| Records |
| Author |
Gaunet, F.; Massioui, F.E. |
| Title |
Marked referential communicative behaviours, but no differentiation of the “knowledge state” of humans in untrained pet dogs versus 1-year-old infants |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2014 |
Publication |
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Abbreviated Journal |
Animal Cognition |
| Volume |
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Issue |
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Pages |
1-11 |
| Keywords |
Dog; Communication; Knowledge attribution; Infant; Social; Learning |
| Abstract |
The study examines whether untrained dogs and infants take their caregiver’s visual experience into account when communicating with them. Fifteen adult dogs and 15 one-year-old infants were brought into play with their caregivers with one of their own toys. The caregiver gave the toy to the experimenter, who, in different conditions, placed it either above or under one of two containers, with both the infant or dog and the caregiver witnessing the positioning; in a third condition, the caregiver left the room before the toy was placed under one of the two containers and later returned. Afterwards, for each condition, the caregiver asked the participant to indicate the location of the toy. Neither dogs nor infants—untrained to the use of the partner’s knowledge state—showed much difference of behaviour between the three conditions. However, dogs showed more persistence for most behaviours (gaze at the owner, gaze at the toy and gaze alternation) and conditions, suggesting that the situation made more demands on dogs’ communicative behaviours than on those of infants. When all deictic behaviours of infants (arm points towards the toy and gaze at the toy) were taken into account, dogs and infants did not differ. Phylogeny, early experience and ontogeny may all play a role in the ways that both species communicate with adult humans. |
| Address |
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| Corporate Author |
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Thesis |
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| Publisher |
Springer Berlin Heidelberg |
Place of Publication |
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Editor |
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| Language |
English |
Summary Language |
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Original Title |
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| Series Editor |
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Series Title |
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Series Issue |
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Edition |
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| ISSN |
1435-9448 |
ISBN |
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| Notes |
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Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
5789 |
| Permanent link to this record |
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| Author |
Kornblith, H. |
| Title |
Knowledge and its Place in Nature |
Type |
Book Whole |
| Year |
2002 |
Publication |
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Abbreviated Journal |
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| Volume |
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Issue |
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Pages |
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| Keywords |
animals; cognitive ethology; conceptual analysis; epistemology; Hilary Kornblith; knowledge; natural kind; naturalistic epistemology; normativity; philosophy |
| Abstract |
Argues that conceptual analysis should be rejected in favour of a more naturalistic approach to epistemology. There is a robust natural phenomenon of knowledge; knowledge is a natural kind. An examination of the cognitive ethology literature reveals a category of knowledge that does both causal and explanatory work. It is argued that knowledge in this very sense is what philosophers have been talking about all along. Rival accounts of knowledge that are more demanding—requiring either that certain social conditions be met or that an agent engage in some sort of reflection—are discussed in detail, and it is argued that they are inadequate to the phenomenon. In addition, it is argued that the account of knowledge that emerges from the cognitive ethology literature can provide an explanation of the normative force of epistemic claims. |
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Thesis |
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| Publisher |
Oxford University Press |
Place of Publication |
Oxford |
Editor |
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| Language |
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Summary Language |
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Original Title |
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| Series Editor |
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Series Title |
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Abbreviated Series Title |
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| Series Volume |
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Series Issue |
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Edition |
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| ISSN |
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ISBN |
9780199246311 |
Medium |
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| Area |
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Expedition |
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Conference |
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| Notes |
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Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
4413 |
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| Author |
Massen, J.; Sterck, E.; de Vos, H. |
| Title |
Close social associations in animals and humans: functions and mechanisms of friendship |
Type |
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| Year |
2010 |
Publication |
Behaviour |
Abbreviated Journal |
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| Volume |
147 |
Issue |
11 |
Pages |
1379 |
| Keywords |
Both humans and group-living animals associate and behave affiliatively more with some individuals than others. Human friendship has long been acknowledged, and recently scientists studying animal behaviour have started using the term friendship for close social associates in animals. Yet, while biologists describe friends as social tools to enhance fitness, social scientists describe human friendship as unconditional. We investigate whether these different descriptions reflect true differences in human friendship and animal close social associations or are a by-product of different research approaches: namely social scientists focussing on proximate and biologists on ultimate explanations. We first stress the importance of similar measures to determine close social associations, thereafter examine their ultimate benefits and proximate motivations, and discuss the latest findings on the central-neural regulation of social bonds. We conclude that both human friendship and animal close social associations are ultimately beneficial. On the proximate level, motivations for friendship in humans and for close social associations in animals are not necessarily based on benefits and are often unconditional. Moreover, humans share with many animals a similar physiological basis of sociality. Therefore, biologists and social scientist describe the same phenomenon, and the use of the term friendship for animals seems justified. |
| Abstract |
Both humans and group-living animals associate and behave affiliatively more with some individuals than others. Human friendship has long been acknowledged, and recently scientists studying animal behaviour have started using the term friendship for close social associates in animals. Yet, while biologists describe friends as social tools to enhance fitness, social scientists describe human friendship as unconditional. We investigate whether these different descriptions reflect true differences in human friendship and animal close social associations or are a by-product of different research approaches: namely social scientists focussing on proximate and biologists on ultimate explanations. We first stress the importance of similar measures to determine close social associations, thereafter examine their ultimate benefits and proximate motivations, and discuss the latest findings on the central-neural regulation of social bonds. We conclude that both human friendship and animal close social associations are ultimately beneficial. On the proximate level, motivations for friendship in humans and for close social associations in animals are not necessarily based on benefits and are often unconditional. Moreover, humans share with many animals a similar physiological basis of sociality. Therefore, biologists and social scientist describe the same phenomenon, and the use of the term friendship for animals seems justified. |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
5813 |
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