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Bugnyar, T., & Kotrschal, K. (2004). Leading a conspecific away from food in ravens ( Corvus corax)? Anim. Cogn., 7(2), 69–76.
Abstract: Active misleading of conspecifics has been described as a social strategy mainly for primates. Here we report a raven leading a competitor away from food in a social foraging task. Four individuals had to search and compete for hidden food at color-marked clusters of artificial food caches. At the beginning of the experiment, a subordinate male found and exploited the majority of the food. As a result, the dominant male displaced him from the already opened boxes. The subordinate male then developed a pattern, when the loss of reward to the dominant got high, of moving to unrewarded clusters and opening boxes there. This diversion often led the dominant to approach those unrewarded clusters and the subordinate then had a head start for exploiting the rewarded boxes. Subsequently, however, the dominant male learned not to follow the subordinate to unrewarded clusters and eventually started searching for the reward himself. These interactions between the two males illustrate the ravens' potential for deceptively manipulating conspecifics. We discuss under which circumstances ravens might use this capacity.
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Potì, P. (2000). Aspects of spatial cognition in capuchins (Cebus apella): frames of reference and scale of space. Anim. Cogn., 3(2), 69–77.
Abstract: Frames of reference (i.e. sets of loci defining spatial locations) determine animals' performances in object search tasks. Reference frames are used at different scales. Although much behavioural research has been conducted on search strategies in many animal species, relatively little has been done on nonhuman primates. The two experiments reported here focused on the relative strength and the level of functioning of different reference frames at the small-scale level in four capuchins (Cebus apella). Two identical boxes and a landmark were placed on a round platform that could be rotated. A reward was hidden in subject's view under one box, and then a sash-screen was lowered to hide the rotation of the platform; the sash-screen was then lifted and the subject allowed to search for the reward. In experiment 1 the rewarded box was always the closer to the landmark, in experiment 2 it could be either the box closer to or the box farther from the landmark. Capuchins were successful after invisible rotations in experiment 1, but they failed after invisible rotations in experiment 2. Two possible explanations are proposed: (1) capuchins relied heavily on the left-right body-axis as a frame, and they could only substitute it with a simple association between the rewarded position and the landmark; or (2) capuchins failed because they chose external cues in the room, therefore on a inappropriate scale. The latter explanation allows two further inferences: (a) the capuchins' choice was indirectly related to their body-axes; and (b) the capuchins revealed a cognitive asymmetry between small-scale and large-scale spaces, thus differing from humans.
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Johnson, C. M. (2001). Distributed primate cognition: a review. Anim. Cogn., 3(4), 167–183.
Abstract: A model of “distributed cognition” is contrasted with the “mental representation” model exemplified by Tomasello and Call's Primate Cognition. Rather than using behavior as a basis for inferences to invisible mental events such as intentions, the distributed approach treats communicative interactions as, themselves, directly observable cognitive events. Similar to a Vygotskian approach, this model characterizes cognition as “co-constructed” by the participants. This approach is thus particularly suitable for studying primates (including humans), whose reliance on multiparty negotiations can undermine the researcher's ability to extrapolate from observable outcomes back to individual intentions. Detailed (e.g., frame-by-frame) analyses of such interactions reveal cross-species differences in the relevant media of information flow (e.g., behavioral coordination, relative gaze) as well as in the flexibility and complexity of the trajectories observed. Plus, with its focus on dynamics, the distributed approach is especially useful for modeling developmental and evolutionary processes. In discussing enculturation and the ontogeny of imitation, its emphasis is on changes in how expert and novice participate in such events, rather than how either may represent them. Primate cognitive evolution is seen as involving changes in context sensitivity, multi-tasking, and the coordination of social attention. Humans in particular – in, especially, the context of teaching – are seen as having specialized in linking co-perception with the refined sensory-motor coordination that enables them to translate observed behavior into strategically similar action. Highlighting the continuity between human and nonhuman development, this promising, complementary model enables us to tap the richness of micro-ethology as a cognitive science.
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Griffin, D. R. (1998). From cognition to consciousness. Anim. Cogn., 1(1), 3–16.
Abstract: This paper proposes an extension of scientific horizons in the study of animal behavior and cognition to include conscious experiences. From this perspective animals are best appreciated as actors rather than passive objects. A major adaptive function of their central nervous systems may be simple, but conscious and rational, thinking about alternative actions and choosing those the animal believes will get what it wants, or avoid what it dislikes or fears. Versatile adjustment of behavior in response to unpredictable challenges provides strongly suggestive evidence of simple but conscious thinking. And especially significant objective data about animal thoughts and feelings are already available, once communicative signals are recognized as evidence of the subjective experiences they often convey to others. The scientific investigation of human consciousness has undergone a renaissance in the 1990s, as exemplified by numerous symposia, books and two new journals. The neural correlates of cognition appear to be basically similar in all central nervous systems. Therefore other species equipped with very similar neurons, synapses, and glia may well be conscious. Simple perceptual and rational conscious thinking may be at least as important for small animals as for those with large enough brains to store extensive libraries of behavioral rules. Perhaps only in “megabrains” is most of the information processing unconscious.
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Snowdon, C. T. (2001). Social processes in communication and cognition in callitrichid monkeys: a review. Anim. Cogn., 4(3), 247–257.
Abstract: Studies of vocal development in nonhuman primates have found little evidence for plasticity in vocal production, somewhat more for usage of calls, with the greatest plasticity arising in response to calls of others. Generally, similar results were obtained with callitrichid monkeys, the marmosets and tamarins, but with several interesting exceptions. Infant pygmy marmosets show babbling behavior with improvement in adult call structure related to the amount and diversity of babbling. Adult marmosets alter call structure in response to changes in social partners, and wild marmosets have vocal dialects and modify call structure according to how far they are from other group members, suggesting the potential to modify call structure in different social and environmental contexts, though direct learning of novel vocalizations has not been observed. Infant cotton-top tamarins do not produce adult-like calls in appropriate contexts, at least in the first few months of life, but through food sharing from adults infants learn about appropriate foods and the appropriate contexts for food vocalizations. Tamarins modify call structure and usage with changes in social status. Tamarins, unlike other monkeys tested, can learn to avoid noxious foods through observation of other group members, and can learn about novel food locations. Recent studies provide evidence of contextual imitation in marmosets. The plasticity in vocal communication and evidence of social learning in marmosets and tamarins relative to other monkeys may be related to the cooperative breeding system of marmosets and tamarins. With a high degree of behavioral coordination among group members, there is a priority on monitoring signals and behavior of others and adjusting one's own signals and behavior. This creates the context for vocal plasticity and social learning.
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Gould, J. L. (2004). Thinking about thinking: how Donald R. Griffin (1915-2003) remade animal behavior. Anim. Cogn., 7(1), 1–4.
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Hare, B. (2001). Can competitive paradigms increase the validity of experiments on primate social cognition? Anim. Cogn., 4(3), 269–280.
Abstract: Experiments vary in their ability to distinguish between competing hypotheses. In tests on primate cognition the majority of this variation is due to an experimenter's ability to test primates in valid settings while providing the adequate amount of experimental control. While experimenters studying primate cognition can use methods of control perfected in captivity, it is still very unclear how to design and then objectively evaluate the external validity of new experimental paradigms. I recommend that more effort be allocated to specify how to create relevant test settings for primates. Primate social life is highly competitive. This means that all aspects of primates themselves, including their cognitive abilities, have likely been shaped by the need to out-compete conspecifics. Based on this hypothesis, sophisticated cognitive abilities of primates might best be demonstrated in competitive contexts. Thus, it is suggested that one possible measure of validity is whether investigators integrate a competitive component into their experimental designs. To evaluate this methodological prediction I review the literature on chimpanzee perspective-taking as a case study including several recent studies that include a competitive component in their experimental designs.
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Miklósi, Á. (2002). Cecilia Heyes and Ludwig Huber (eds): The Evolution of Cognition. Anim. Cogn., 5(3), 187–189.
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Czeschlik, T. (1998). Animal cognition – the phylogeny and ontogeny of cognitive abilities. Anim. Cogn., 1(1), 1–2.
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López, J. C., Broglio, C., Rodríguez, F., Thinus-Blanc, C., & Salas, C. (1999). Multiple spatial learning strategies in goldfish (Carassius auratus). Anim. Cogn., 2(2), 109–120.
Abstract: There is a considerable amount of evidence that mammals and birds can use different spatial learning strategies based on multiple learning and memory systems. Unfortunately, only a few studies have investigated spatial learning and memory mechanisms in other vertebrates. This study aimed to identify the strategies used by goldfish to solve two different spatial tasks in a series of three experiments. In experiment 1, two groups of goldfish (Carassius auratus) were trained either in a spatial constancy task (SC), in which visual cues signalled the goal indirectly, or in a directly cued task (DC) in which similar cues signalled the goal directly. Transfer tests were conducted to study the effects of discrete cue deletion on the performance in both tasks. In these transfer tests the performance of the animals trained in the DC task dropped to chance level when the cue that signalled the goal directly was removed. In contrast, the removal of any single cue did not disrupt SC performance. In experiment 2, fish trained in the SC or the DC task were trained with the goal reversed. Goldfish in the SC group needed fewer sessions to master the reversal task than DC animals. Finally, experiment 3 investigated the effects of a substantial modification of the geometrical features of the apparatus on the performance of animals trained in the SC or in the DC condition. The performance of DC goldfish was not affected, whereas the same change disrupted performance in the SC animals despite the presence of the visual cues. These results suggest that there are separate spatial learning and memory systems in fish. Whereas the DC animals used a typical guidance strategy, relying only on the cue that signalled the goal directly, SC fish relied on a strategy with the properties of an actual spatial mapping system. Thus, the comparative approach points to the generality of these learning strategies among vertebrates.
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