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Shettleworth, S. J., & Sutton, J. E. (2005). Multiple systems for spatial learning: dead reckoning and beacon homing in rats. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 31(2), 125–141.
Abstract: Rats homed with food in a large lighted arena. Without visual cues, they used dead reckoning. When a beacon indicated the home, rats could also use the beacon. Homing did not differ in 2 groups of rats, 1 provided with the beacon and 1 without it; tests without the beacon gave no evidence that beacon learning overshadowed dead reckoning (Experiment 1). When the beacon was at the home for 1 group and in random locations for another, there was again no evidence of cue competition (Experiment 2). Dead reckoning experience did not block acquisition of beacon homing (Experiment 3). Beacon learning and dead reckoning do not compete for predictive value but acquire information in parallel and are used hierarchically.
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Beran, M. J., Beran, M. M., Harris, E. H., & Washburn, D. A. (2005). Ordinal judgments and summation of nonvisible sets of food items by two chimpanzees and a rhesus macaque. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 31(3), 351–362.
Abstract: Two chimpanzees and a rhesus macaque rapidly learned the ordinal relations between 5 colors of containers (plastic eggs) when all containers of a given color contained a specific number of identical food items. All 3 animals also performed at high levels when comparing sets of containers with sets of visible food items. This indicates that the animals learned the approximate quantity of food items in containers of a given color. However, all animals failed in a summation task, in which a single container was compared with a set of 2 containers of a lesser individual quantity but a greater combined quantity. This difficulty was not overcome by sequential presentation of containers into opaque receptacles, but performance improved if the quantitative difference between sizes was very large.
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Zentall, T. R., Klein, E. D., & Singer, R. A. (2004). Evidence for detection of one duration sample and default responding to other duration samples by pigeons may result from an artifact of retention-test ambiguity. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 30(2), 129–134.
Abstract: S. C. Gaitan and J. T. Wixted (2000) proposed that when pigeons are trained on a conditional discrimination to associate 1 duration sample with 1 comparison and 2 other duration samples with a 2nd comparison, they detect only the single duration, and on trials involving either of the 2 other duration samples, they respond to the other comparison by default. In 2 experiments, the authors show instead that pigeons lend to treat the retention intervals (such as those used by Gaitan and Wixted) as intertrial intervals, and thus, they tend to treat all trials with a delay as 0-s sample trials. The authors tested this hypothesis by showing that divergent retention functions do not appear when the retention interval is discriminably different from the intertrial interval.
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Beran, M. J., Pate, J. L., Washburn, D. A., & Rumbaugh, D. M. (2004). Sequential responding and planning in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 30(3), 203–212.
Abstract: Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) selected either Arabic numerals or colored squares on a computer monitor in a learned sequence. On shift trials, the locations of 2 stimuli were interchanged at some point. More errors were made when this interchange occurred for the next 2 stimuli to be selected than when the interchange was for stimuli later in the sequence. On mask trials, all remaining stimuli were occluded after the 1st selection. Performance exceeded chance levels for only 1 selection after these masks were applied. There was no difference in performance for either stimulus type (numerals or colors). The data indicated that the animals planned only the next selection during these computerized tasks as opposed to planning the entire response sequence.
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Cerutti, D. T., & Staddon, J. E. R. (2004). Immediacy versus anticipated delay in the time-left experiment: a test of the cognitive hypothesis. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 30(1), 45–57.
Abstract: In the time-left experiment (J. Gibbon & R. M. Church, 1981), animals are said to compare an expectation of a fixed delay to food, for one choice, with a decreasing delay expectation for the other, mentally representing both upcoming time to food and the difference between current time and upcoming time (the cognitive hypothesis). The results of 2 experiments support a simpler view: that animals choose according to the immediacies of reinforcement for each response at a time signaled by available time markers (the temporal control hypothesis). It is not necessary to assume that animals can either represent or subtract representations of times to food to explain the results of the time-left experiment.
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Kaiser, D. H., Zentall, T. R., & Neiman, E. (2002). Timing in pigeons: effects of the similarity between intertrial interval and gap in a timing signal. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 28(4), 416–422.
Abstract: Previous research suggests that when a fixed interval is interrupted (known as the gap procedure), pigeons tend to reset memory and start timing from 0 after the gap. However, because the ambient conditions of the gap typically have been the same as during the intertrial interval (ITI), ambiguity may have resulted. In the present experiment, the authors found that when ambient conditions during the gap were similar to the ITI, pigeons tended to reset memory, but when ambient conditions during the gap were different from the ITI, pigeons tended to stop timing, retain the duration of the stimulus in memory, and add to that time when the stimulus reappeared. Thus, when the gap was unambiguous, pigeons timed accurately.
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Clement, T. S., & Zentall, T. R. (2002). Second-order contrast based on the expectation of effort and reinforcement. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 28(1), 64–74.
Abstract: Pigeons prefer signals for reinforcement that require greater effort (or time) to obtain over those that require less effort to obtain (T. S. Clement, J. Feltus, D. H. Kaiser, & T. R. Zentall, 2000). Preference was attributed to contrast (or to the relatively greater improvement in conditions) produced by the appearance of the signal when it was preceded by greater effort. In Experiment 1, the authors of the present study demonstrated that the expectation of greater effort was sufficient to produce such a preference (a second-order contrast effect). In Experiments 2 and 3, low versus high probability of reinforcement was substituted for high versus low effort, respectively, with similar results. In Experiment 3, the authors found that the stimulus preference could be attributed to positive contrast (when the discriminative stimuli represented an improvement in the probability of reinforcement) and perhaps also negative contrast (when the discriminative stimuli represented reduction in the probability of reinforcement).
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Zentall, T. R., & Clement, T. S. (2002). Memory mechanisms in pigeons: evidence of base-rate neglect. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 28(1), 111–115.
Abstract: In delayed matching to sample, once acquired, pigeons presumably choose comparisons according to their memory for (the strength of) the sample. When memory for the sample is sufficiently weak, comparison choice should depend on the history of reinforcement associated with each of the comparison stimuli. In the present research, pigeons acquired two matching tasks in which Sample S1 was associated with one comparison from each task, C1 and C3, whereas Sample S2 was associated with Comparison C2, and Sample S3 was associated with Comparison C4. As the retention interval increased, the pigeons showed a bias to choose the comparison (C1 or C3) associated with the more frequently occurring sample (S1). Thus, pigeons were sensitive also to the (irrelevant) likelihood that each of the samples was presented. The results suggest that pigeons may allow their reference memory for the overall sample frequency to influence comparison choice, independent of the comparison stimuli present.
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Shettleworth, S. J., & Westwood, R. P. (2002). Divided attention, memory, and spatial discrimination in food-storing and nonstoring birds, black-capped chickadees (Poecile atricapilla) and dark-eyed juncos (Junco hyemalis). J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 28(3), 227–241.
Abstract: Food-storing birds, black-capped chickadees (Poecile atricapilla), and nonstoring birds, dark-eyed juncos (Junco hyemalis), matched color or location on a touch screen. Both species showed a divided attention effect for color but not for location (Experiment 1). Chickadees performed better on location than on color with retention intervals up to 40 s, but juncos did not (Experiment 2). Increasing sample-distractor distance improved performance similarly in both species. Multidimensional scaling revealed that both use a Euclidean metric of spatial similarity (Experiment 3). When choosing between the location and color of a remembered item, food storers choose location more than do nonstorers. These results explain this effect by differences in memory for location relative to color, not division of attention or spatial discrimination ability.
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Manns, J. R., Clark, R. E., & Squire, L. R. (2002). Standard delay eyeblink classical conditioning is independent of awareness. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 28(1), 32–37.
Abstract: P. F. Lovibond and D. R. Shanks (2002) suggested that all forms of classical conditioning depend on awareness of the stimulus contingencies. This article considers the available data for eyeblink classical conditioning, including data from 2 studies (R. E. Clark, J. R. Manns, & L. R. Squire, 2001; J. R. Manns, R. E. Clark, & L. R. Squire, 2001) that were completed too recently to have been considered in their review. In addition, in response to questions raised by P. F. Lovibond and D. R. Shanks, 2 new analyses of data are presented from studies published previously. The available data from humans and experimental animals provide strong evidence that delay eyeblink classical conditioning (but not trace eyeblink classical conditioning) can be acquired and retained independently of the forebrain and independently of awareness. This conclusion applies to standard conditioning paradigms; for example, to single-cue delay conditioning when a tone is used as the conditioned stimulus (CS) and to differential delay conditioning when the positive and negative conditioned stimuli (CS+ and CS-) are a tone and white noise.
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