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Ferrero, D. M., Moeller, L. M., Osakada, T., Horio, N., Li, Q., Roy, D. S., et al. (2013). A juvenile mouse pheromone inhibits sexual behaviour through the vomeronasal system. Nature, 502(7471), 368–371.
Abstract: Animals display a repertoire of different social behaviours. Appropriate behavioural responses depend on sensory input received during social interactions. In mice, social behaviour is driven by pheromones, chemical signals that encode information related to age, sex and physiological state1. However, although mice show different social behaviours towards adults, juveniles and neonates, sensory cues that enable specific recognition of juvenile mice are unknown. Here we describe a juvenile pheromone produced by young mice before puberty, termed exocrine-gland secreting peptide 22 (ESP22). ESP22 is secreted from the lacrimal gland and released into tears of 2- to 3-week-old mice. Upon detection, ESP22 activates high-affinity sensory neurons in the vomeronasal organ, and downstream limbic neurons in the medial amygdala. Recombinant ESP22, painted on mice, exerts a powerful inhibitory effect on adult male mating behaviour, which is abolished in knockout mice lacking TRPC2, a key signalling component of the vomeronasal organ2, 3. Furthermore, knockout of TRPC2 or loss of ESP22 production results in increased sexual behaviour of adult males towards juveniles, and sexual responses towards ESP22-deficient juveniles are suppressed by ESP22 painting. Thus, we describe a pheromone of sexually immature mice that controls an innate social behaviour, a response pathway through the accessory olfactory system and a new role for vomeronasal organ signalling in inhibiting sexual behaviour towards young. These findings provide a molecular framework for understanding how a sensory system can regulate behaviour.
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Fenton, B., & Ratcliffe, J. (2004). Animal behaviour: eavesdropping on bats. Nature, 429(6992), 612–613.
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Fehr, E., & Gachter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415(6868), 137–140.
Abstract: Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
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Fedak Ma, S. H. (1979). Reappraisal of energetics of locomotion shows identical cost in bipeds and quadrupeds including ostrich and horse. Nature, 282, 713–716.
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Ewart Jc,. (1903). The wild horse. Nature, 68, 271–274.
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Eisenmann V,. (1982). Le cheval: Passé, présent et avenir. Bull Inf Mus Nat Hist Naturelle, 30, 29–34.
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Dyer, F. C. (2002). Animal behaviour: when it pays to waggle (Vol. 419).
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Dreber, A., Rand, D. G., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A. (2008). Winners don/'t punish. Nature, 452(7185), 348–351.
Abstract: A key aspect of human behaviour is cooperation1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. We tend to help others even if costs are involved. We are more likely to help when the costs are small and the benefits for the other person significant. Cooperation leads to a tension between what is best for the individual and what is best for the group. A group does better if everyone cooperates, but each individual is tempted to defect. Recently there has been much interest in exploring the effect of costly punishment on human cooperation8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23. Costly punishment means paying a cost for another individual to incur a cost. It has been suggested that costly punishment promotes cooperation even in non-repeated games and without any possibility of reputation effects10. But most of our interactions are repeated and reputation is always at stake. Thus, if costly punishment is important in promoting cooperation, it must do so in a repeated setting. We have performed experiments in which, in each round of a repeated game, people choose between cooperation, defection and costly punishment. In control experiments, people could only cooperate or defect. Here we show that the option of costly punishment increases the amount of cooperation but not the average payoff of the group. Furthermore, there is a strong negative correlation between total payoff and use of costly punishment. Those people who gain the highest total payoff tend not to use costly punishment: winners don't punish. This suggests that costly punishment behaviour is maladaptive in cooperation games and might have evolved for other reasons.
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de Waal, F. B. M. (2005). A century of getting to know the chimpanzee. Nature, 437(7055), 56–59.
Abstract: A century of research on chimpanzees, both in their natural habitat and in captivity, has brought these apes socially, emotionally and mentally much closer to us. Parallels and homologues between chimpanzee and human behaviour range from tool-technology and cultural learning to power politics and intercommunity warfare. Few behavioural domains have remained untouched by this increased knowledge, which has dramatically challenged the way we view ourselves. The sequencing of the chimpanzee genome will no doubt bring more surprises and insights. Humans do occupy a special place among the primates, but this place increasingly has to be defined against a backdrop of substantial similarity.
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de Waal, F. B., & Berger, M. L. (2000). Payment for labour in monkeys. Nature, 404(6778), 563.
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