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Author Bergstrom, C.T.; Lachmann, M. openurl 
  Title Signaling among relatives. III. Talk is cheap Type Journal Article
  Year 1998 Publication Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Abbreviated Journal Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.  
  Volume 95 Issue 9 Pages 5100-5105  
  Keywords Animal Communication; Animals; Costs and Cost Analysis; *Evolution; Interpersonal Relations; Models, Biological  
  Abstract The Sir Philip Sidney game has been used by numerous authors to show how signal cost can facilitate honest signaling among relatives. Here, we demonstrate that, in this game, honest cost-free signals are possible as well, under very general conditions. Moreover, these cost-free signals are better for all participants than the previously explored alternatives. Recent empirical evidence suggests that begging is energetically inexpensive for nestling birds; this finding led some researchers to question the applicability of the costly signaling framework to nestling begging. Our results show that cost-free or inexpensive signals, as observed empirically, fall within the framework of signaling theory.  
  Address Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA. carl@charles.stanford.edu  
  Corporate Author Thesis  
  Publisher Place of Publication Editor  
  Language English Summary Language Original Title  
  Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title  
  Series Volume Series Issue (up) Edition  
  ISSN 0027-8424 ISBN Medium  
  Area Expedition Conference  
  Notes PMID:9560235 Approved no  
  Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 561  
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