| Records |
Author  |
Byrne, R.W. |
| Title |
Do larger brains mean greater intelligence? |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1993 |
Publication |
Behavioral and Brain Sciences |
Abbreviated Journal |
Behav. Brain Sci. |
| Volume |
16 |
Issue |
4 |
Pages |
696-697 |
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| Publisher |
Cambridge University Press |
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Edition |
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| ISSN |
1469-1825 |
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no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
6171 |
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| Author |
Giraldeau, L.-A.; Lefebvre, L.; Morand-Ferron, J. |
| Title |
Can a restrictive definition lead to biases and tautologies? |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2007 |
Publication |
Behavioral and Brain Sciences |
Abbreviated Journal |
Behav. Brain Sci. |
| Volume |
30 |
Issue |
4 |
Pages |
411-412 |
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| Abstract |
We argue that the operational definition proposed by Ramsey et al. does not represent a significant improvement for students of innovation, because it is so restrictive that it might actually prevent the testing of hypotheses on the relationships between innovation, ecology, evolution, culture, and intelligence. To avoid tautological thinking, we need to use an operational definition that is taxonomically unbiased and neutral with respect to the hypotheses to be tested. |
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| Publisher |
Cambridge University Press |
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Edition |
2007/12/17 |
| ISSN |
0140-525x |
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no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
6533 |
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| Author |
Preston, S.D.; de Waal, F.B.M. |
| Title |
Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2002 |
Publication |
Behavioral and Brain Sciences |
Abbreviated Journal |
Behav Brain Sci |
| Volume |
25 |
Issue |
1 |
Pages |
1-20; discussion 20-71 |
| Keywords |
Adult; Animals; Child; Emotions/physiology; *Empathy; Evolution; Haplorhini; Helping Behavior; Humans; Mental Disorders/physiopathology/psychology; Morals; Personality Development; Phylogeny; Prefrontal Cortex/physiopathology; Socialization |
| Abstract |
There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon of empathy. There are emotional, cognitive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mechanism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors (e.g., alarm, social facilitation, vicariousness of emotions, mother-infant responsiveness, and the modeling of competitors and predators) that are crucial for the reproductive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action Model (PAM), together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature (similarity, familiarity, past experience, explicit teaching, and salience). It can also predict a variety of empathy disorders. The interaction between the PAM and prefrontal functioning can also explain different levels of empathy across species and age groups. This view can advance our evolutionary understanding of empathy beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and can explain different levels of empathy across individuals, species, stages of development, and situations. |
| Address |
University of Iowa Hospital and Clinics, 2RCP-Neurology Clinic, Iowa City, IA 52242. stephanie-d-preston@uiowa.edu |
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English |
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0140-525X |
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| Notes |
PMID:12625087 |
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no |
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refbase @ user @ |
Serial |
181 |
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| Author |
Vallortigara, G.; Rogers, L.J. |
| Title |
Survival with an asymmetrical brain: advantages and disadvantages of cerebral lateralization |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2005 |
Publication |
The Behavioral and Brain Sciences |
Abbreviated Journal |
Behav Brain Sci |
| Volume |
28 |
Issue |
4 |
Pages |
575-89; discussion 589-633 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Attention/*physiology; Behavior/*physiology; Behavior, Animal/*physiology; Dominance, Cerebral/*physiology; *Evolution; Humans; Models, Biological; Visual Perception/physiology |
| Abstract |
Recent evidence in natural and semi-natural settings has revealed a variety of left-right perceptual asymmetries among vertebrates. These include preferential use of the left or right visual hemifield during activities such as searching for food, agonistic responses, or escape from predators in animals as different as fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals. There are obvious disadvantages in showing such directional asymmetries because relevant stimuli may be located to the animal's left or right at random; there is no a priori association between the meaning of a stimulus (e.g., its being a predator or a food item) and its being located to the animal's left or right. Moreover, other organisms (e.g., predators) could exploit the predictability of behavior that arises from population-level lateral biases. It might be argued that lateralization of function enhances cognitive capacity and efficiency of the brain, thus counteracting the ecological disadvantages of lateral biases in behavior. However, such an increase in brain efficiency could be obtained by each individual being lateralized without any need to align the direction of the asymmetry in the majority of the individuals of the population. Here we argue that the alignment of the direction of behavioral asymmetries at the population level arises as an “evolutionarily stable strategy” under “social” pressures occurring when individually asymmetrical organisms must coordinate their behavior with the behavior of other asymmetrical organisms of the same or different species. |
| Address |
Department of Psychology and B.R.A.I.N. Centre for Neuroscience, University of Trieste, 34123 Trieste, Italy. vallorti@univ.trieste.it |
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English |
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0140-525X |
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| Notes |
PMID:16209828 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
4622 |
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| Author |
Whiten, A.; Byrne, R.W. |
| Title |
Tactical deception in primates |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1988 |
Publication |
Behavioral and Brain Sciences |
Abbreviated Journal |
Behav. Brain Sci. |
| Volume |
11 |
Issue |
02 |
Pages |
233-244 |
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| Abstract |
ABSTRACT Tactical deception occurs when an individual is able to use an “honest” act from his normal repertoire in a different context to mislead familiar individuals. Although primates have a reputation for social skill, most primate groups are so intimate that any deception is likely to be subtle and infrequent. Published records are sparse and often anecdotal. We have solicited new records from many primatologists and searched for repeating patterns. This has revealed several different forms of deceptive tactic, which we classify in terms of the function they perform. For each class, we sketch the features of another individual's state of mind that an individual acting with deceptive intent must be able to represent, thus acting as a “natural psychologist.” Our analysis will sharpen attention to apparent taxonomic differences. Before these findings can be generalized, however, behavioral scientists must agree on some fundamental methodological and theoretical questions in the study of the evolution of social cognition. |
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Cambridge Journals Online |
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1469-1825 |
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| Notes |
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Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
5937 |
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