., Detrain, C., & Deneubourg, J. L. (2006). Collegial decision making based on social amplification leads to optimal group formation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 103(15), 5835–5840.
Abstract: Group-living animals are often faced with choosing between one or more alternative resource sites. A central question in such collective decision making includes determining which individuals induce the decision and when. This experimental and theoretical study of shelter selection by cockroach groups demonstrates that choices can emerge through nonlinear interaction dynamics between equal individuals without perfect knowledge or leadership. We identify a simple mechanism whereby a decision is taken on the move with limited information and signaling and without comparison of available opportunities. This mechanism leads to optimal mean benefit for group individuals. Our model points to a generic self-organized collective decision-making process independent of animal species.
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Drea, C. M., & Wallen, K. (1999). Low-status monkeys “play dumb” when learning in mixed social groups. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 96(22), 12965–12969.
Abstract: Many primates, including humans, live in complex hierarchical societies where social context and status affect daily life. Nevertheless, primate learning studies typically test single animals in limited laboratory settings where the important effects of social interactions and relationships cannot be studied. To investigate the impact of sociality on associative learning, we compared the individual performances of group-tested rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) across various social contexts. We used a traditional discrimination paradigm that measures an animal's ability to form associations between cues and the obtaining of food in choice situations; but we adapted the task for group testing. After training a 55-member colony to separate on command into two subgroups, composed of either high- or low-status families, we exposed animals to two color discrimination problems, one with all monkeys present (combined condition), the other in their “dominant” and “subordinate” cohorts (split condition). Next, we manipulated learning history by testing animals on the same problems, but with the social contexts reversed. Monkeys from dominant families excelled in all conditions, but subordinates performed well in the split condition only, regardless of learning history. Subordinate animals had learned the associations, but expressed their knowledge only when segregated from higher-ranking animals. Because aggressive behavior was rare, performance deficits probably reflected voluntary inhibition. This experimental evidence of rank-related, social modulation of performance calls for greater consideration of social factors when assessing learning and may also have relevance for the evaluation of human scholastic achievement.
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Reader, S. M., & Laland, K. N. (2002). Social intelligence, innovation, and enhanced brain size in primates. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 99(7), 4436–4441.
Abstract: Despite considerable current interest in the evolution of intelligence, the intuitively appealing notion that brain volume and “intelligence” are linked remains untested. Here, we use ecologically relevant measures of cognitive ability, the reported incidence of behavioral innovation, social learning, and tool use, to show that brain size and cognitive capacity are indeed correlated. A comparative analysis of 533 instances of innovation, 445 observations of social learning, and 607 episodes of tool use established that social learning, innovation, and tool use frequencies are positively correlated with species' relative and absolute “executive” brain volumes, after controlling for phylogeny and research effort. Moreover, innovation and social learning frequencies covary across species, in conflict with the view that there is an evolutionary tradeoff between reliance on individual experience and social cues. These findings provide an empirical link between behavioral innovation, social learning capacities, and brain size in mammals. The ability to learn from others, invent new behaviors, and use tools may have played pivotal roles in primate brain evolution.
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Hoy, R. (2005). Animal awareness: The (un)binding of multisensory cues in decision making by animals. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 102(7), 2267–2268.
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Reiss, D., & Marino, L. (2001). Mirror self-recognition in the bottlenose dolphin: a case of cognitive convergence. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 98(10), 5937–5942.
Abstract: The ability to recognize oneself in a mirror is an exceedingly rare capacity in the animal kingdom. To date, only humans and great apes have shown convincing evidence of mirror self-recognition. Two dolphins were exposed to reflective surfaces, and both demonstrated responses consistent with the use of the mirror to investigate marked parts of the body. This ability to use a mirror to inspect parts of the body is a striking example of evolutionary convergence with great apes and humans.
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Griffin, D. R. (2001). Animals know more than we used to think (Vol. 98).
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Hampton, R. R. (2001). Rhesus monkeys know when they remember. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 98(9), 5359–5362.
Abstract: Humans are consciously aware of some memories and can make verbal reports about these memories. Other memories cannot be brought to consciousness, even though they influence behavior. This conspicuous difference in access to memories is central in taxonomies of human memory systems but has been difficult to document in animal studies, suggesting that some forms of memory may be unique to humans. Here I show that rhesus macaque monkeys can report the presence or absence of memory. Although it is probably impossible to document subjective, conscious properties of memory in nonverbal animals, this result objectively demonstrates an important functional parallel with human conscious memory. Animals able to discern the presence and absence of memory should improve accuracy if allowed to decline memory tests when they have forgotten, and should decline tests most frequently when memory is attenuated experimentally. One of two monkeys examined unequivocally met these criteria under all test conditions, whereas the second monkey met them in all but one case. Probe tests were used to rule out “cueing” by a wide variety of environmental and behavioral stimuli, leaving detection of the absence of memory per se as the most likely mechanism underlying the monkeys' abilities to selectively decline memory tests when they had forgotten.
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Hauser, M. D., Kralik, J., Botto-Mahan, C., Garrett, M., & Oser, J. (1995). Self-recognition in primates: phylogeny and the salience of species-typical features. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 92(23), 10811–10814.
Abstract: Self-recognition has been explored in nonlinguistic organisms by recording whether individuals touch a dye-marked area on visually inaccessible parts of their face while looking in a mirror or inspect parts of their body while using the mirror's reflection. Only chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and humans over the age of approximately 2 years consistently evidence self-directed mirror-guided behavior without experimenter training. To evaluate the inferred phylogenetic gap between hominoids and other animals, a modified dye-mark test was conducted with cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus), a New World monkey species. The white hair on the tamarins' head was color-dyed, thereby significantly altering a visually distinctive species-typical feature. Only individuals with dyed hair and prior mirror exposure touched their head while looking in the mirror. They looked longer in the mirror than controls, and some individuals used the mirror to observe visually inaccessible body parts. Prior failures to pass the mirror test may have been due to methodological problems, rather than to phylogenetic differences in the capacity for self-recognition. Specifically, an individual's sensitivity to experimentally modified parts of its body may depend crucially on the relative saliency of the modified part (e.g., face versus hair). Moreover, and in contrast to previous claims, we suggest that the mirror test may not be sufficient for assessing the concept of self or mental state attribution in nonlinguistic organisms.
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