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Evans, T. A., & Westergaard, G. C. (2004). Discrimination of functionally appropriate and inappropriate throwing tools by captive tufted capuchins (Cebus apella). Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 255–262.
Abstract: A tool-throwing task was used to test whether capuchin monkeys understand the difference between functionally appropriate and functionally inappropriate tools. A group of monkeys was trained to obtain a sticky treat from a container outside their enclosure using a projectile attached to one end of an anchored line. Subsequently, these monkeys were given choice tests between functional and nonfunctional versions of tools used in training. A different feature of the tool was varied between alternatives in each choice test. The monkeys chose to use functional tools significantly more often than nonfunctional tools in early exposures to each choice test. A second experiment tested whether these subjects, as well as a second group of minimally trained participants, could distinguish between functional and nonfunctional tools that appeared different from those used in training. A new set of design features was varied between tools in these choice tests. All participants continued to choose functional tools significantly more often than nonfunctional tools, regardless of their tool-throwing experience or the novel appearance of the tools. These results suggest that capuchin monkeys, like chimpanzees studied in similar experiments, are sensitive to a variety of functionally relevant tool features.
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Santos, L. R., Barnes, J. L., & Mahajan, N. (2005). Expectations about numerical events in four lemur species (Eulemur fulvus, Eulemur mongoz, Lemur catta and Varecia rubra). Anim. Cogn., 8(4), 253–262.
Abstract: Although much is known about how some primates--in particular, monkeys and apes--represent and enumerate different numbers of objects, very little is known about the numerical abilities of prosimian primates. Here, we explore how four lemur species (Eulemur fulvus, E. mongoz, Lemur catta, and Varecia rubra) represent small numbers of objects. Specifically, we presented lemurs with three expectancy violation looking time experiments aimed at exploring their expectations about a simple 1+1 addition event. In these experiments, we presented subjects with displays in which two lemons were sequentially added behind an occluder and then measured subjects' duration of looking to expected and unexpected outcomes. In experiment 1, subjects looked reliably longer at an unexpected outcome of only one object than at an expected outcome of two objects. Similarly, subjects in experiment 2 looked reliably longer at an unexpected outcome of three objects than at an expected outcome of two objects. In experiment 3, subjects looked reliably longer at an unexpected outcome of one object twice the size of the original than at an expected outcome of two objects of the original size. These results suggest that some prosimian primates understand the outcome of simple arithmetic operations. These results are discussed in light of similar findings in human infants and other adult primates.
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Imura, T., & Tomonaga, M. (2003). Perception of depth from shading in infant chimpanzees ( Pan troglodytes). Anim. Cogn., 6(4), 253–258.
Abstract: We investigated the ability to perceive depth from shading, one of the pictorial depth cues, in three chimpanzee infants aged 4-10 months old, using a preferential reaching task commonly used to study pictorial depth perception in human infants. The chimpanzee infants reached significantly more to three-dimensional toys than to pictures thereof and more to the three-dimensional convex than to the concave. Furthermore, two of the three infants reached significantly more to the photographic convex than to the photographic concave. These infants also looked longer at the photographic convex than the concave. Our results suggest that chimpanzees perceive, at least as early as the latter half of the first year of life, pictorial depth defined by shading information. Photographic convexes contain richer information about pictorial depth (e.g., attached shadow, cast shadow, highlighted area, and global difference in brightness) than simple computer-graphic graded patterns. These cues together might facilitate the infants' perception of depth from shading.
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Watve, M., Thakar, J., Kale, A., Puntambekar, S., Shaikh, I., Vaze, K., et al. (2002). Bee-eaters ( Merops orientalis) respond to what a predator can see. Anim. Cogn., 5(4), 253–259.
Abstract: Two sets of experiments are reported that show that the small green bee-eater ( Merops orientalis, a small tropical bird) can appreciate what a predator can or cannot see. Bee-eaters avoid entering the nest in the presence of a potential nest predator. In the first set of experiments bee-eaters entered the nest more frequently when the predator was unable to see the nest from its position, as compared to an approximately equidistant position from which the nest could be seen. In the second set of experiments bee-eaters entered the nest more frequently when the predator was looking away from the nest. The angle of gaze from the nest was associated significantly positively with the probability of entering the nest whereas the angle from the bird was not. Birds showed considerable flexibility as well as individual variation in the possible methods of judging the predator's position and direction of gaze.
Keywords: Animals; Birds/*physiology; *Predatory Behavior; *Visual Perception
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Takimoto, A., Kuroshima, H., & Fujita, K. (2010). Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) are sensitive to others’ reward: an experimental analysis of food-choice for conspecifics. Anim. Cogn., 13(2), 249–261.
Abstract: Abstract The issue whether non-human primates have other-regarding preference and/or inequity aversion has been under debate. We investigated whether tufted capuchin monkeys are sensitive to others’ reward in various experimental food sharing settings. Two monkeys faced each other. The operator monkey chose one of two food containers placed between the participants, each containing a food item for him/herself and another for the recipient. The recipient passively received either high- or low-value food depending on the operator’s choice, whereas the operator obtained the same food regardless of his/her choice. The recipients were either the highest- or lowest-ranking member of the group, and the operators were middle-ranking. In Experiment 1, the operators chose the high-value food for the subordinate recipient more frequently than when there was no recipient, whereas they were indifferent in their choice for the dominant. This differentiated behavior could have been because the dominant recipient frequently ate the low-value food. In Experiment 2, we increased the difference in the value of the two food items so that both recipients would reject the low-value food. The results were the same as in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, we placed an opaque screen in front of the recipient to examine effects of visual contact between the participants. The operators’ food choice generally shifted toward providing the low-value food for the recipient. These results suggest that capuchins are clearly sensitive to others’ reward and that they show other-regarding preference or a form of inequity aversion depending upon the recipients and the presence of visual contact.
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Lea, S. E. G., Goto, K., Osthaus, B., & Ryan, C. M. E. (2006). The logic of the stimulus. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 247–256.
Abstract: This paper examines the contribution of stimulus processing to animal logics. In the classic functionalist S-O-R view of learning (and cognition), stimuli provide the raw material to which the organism applies its cognitive processes-its logic, which may be taxon-specific. Stimuli may contribute to the logic of the organism's response, and may do so in taxon-specific ways. Firstly, any non-trivial stimulus has an internal organization that may constrain or bias the way that the organism addresses it; since stimuli can only be defined relative to the organism's perceptual apparatus, and this apparatus is taxon-specific, such constraints or biases will often be taxon-specific. Secondly, the representation of a stimulus that the perceptual system builds, and the analysis it makes of this representation, may provide a model for the synthesis and analysis done at a more cognitive level. Such a model is plausible for evolutionary reasons: perceptual analysis was probably perfected before cognitive analysis in the evolutionary history of the vertebrates. Like stimulus-driven analysis, such perceptually modelled cognition may be taxon-specific because of the taxon-specificity of the perceptual apparatus. However, it may also be the case that different taxa are able to free themselves from the stimulus logic, and therefore apply a more abstract logic, to different extents. This thesis is defended with reference to two examples of cases where animals' cognitive logic seems to be isomorphic with perceptual logic, specifically in the case of pigeons' attention to global and local information in visual stimuli, and dogs' failure to comprehend means-end relationships in string-pulling tasks.
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Lewis, K. P., Jaffe, S., & Brannon, E. M. (2005). Analog number representations in mongoose lemurs (Eulemur mongoz): evidence from a search task. Anim. Cogn., 8(4), 247–252.
Abstract: A wealth of data demonstrating that monkeys and apes represent number have been interpreted as suggesting that sensitivity to number emerged early in primate evolution, if not before. Here we examine the numerical capacities of the mongoose lemur (Eulemur mongoz), a member of the prosimian suborder of primates that split from the common ancestor of monkeys, apes and humans approximately 47-54 million years ago. Subjects observed as an experimenter sequentially placed grapes into an opaque bucket. On half of the trials the experimenter placed a subset of the grapes into a false bottom such that they were inaccessible to the lemur. The critical question was whether lemurs would spend more time searching the bucket when food should have remained in the bucket, compared to when they had retrieved all of the food. We found that the amount of time lemurs spent searching was indicative of whether grapes should have remained in the bucket, and furthermore that lemur search time reliably differentiated numerosities that differed by a 1:2 ratio, but not those that differed by a 2:3 or 3:4 ratio. Finally, two control conditions determined that lemurs represented the number of food items, and neither the odor of the grapes, nor the amount of grape (e.g., area) in the bucket. These results suggest that mongoose lemurs have numerical representations that are modulated by Weber's Law.
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Jackson, R. R., & Li, D. (2004). One-encounter search-image formation by araneophagic spiders. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 247–254.
Abstract: An experimental study of search-image use by araneophagic jumping spiders (i.e., salticid spiders that prey routinely on other spiders) supports five conclusions. First, araneophagic salticids have an innate predisposition to form search images for specific prey from their preferred prey category (spiders) rather than for prey from a non-preferred category (insects). Second, single encounters are sufficient for forming search images. Third, search images are based on selective attention specifically to optical cues. Fourth, there are trade-offs in attention during search-image use (i.e., forming a search image for one type of spider diminishes the araneophagic salticid's attention to other spiders). Fifth, the araneophagic salticid's adoption of search images is costly to the prey (i.e., when the araneophagic salticid adopts a search, the prey's prospects for surviving encounters with the araneophagic salticid are diminished). Cognitive and ecological implications of search-image use are discussed.
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Snowdon, C. T. (2001). Social processes in communication and cognition in callitrichid monkeys: a review. Anim. Cogn., 4(3), 247–257.
Abstract: Studies of vocal development in nonhuman primates have found little evidence for plasticity in vocal production, somewhat more for usage of calls, with the greatest plasticity arising in response to calls of others. Generally, similar results were obtained with callitrichid monkeys, the marmosets and tamarins, but with several interesting exceptions. Infant pygmy marmosets show babbling behavior with improvement in adult call structure related to the amount and diversity of babbling. Adult marmosets alter call structure in response to changes in social partners, and wild marmosets have vocal dialects and modify call structure according to how far they are from other group members, suggesting the potential to modify call structure in different social and environmental contexts, though direct learning of novel vocalizations has not been observed. Infant cotton-top tamarins do not produce adult-like calls in appropriate contexts, at least in the first few months of life, but through food sharing from adults infants learn about appropriate foods and the appropriate contexts for food vocalizations. Tamarins modify call structure and usage with changes in social status. Tamarins, unlike other monkeys tested, can learn to avoid noxious foods through observation of other group members, and can learn about novel food locations. Recent studies provide evidence of contextual imitation in marmosets. The plasticity in vocal communication and evidence of social learning in marmosets and tamarins relative to other monkeys may be related to the cooperative breeding system of marmosets and tamarins. With a high degree of behavioral coordination among group members, there is a priority on monitoring signals and behavior of others and adjusting one's own signals and behavior. This creates the context for vocal plasticity and social learning.
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Tanaka, M., Tomonaga, M., & Matsuzawa, T. (2003). Finger drawing by infant chimpanzees ( Pan troglodytes). Anim. Cogn., 6(4), 245–251.
Abstract: We introduced a new technique to investigate the development of scribbling in very young infants. We tested three infant chimpanzees to compare the developmental processes of scribbling between humans and chimpanzees. While human infants start to scribble on paper at around the age of 18 months, our 13- to 23-month-old infant chimpanzees had never been observed scribbling prior to this study. We used a notebook computer with a touch-sensitive screen. This apparatus was able to record the location of the subjects' touches on the screen. Each touch generated a fingertip-sized dot at the corresponding on-screen location. During spontaneous interactions with this apparatus, all three infants and two mother chimpanzees left scribbles with their fingers on the screen. The scribbles contained not only simple dots or short lines, but also curves and hook-like lines or loops, most of which were observed in the instrumental drawings of adult chimpanzees. The results suggest that perceptual-motor control for finger drawing develops in infant chimpanzees. Two of the infants performed their first scribble with a marker on paper at the age of 20-23 months. Just prior to this, they showed a rapid increase in combinatory manipulation of objects. These findings suggest that the development of combinatory manipulation of objects as well as that of perceptual-motor control may be necessary for the emergence of instrumental drawing on paper.
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