| Records |
Author  |
Griffin, D.R. |
| Title |
From cognition to consciousness |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1998 |
Publication |
Animal Cognition |
Abbreviated Journal |
Anim. Cogn. |
| Volume |
1 |
Issue |
1 |
Pages |
3-16 |
| Keywords |
Animal minds – Cognitive ethology – Cognition – Consciousness |
| Abstract |
This paper proposes an extension of scientific horizons in the study of animal behavior and cognition to include conscious experiences. From this perspective animals are best appreciated as actors rather than passive objects. A major adaptive function of their central nervous systems may be simple, but conscious and rational, thinking about alternative actions and choosing those the animal believes will get what it wants, or avoid what it dislikes or fears. Versatile adjustment of behavior in response to unpredictable challenges provides strongly suggestive evidence of simple but conscious thinking. And especially significant objective data about animal thoughts and feelings are already available, once communicative signals are recognized as evidence of the subjective experiences they often convey to others. The scientific investigation of human consciousness has undergone a renaissance in the 1990s, as exemplified by numerous symposia, books and two new journals. The neural correlates of cognition appear to be basically similar in all central nervous systems. Therefore other species equipped with very similar neurons, synapses, and glia may well be conscious. Simple perceptual and rational conscious thinking may be at least as important for small animals as for those with large enough brains to store extensive libraries of behavioral rules. Perhaps only in “megabrains” is most of the information processing unconscious. |
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no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
3088 |
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| Author |
Kornblith, H. |
| Title |
Knowledge and its Place in Nature |
Type |
Book Whole |
| Year |
2002 |
Publication |
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Abbreviated Journal |
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| Volume |
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Issue |
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Pages |
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| Keywords |
animals; cognitive ethology; conceptual analysis; epistemology; Hilary Kornblith; knowledge; natural kind; naturalistic epistemology; normativity; philosophy |
| Abstract |
Argues that conceptual analysis should be rejected in favour of a more naturalistic approach to epistemology. There is a robust natural phenomenon of knowledge; knowledge is a natural kind. An examination of the cognitive ethology literature reveals a category of knowledge that does both causal and explanatory work. It is argued that knowledge in this very sense is what philosophers have been talking about all along. Rival accounts of knowledge that are more demanding—requiring either that certain social conditions be met or that an agent engage in some sort of reflection—are discussed in detail, and it is argued that they are inadequate to the phenomenon. In addition, it is argued that the account of knowledge that emerges from the cognitive ethology literature can provide an explanation of the normative force of epistemic claims. |
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Oxford University Press |
Place of Publication |
Oxford |
Editor |
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9780199246311 |
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| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
4413 |
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