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| Author | Crowley, P.H.; Provencher, L.; Sloane, S.; Dugatkin, L.A.; Spohn, B.; Rogers, L.; Alfieri, M. | ||||
| Title | Evolving cooperation: the role of individual recognition | Type | Journal Article | ||
| Year | 1996 | Publication | Biosystems | Abbreviated Journal | Biosystems |
| Volume | 37 | Issue | 1-2 | Pages | 49-66 |
| Keywords | Game theory; Genetic algorithms; Individual recognition; Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma; Reciprocal altruism | ||||
| Abstract | To evaluate the role of individual recognition in the evolution of cooperation, we formulated and analyzed a genetic algorithm model (EvCo) for playing the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game. Strategies compete against each other during each generation, and successful strategies contribute more of their attributes to the next generation. Each strategy is encoded on a `chromosome' that plays the IPD, responding to the sequences of most recent responses by the interacting individuals (chromosomes). The analysis reported in this paper considered different memory capabilities (one to five previous interactions), pairing continuities (pairs of individuals remain together for about one, two, five, or 1000 consecutive interactions), and types of individual recognition (recognition capability was maximal, nil, or allowed to evolve between these limits). Analysis of the results focused on the frequency of mutual cooperation in pairwise interactions (a good indicator of overall success in the IPD) and on the extent to which previous responses by the focal individual and its partner were associated with the partner's identity (individual recognition). Results indicated that a fixed, substantial amount of individual recognition could maintain high levels of mutual cooperation even at low pairing continuities, and a significant but limited capability for individual recognition evolved under selection. Recognition generally increased mutual cooperation more when the recent responses of individuals other than the current partner were ignored. Titrating recognition memory under selection using a fitness cost suggested that memory of the partner's previous responses was more valuable than memory of the focal's previous responses. The dynamics produced to date by EvCo are a step toward understanding the evolution of social networks, for which additional benefits associated with group interactions must be incorporated. | ||||
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| Notes | Approved | no | |||
| Call Number | refbase @ user @ | Serial | 483 | ||
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| Author | Czaran, T. | ||||
| Title | Game theory and evolutionary ecology: Evolutionary Games & Population Dynamics by J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, and Game Theory & Animal Behaviour, edited by L.A. Dugatkin and H.K. Reeve | Type | Journal Article | ||
| Year | 1999 | Publication | Trends in Ecology & Evolution | Abbreviated Journal | Trends. Ecol. Evol |
| Volume | 14 | Issue | 6 | Pages | 246-247 |
| Keywords | Game theory; Evolutionary ecology; Population dynamics; Ethology | ||||
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| Notes | Approved | no | |||
| Call Number | refbase @ user @ | Serial | 485 | ||
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| Author | Dall, Sasha R. X; Houston, Alasdair I.; McNamara, John M. | ||||
| Title | The behavioural ecology of personality: consistent individual differences from an adaptive perspective | Type | Journal Article | ||
| Year | 2004 | Publication | Ecology Letters | Abbreviated Journal | Ecol. Letters |
| Volume | 7 | Issue | Pages | 734-739 | |
| Keywords | Adaptive individual differences, behavioural ecology, behavioural syndromes, evolutionary game theory, life history strategies, personality differences, state-dependent dynamic programming | ||||
| Abstract | Individual humans, and members of diverse other species, show consistent differences in aggressiveness, shyness, sociability and activity. Such intraspecific differences in behaviour have been widely assumed to be non-adaptive variation surrounding (possibly) adaptive population-average behaviour. Nevertheless, in keeping with recent calls to apply Darwinian reasoning to ever-finer scales of biological variation, we sketch the fundamentals of an adaptive theory of consistent individual differences in behaviour. Our thesis is based on the notion that such .personality differences. can be selected for if fitness payoffs are dependent on both the frequencies with which competing strategies are played and an individual`s behavioural history. To this end, we review existing models that illustrate this and propose a game theoretic approach to analyzing personality differences that is both dynamic and state-dependent. Our motivation is to provide insights into the evolution and maintenance of an apparently common animal trait: personality, which has far reaching ecological and evolutionary implications. |
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| Notes | Approved | no | |||
| Call Number | refbase @ user @ | Serial | 494 | ||
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| Author | Dubois, F.; Giraldeau, L.-A. | ||||
| Title | The forager's dilemma: food sharing and food defense as risk-sensitive foraging options | Type | Journal Article | ||
| Year | 2003 | Publication | The American Naturalist | Abbreviated Journal | Am Nat |
| Volume | 162 | Issue | 6 | Pages | 768-779 |
| Keywords | Animals; Competitive Behavior/*physiology; *Environment; Feeding Behavior/*physiology; *Game Theory; *Models, Biological; Population Density; Population Dynamics | ||||
| Abstract | Although many variants of the hawk-dove game predict the frequency at which group foraging animals should compete aggressively, none of them can explain why a large number of group foraging animals share food clumps without any overt aggression. One reason for this shortcoming is that hawk-dove games typically consider only a single contest, while most group foraging situations involve opponents that interact repeatedly over discovered food clumps. The present iterated hawk-dove game predicts that in situations that are analogous to a prisoner's dilemma, animals should share the resources without aggression, provided that the number of simultaneously available food clumps is sufficiently large and the number of competitors is relatively small. However, given that the expected gain of an aggressive animal is more variable than the gain expected by nonaggressive individuals, the predicted effect of the number of food items in a clump-clump richness-depends on whether only the mean or both the mean and variability associated with payoffs are considered. More precisely, the deterministic game predicts that aggression should increase with clump richness, whereas the stochastic risk-sensitive game predicts that the frequency of encounters resulting in aggression should peak at intermediate clump richnesses or decrease with increasing clump richness if animals show sensitivity to the variance or coefficient of variation, respectively. | ||||
| Address | Departement des Sciences Biologiques, Universite du Quebec a Montreal, Case postale 8888, Succursale Centre-Ville, Montreal, Quebec H3C 3P8, Canada. fdubois@u-bourgogne.fr | ||||
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| Language | English | Summary Language | Original Title | ||
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| ISSN | 0003-0147 | ISBN | Medium | ||
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| Notes | PMID:14737714 | Approved | no | ||
| Call Number | Serial | 2132 | |||
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| Author | Dubois, F.; Giraldeau, L.-A.; Hamilton, I.M.; Grant, J.W.A.; Lefebvre, L. | ||||
| Title | Distraction sneakers decrease the expected level of aggression within groups: a game-theoretic model | Type | Journal Article | ||
| Year | 2004 | Publication | The American Naturalist | Abbreviated Journal | Am Nat |
| Volume | 164 | Issue | 2 | Pages | E32-45 |
| Keywords | *Aggression; Animals; Behavior, Animal/*physiology; Columbidae/*physiology; Competitive Behavior; Cooperative Behavior; *Game Theory; Hawks/*physiology; Models, Biological | ||||
| Abstract | Hawk-dove games have been extensively used to predict the conditions under which group-living animals should defend their resources against potential usurpers. Typically, game-theoretic models on aggression consider that resource defense may entail energetic and injury costs. However, intruders may also take advantage of owners who are busy fighting to sneak access to unguarded resources, imposing thereby an additional cost on the use of the escalated hawk strategy. In this article we modify the two-strategy hawk-dove game into a three-strategy hawk-dove-sneaker game that incorporates a distraction-sneaking tactic, allowing us to explore its consequences on the expected level of aggression within groups. Our model predicts a lower proportion of hawks and hence lower frequencies of aggressive interactions within groups than do previous two-strategy hawk-dove games. The extent to which distraction sneakers decrease the frequency of aggression within groups, however, depends on whether they search only for opportunities to join resources uncovered by other group members or for both unchallenged resources and opportunities to usurp. | ||||
| Address | Departement des Sciences Biologiques, Universite du Quebec a Montreal, Case postale 8888 Succursale Centre-Ville, Montreal, Quebec H3C 3P8, Canada. frede_dubois@yahoo.fr | ||||
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| Language | English | Summary Language | Original Title | ||
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| ISSN | 1537-5323 | ISBN | Medium | ||
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| Notes | PMID:15278850 | Approved | no | ||
| Call Number | Serial | 2130 | |||
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| Author | Dugatkin, L.; Alfieri, M. | ||||
| Title | Tit-For-Tat in guppies (Poecilia reticulata): the relative nature of cooperation and defection during predator inspection | Type | Journal Article | ||
| Year | 1991 | Publication | Evolutionary Ecology | Abbreviated Journal | Evol. Ecol. |
| Volume | 5 | Issue | 3 | Pages | 300-309 |
| Keywords | Game theory – Tit-For-Tat – predator inspection – guppy | ||||
| Abstract | Summary The introduction of game-theoretical thinking into evolutionary biology has laid the groundwork for a heuristic view of animal behaviour in which individuals employ “strategies” – rules that instruct them how to behave in a given circumstance to maximize relative fitness. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) found that a strategy called Tit-For-Tat (TFT) is one robust cooperative solution to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. There exists, however, little empirical evidence that animals employ TFT. Predator inspection in fish provides one ecological context in which to examine the use of the TFT strategy. | ||||
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| Notes | Approved | no | |||
| Call Number | Equine Behaviour @ team @ | Serial | 2177 | ||
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| Author | Dugatkin, L.A.; Bekoff, M. | ||||
| Title | Play and the evolution of fairness: a game theory model | Type | Journal Article | ||
| Year | 2003 | Publication | Behavioural Processes | Abbreviated Journal | Behav. Process. |
| Volume | 60 | Issue | 3 | Pages | 209-214 |
| Keywords | Play; Fairness; Game theory | ||||
| Abstract | Bekoff [J. Consci. Stud. 8 (2001) 81] argued that mammalian social play is a useful behavioral phenotype on which to concentrate in order to learn more about the evolution of fairness. Here, we build a game theoretical model designed to formalize some of the ideas laid out by Bekoff, and to examine whether `fair' strategies can in fact be evolutionarily stable. The models we present examine fairness at two different developmental stages during an individual's ontogeny, and hence we create four strategies--fair at time 1/fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/fair at time 2. Our results suggest that when considering species where fairness can be expressed during two different developmental stages, acting fairly should be more common than never acting fairly. In addition, when no one strategy was evolutionarily stable, we found that all four strategies we model can coexist at evolutionary equilibrium. Even in the absence of an overwhelming database from which to test our model, the general predictions we make have significant implications for the evolution of fairness. | ||||
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| Call Number | refbase @ user @ | Serial | 488 | ||
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| Author | Mesterton-Gibbons, M.; Gavrilets, S.; Gravner, J.; Akçay, E. | ||||
| Title | Models of coalition or alliance formation | Type | Journal Article | ||
| Year | 2011 | Publication | Journal of Theoretical Biology | Abbreviated Journal | J. Theor. Biol. |
| Volume | 274 | Issue | 1 | Pages | 187-204 |
| Keywords | Game theory; Cooperation | ||||
| Abstract | More than half a century has now elapsed since coalition or alliance formation theory (CAFT) was first developed. During that time, researchers have amassed a vast amount of detailed and high-quality data on coalitions or alliances among primates and other animals. But models have not kept pace, and more relevant theory is needed. In particular, even though CAFT is primarily an exercise in polyadic game theory, game theorists have devoted relatively little attention to questions that motivate field research, and much remains largely unexplored. The state of the art is both a challenge and an opportunity. In this review we describe a variety of game-theoretic and related modelling approaches that have much untapped potential to address the questions that field biologists ask. | ||||
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| ISSN | 0022-5193 | ISBN | Medium | ||
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| Notes | Approved | no | |||
| Call Number | Equine Behaviour @ team @ | Serial | 5322 | ||
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| Author | Suzuki, Y.; Toquenaga, Y. | ||||
| Title | Effects of information and group structure on evolution of altruism: analysis of two-score model by covariance and contextual analyses | Type | Journal Article | ||
| Year | 2005 | Publication | Journal of theoretical biology | Abbreviated Journal | J. Theor. Biol. |
| Volume | 232 | Issue | 2 | Pages | 191-201 |
| Keywords | *Altruism; Analysis of Variance; *Communication; Cooperative Behavior; *Evolution; Game Theory; *Group Structure; Humans; Models, Genetic; Models, Psychological; Selection (Genetics); Trust | ||||
| Abstract | An altruistic individual has to gamble on cooperation to a stranger because it does not know whether the stranger is trustworthy before direct interaction. Nowak and Sigmund (Nature 393 (1998a) 573; J. Theor. Biol. 194 (1998b) 561) presented a new theoretical framework of indirect reciprocal altruism by image scoring game where all individuals are informed about a partner's behavior from its image score without direct interaction. Interestingly, in a simplified version of the image scoring game, the evolutionarily stability condition for altruism became a similar form of Hamilton's rule, i.e. inequality that the probability of getting correct information is more than the ratio of cost to benefit. Since the Hamilton's rule was derived by evolutionarily stable analysis, the evolutionary meaning of the probability of getting correct information has not been clearly examined in terms of kin and group selection. In this study, we applied covariance analysis to the two-score model for deriving the Hamilton's rule. We confirmed that the probability of getting correct information was proportional to the bias of altruistic interactions caused by using information about a partner's image score. The Hamilton's rule was dependent on the number of game bouts even though the information reduced the risk of cooperation to selfish one at the first encounter. In addition, we incorporated group structure to the two-score model to examine whether the probability of getting correct information affect selection for altruism by group selection. We calculated a Hamilton's rule of group selection by contextual analysis. Group selection is very effective when either the probability of getting correct information or that of future interaction, or both are low. The two Hamilton's rules derived by covariance and contextual analyses demonstrated the effects of information and group structure on the evolution of altruism. We inferred that information about a partner's behavior and group structure can produce flexible pathways for the evolution of altruism. | ||||
| Address | Integrative Environmental Sciences, Graduate School of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Tsukuba, 1-1-1, Ten-Nou-Dai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8572, Japan. yukari@pe.ies.life.tsukuba.ac.jp | ||||
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| ISSN | 0022-5193 | ISBN | Medium | ||
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| Notes | PMID:15530489 | Approved | no | ||
| Call Number | refbase @ user @ | Serial | 556 | ||
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