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Author (up) Bergstrom, C.T.; Lachmann, M.
Title Signaling among relatives. III. Talk is cheap Type Journal Article
Year 1998 Publication Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Abbreviated Journal Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
Volume 95 Issue 9 Pages 5100-5105
Keywords Animal Communication; Animals; Costs and Cost Analysis; *Evolution; Interpersonal Relations; Models, Biological
Abstract The Sir Philip Sidney game has been used by numerous authors to show how signal cost can facilitate honest signaling among relatives. Here, we demonstrate that, in this game, honest cost-free signals are possible as well, under very general conditions. Moreover, these cost-free signals are better for all participants than the previously explored alternatives. Recent empirical evidence suggests that begging is energetically inexpensive for nestling birds; this finding led some researchers to question the applicability of the costly signaling framework to nestling begging. Our results show that cost-free or inexpensive signals, as observed empirically, fall within the framework of signaling theory.
Address Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA. carl@charles.stanford.edu
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0027-8424 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:9560235 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 561
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