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| Author |
Pedersen, E.J.; Kurzban, R.; McCullough, M.E. |
| Title |
Do humans really punish altruistically? A closer look |
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Journal Article |
| Year |
2013 |
Publication |
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences |
Abbreviated Journal |
Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B |
| Volume |
280 |
Issue |
1758 |
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| Abstract |
Some researchers have proposed that natural selection has given rise in humans to one or more adaptations for altruistically punishing on behalf of other individuals who have been treated unfairly, even when the punisher has no chance of benefiting via reciprocity or benefits to kin. However, empirical support for the altruistic punishment hypothesis depends on results from experiments that are vulnerable to potentially important experimental artefacts. Here, we searched for evidence of altruistic punishment in an experiment that precluded these artefacts. In so doing, we found that victims of unfairness punished transgressors, whereas witnesses of unfairness did not. Furthermore, witnesses’ emotional reactions to unfairness were characterized by envy of the unfair individual's selfish gains rather than by moralistic anger towards the unfair behaviour. In a second experiment run independently in two separate samples, we found that previous evidence for altruistic punishment plausibly resulted from affective forecasting error—that is, limitations on humans’ abilities to accurately simulate how they would feel in hypothetical situations. Together, these findings suggest that the case for altruistic punishment in humans—a view that has gained increasing attention in the biological and social sciences—has been overstated. |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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5804 |
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| Author |
Tibbetts, E.A. |
| Title |
Visual signals of individual identity in the wasp Polistes fuscatus |
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Journal Article |
| Year |
2002 |
Publication |
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences |
Abbreviated Journal |
Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. |
| Volume |
269 |
Issue |
1423 |
Pages |
1423-1428 |
| Keywords |
hymenoptera; individual-recognition; learning-insect |
| Abstract |
Individual recognition is an essential component of interactions in many social systems, but insects are often thought incapable of the sophistication necessary to recognize individuals. If this were true, it would impose limits on the societies that insects could form. For example, queens and workers of the paper wasp Polistes fuscatus form a linear dominance hierarchy that determines how food, work and reproduction are divided within the colony. Such a stable hierarchy would be facilitated if individuals of different ranks have some degree of recognition. P. fuscatus wasps have, to our knowledge, previously undocumented variability in their yellow facial and abdominal markings that are intriguing candidates for signals of individual identity. Here, I describe these highly variable markings and experimentally test whether P. fuscatus queens and workers use these markings to identify individual nest-mates visually. I demonstrate that individuals whose yellow markings are experimentally altered with paint receive more aggression than control wasps who are painted in a way that does not alter their markings. Further, aggression declines towards wasps with experimentally altered markings as these novel markings become familiar to their nestmates. This evidence for individual recognition in P. fuscatus indicates that interactions between insects may be even more complex than previously anticipated.
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ 929 |
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4732 |
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| Author |
Reeve, H. Kern |
| Title |
Evolutionarily stable communication between kin: a general model |
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Journal Article |
| Year |
1997 |
Publication |
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences |
Abbreviated Journal |
Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. |
| Volume |
264 |
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(1384) |
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1037-1040. |
| Keywords |
Signalling Systems |
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At present, the most general evolutionary theory of honest communication is Grafen's model of Zahavi's 'handicap' signalling system, in which honesty of signals about the signaller's quality (e.g. mate suitability or fighting ability) is maintained by the differentially high cost of signals to signallers having lower quality. The latter model is here further generalized to include any communication between signallers and receivers that are genetically related (e.g. parents and begging offspring, cooperative or competing siblings). Signalling systems involving relatives are shown to be evolutionarily stable, despite a potential pay-off for false signalling, if the Zahavian assumption of differential signal costs holds and there are diminishing reproductive returns to the signaller as the receiver's assessed value of its attribute increases, or if, regardless of whether the Zahavian assumption holds, signallers with high values of the attribute benefit more from a given receiver assessment than signallers with low values (e.g. begging chicks that are hungrier benefit more from being fed). In stable systems of signalling among kin, it is also shown to be generally true that (i) levels of signalling and thus observed signal costs will decline as relatedness increases or as the receiver's reproductive penalty for erroneous assessment increases, and (ii) receivers will consistently, altruistically overestimate the true value of the signalled attribute. |
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refbase @ user @ |
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557 |
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