| Records |
| Author |
Shettleworth, S.J. |
| Title |
Cognitive science: rank inferred by reason |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2004 |
Publication |
Nature |
Abbreviated Journal |
Nature |
Volume  |
430 |
Issue |
7001 |
Pages |
732-733 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Group Structure; Male; *Social Dominance; Songbirds/*physiology |
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1476-4687 |
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| Notes |
PMID:15306792 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
refbase @ user @ |
Serial |
365 |
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| Author |
Fenton, B.; Ratcliffe, J. |
| Title |
Animal behaviour: eavesdropping on bats |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2004 |
Publication |
Nature |
Abbreviated Journal |
Nature |
| Volume |
429 |
Issue |
6992 |
Pages |
612-613 |
| Keywords |
Acoustics; Animals; Chiroptera/anatomy & histology/classification/genetics/*physiology; Echolocation/*physiology; *Evolution; Phylogeny; Predatory Behavior/physiology; Species Specificity |
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1476-4687 |
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| Notes |
PMID:15190335 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
refbase @ user @ |
Serial |
500 |
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| Author |
Proudman, C.; Pinchbeck, G.; Clegg, P.; French, N. |
| Title |
Equine welfare: risk of horses falling in the Grand National |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2004 |
Publication |
Nature |
Abbreviated Journal |
Nature |
| Volume |
428 |
Issue |
6981 |
Pages |
385-386 |
| Keywords |
Accidental Falls/prevention & control/*statistics & numerical data; Animal Welfare; Animals; Great Britain; Horse Diseases/prevention & control; Horses/*physiology; Odds Ratio; Risk Assessment; *Sports |
| Abstract |
As in other competitive sports, the famous Grand National steeplechase, which is held at Aintree in the United Kingdom and is watched by 600 million people worldwide, sometimes results in injury. By analysing data from the past 15 Grand National races (consisting of 560 starts by horses), we are able to identify several factors that are significantly associated with failure to complete the race: no previous experience of the course and its unique obstacles, unfavourable ground conditions (too soft or too hard), a large number of runners, and the length of the odds ('starting price'). We also find that there is an increased risk of falling at the first fence and at the jump known as Becher's Brook, which has a ditch on the landing side. Our findings indicate ways in which the Grand National could be made safer for horses and illustrate how epidemiological analysis might contribute to preventing injury in competitive sport. |
| Address |
Epidemiology Group, Faculty of Veterinary Science, University of Liverpool, Leahurst, Neston, Wirral CH64 7TE, UK. c.j.proudman@liverpool.ac.uk |
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1476-4687 |
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PMID:15042079 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
refbase @ user @ |
Serial |
535 |
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| Author |
Hassenberg L, |
| Title |
Verhalten bei Einhufern |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1971 |
Publication |
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Abbreviated Journal |
Die Neue Brehmbücherei |
| Volume |
427 |
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| Notes |
from Professor Hans Klingels Equine Reference List |
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no |
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Serial |
1164 |
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| Author |
Brosnan, S.F.; De Waal, F.B.M. |
| Title |
Monkeys reject unequal pay |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2003 |
Publication |
Nature |
Abbreviated Journal |
Nature |
| Volume |
425 |
Issue |
6955 |
Pages |
297-299 |
| Keywords |
Aging; Animals; Cebus/*psychology; Choice Behavior; *Cooperative Behavior; Female; Male; *Reward; Social Justice |
| Abstract |
During the evolution of cooperation it may have become critical for individuals to compare their own efforts and pay-offs with those of others. Negative reactions may occur when expectations are violated. One theory proposes that aversion to inequity can explain human cooperation within the bounds of the rational choice model, and may in fact be more inclusive than previous explanations. Although there exists substantial cultural variation in its particulars, this 'sense of fairness' is probably a human universal that has been shown to prevail in a wide variety of circumstances. However, we are not the only cooperative animals, hence inequity aversion may not be uniquely human. Many highly cooperative nonhuman species seem guided by a set of expectations about the outcome of cooperation and the division of resources. Here we demonstrate that a nonhuman primate, the brown capuchin monkey (Cebus apella), responds negatively to unequal reward distribution in exchanges with a human experimenter. Monkeys refused to participate if they witnessed a conspecific obtain a more attractive reward for equal effort, an effect amplified if the partner received such a reward without any effort at all. These reactions support an early evolutionary origin of inequity aversion. |
| Address |
Living Links, Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia 30329, USA. sbrosna@emory.edu |
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1476-4687 |
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| Notes |
PMID:13679918 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
refbase @ user @ |
Serial |
179 |
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| Author |
Rands, S.A.; Cowlishaw, G.; Pettifor, R.A.; Rowcliffe, J.M.; Johnstone, R.A. |
| Title |
Spontaneous emergence of leaders and followers in foraging pairs |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2003 |
Publication |
Nature |
Abbreviated Journal |
Nature |
| Volume |
423 |
Issue |
6938 |
Pages |
432-434 |
| Keywords |
Animals; *Energy Metabolism; Food; *Food Chain; *Models, Biological; Motor Activity; *Social Behavior; Time Factors |
| Abstract |
Animals that forage socially often stand to gain from coordination of their behaviour. Yet it is not known how group members reach a consensus on the timing of foraging bouts. Here we demonstrate a simple process by which this may occur. We develop a state-dependent, dynamic game model of foraging by a pair of animals, in which each individual chooses between resting or foraging during a series of consecutive periods, so as to maximize its own individual chances of survival. We find that, if there is an advantage to foraging together, the equilibrium behaviour of both individuals becomes highly synchronized. As a result of this synchronization, differences in the energetic reserves of the two players spontaneously develop, leading them to adopt different behavioural roles. The individual with lower reserves emerges as the 'pace-maker' who determines when the pair should forage, providing a straightforward resolution to the problem of group coordination. Moreover, the strategy that gives rise to this behaviour can be implemented by a simple 'rule of thumb' that requires no detailed knowledge of the state of other individuals. |
| Address |
Department of Zoology, University of Cambridge, Downing Street, Cambridge CB2 3EJ, UK. s.rands@zoo.cam.ac.uk |
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0028-0836 |
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| Notes |
PMID:12761547 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
5138 |
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| Author |
Johnson, D.D.P.; Stopka, P.; Knights, S. |
| Title |
Sociology: The puzzle of human cooperation |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2003 |
Publication |
Nature |
Abbreviated Journal |
Nature |
| Volume |
421 |
Issue |
6926 |
Pages |
911-2; discussion 912 |
| Keywords |
Altruism; *Cooperative Behavior; Evolution; Humans; *Models, Biological; Punishment; Reward; Risk |
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| Address |
Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA. dominic@post.harvard.edu |
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0028-0836 |
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| Notes |
PMID:12606989 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
refbase @ user @ |
Serial |
467 |
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| Author |
Conradt, L.; Roper, T.J. |
| Title |
Group decision-making in animals |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2003 |
Publication |
Nature |
Abbreviated Journal |
Nature |
| Volume |
421 |
Issue |
6919 |
Pages |
155-158 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Behavior, Animal/*physiology; *Decision Making; Democracy; Group Processes; *Models, Biological; Population Density; Social Behavior |
| Abstract |
Groups of animals often need to make communal decisions, for example about which activities to perform, when to perform them and which direction to travel in; however, little is known about how they do so. Here, we model the fitness consequences of two possible decision-making mechanisms: 'despotism' and 'democracy'. We show that under most conditions, the costs to subordinate group members, and to the group as a whole, are considerably higher for despotic than for democratic decisions. Even when the despot is the most experienced group member, it only pays other members to accept its decision when group size is small and the difference in information is large. Democratic decisions are more beneficial primarily because they tend to produce less extreme decisions, rather than because each individual has an influence on the decision per se. Our model suggests that democracy should be widespread and makes quantitative, testable predictions about group decision-making in non-humans. |
| Address |
School of Biological Sciences, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QG, UK. l.conradt@sussex.ac.uk |
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0028-0836 |
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| Notes |
PMID:12520299 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
5136 |
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| Author |
Dyer, F.C. |
| Title |
Animal behaviour: when it pays to waggle |
Type |
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| Year |
2002 |
Publication |
Nature |
Abbreviated Journal |
Nature |
| Volume |
419 |
Issue |
6910 |
Pages |
885-886 |
| Keywords |
*Animal Communication; Animals; Bees/*physiology; California; Dancing/physiology; Environment; Evolution; Female; Flowers/chemistry; *Food; Gravitation; Lighting; Motor Activity/*physiology; Odors; Seasons; Sunlight |
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0028-0836 |
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| Notes |
PMID:12410290 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
refbase @ user @ |
Serial |
769 |
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| Author |
Fehr, E.; Gachter, S. |
| Title |
Altruistic punishment in humans |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2002 |
Publication |
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Abbreviated Journal |
Nature |
| Volume |
415 |
Issue |
6868 |
Pages |
137-140 |
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| Abstract |
Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment. |
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0028-0836 |
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no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
4835 |
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