| Records |
| Author |
Helton, W.S. |
| Title |
Animal expertise, conscious or not |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2005 |
Publication |
Animal Cognition |
Abbreviated Journal |
Anim. Cogn. |
| Volume |
8 |
Issue |
2 |
Pages |
67-74 |
| Keywords |
Animals; *Behavior, Animal; *Cognition; *Consciousness; *Learning; Motor Skills; *Practice (Psychology) |
| Abstract |
Rossano (Cognition 89:207, 2003) proposes expertise as an indicator of consciousness in humans and other animals. Since there is strong evidence that the development of expertise requires deliberate practice (Ericsson in The road to excellence: the acquisition of expert performance in the arts and sciences, sports and games 1996), and deliberate practice appears to be outside of the bounds of unconscious processing, then any signs of expertise development in an animal are indicators of consciousness. Rossano's argument may lead to an unsolvable debate about animal consciousness while causing researchers to overlook the underlying reality of animal expertise. This article provides evidence indicative of animals meeting each of the three definitions of expertise established in the scientific literature: expertise as a social construction, expertise as exceptional performance, and expertise as knowledge. In addition, cases of deliberate practice by non-human animals are offered. Acknowledging some animals as experts, regardless of consciousness, is warranted by the research findings and would prove useful in solving many issues remaining in the human expertise literature. |
| Address |
Department of Psychology, Wilmington College, Wilmington, OH 45177, USA, deak_helton@yahoo.com |
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English |
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1435-9448 |
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| Notes |
PMID:15365876 |
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no |
Call Number  |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2511 |
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| Author |
Griffin, D.R.; Speck, G.B. |
| Title |
New evidence of animal consciousness |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2004 |
Publication |
Animal Cognition |
Abbreviated Journal |
Anim. Cogn. |
| Volume |
7 |
Issue |
1 |
Pages |
5-18 |
| Keywords |
Animal Communication; Animals; Awareness; *Behavior, Animal; *Consciousness |
| Abstract |
This paper reviews evidence that increases the probability that many animals experience at least simple levels of consciousness. First, the search for neural correlates of consciousness has not found any consciousness-producing structure or process that is limited to human brains. Second, appropriate responses to novel challenges for which the animal has not been prepared by genetic programming or previous experience provide suggestive evidence of animal consciousness because such versatility is most effectively organized by conscious thinking. For example, certain types of classical conditioning require awareness of the learned contingency in human subjects, suggesting comparable awareness in similarly conditioned animals. Other significant examples of versatile behavior suggestive of conscious thinking are scrub jays that exhibit all the objective attributes of episodic memory, evidence that monkeys sometimes know what they know, creative tool-making by crows, and recent interpretation of goal-directed behavior of rats as requiring simple nonreflexive consciousness. Third, animal communication often reports subjective experiences. Apes have demonstrated increased ability to use gestures or keyboard symbols to make requests and answer questions; and parrots have refined their ability to use the imitation of human words to ask for things they want and answer moderately complex questions. New data have demonstrated increased flexibility in the gestural communication of swarming honey bees that leads to vitally important group decisions as to which cavity a swarm should select as its new home. Although no single piece of evidence provides absolute proof of consciousness, this accumulation of strongly suggestive evidence increases significantly the likelihood that some animals experience at least simple conscious thoughts and feelings. The next challenge for cognitive ethologists is to investigate for particular animals the content of their awareness and what life is actually like, for them. |
| Address |
Concord Field Station, Harvard University, Old Causeway Road, Bedford, MA 01730, USA |
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English |
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1435-9448 |
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| Notes |
PMID:14658059 |
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no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2549 |
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| Author |
Pere, M.C. |
| Title |
Maternal and fetal blood levels of glucose, lactate, fructose, and insulin in the conscious pig |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1995 |
Publication |
Journal of Animal Science |
Abbreviated Journal |
J. Anim Sci. |
| Volume |
73 |
Issue |
10 |
Pages |
2994-2999 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Blood Glucose/*analysis; Catheterization/methods/veterinary; Consciousness/physiology; Female; Fetal Blood/*chemistry; Fructose/analysis/*blood; Insulin/analysis/*blood; Lactates/analysis/*blood; Pregnancy; Swine/*blood/physiology |
| Abstract |
To study nutrition and metabolism in the fetal pig, a chronic catheterization method was developed that allows blood sampling in arteries and veins, at both the umbilical and uterine sources, in the conscious, unstressed animal. A catheter was inserted in the fetal aorta through a femoral artery, and another one was introduced in the umbilical vein. A catheter was put in a femoral artery of the sow so that its end was in the abdominal aorta. A fourth catheter was placed in a uterine vein draining the fetoplacental unit studied. This procedure was applied to 18 Large White primiparous sows at 99 d of gestation. Blood samples were drawn simultaneously using the four catheters before a meal at 103 d of pregnancy, and glucose, insulin, lactate, and fructose were determinated. Glycemia was 2.5 times higher in the sow than in the fetus. The extraction coefficient of glucose by the fetus amounted to 14% of the umbilical supply. The insulin level in the fetal pig was very low ( < 5 microU/mL). Lactate and fructose seemed to originate from the placenta. Blood lactate was 2.6 times lower in the sow than in the fetus, and its extraction coefficient by the fetus amounted to 8%. Fructose in the fetal blood was 2.3 times higher than that of glucose. Fructose was not utilized by the pig fetus. The present results obtained in the fetal pig are comparable to the conclusions drawn from studies with other species. |
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Station de Recherches Porcines, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, Saint-Gilles, France |
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English |
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0021-8812 |
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| Notes |
PMID:8617670 |
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no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2751 |
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| Author |
Crook, J.H. |
| Title |
On attributing consciousness to animals |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1983 |
Publication |
Nature |
Abbreviated Journal |
Nature |
| Volume |
303 |
Issue |
5912 |
Pages |
11-14 |
| Keywords |
Animals; *Behavior, Animal; Cognition; *Consciousness; Evolution; Learning |
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English |
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| ISSN |
0028-0836 |
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PMID:6843653 |
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no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2795 |
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| Author |
Kozarovitskii, L.B. |
| Title |
[Further comment on the distinction between humans and animals] |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1988 |
Publication |
Nauchnye Doklady Vysshei Shkoly. Biologicheskie Nauki |
Abbreviated Journal |
Nauchnye Doki Vyss Shkoly Biol Nauki |
| Volume |
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Issue |
3 |
Pages |
42-45 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Consciousness; Evolution; Humans; Mental Processes; *Philosophy; Thinking |
| Abstract |
The problem of mind is considered in the aspect of natural scientific and philosophical problem of distinction between human and animal. The widespread confusion of the terms “rudiments”, “elements” of specifically human properties in animals and “biological prerequisites” of these properties are critically analysed. The idea is formulated according to which only in the process of anthropogenesis the rudiments of new social property--mind, conscience--could appear in the developing human beings. |
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Russian |
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Original Title |
Eshche raz o grani mezhdu chelovecheskim i zhivotnym |
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| ISSN |
0470-4606 |
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| Notes |
PMID:3382706 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2800 |
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| Author |
Gallup, G.G.J. |
| Title |
Do minds exist in species other than our own? |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1985 |
Publication |
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews |
Abbreviated Journal |
Neurosci Biobehav Rev |
| Volume |
9 |
Issue |
4 |
Pages |
631-641 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Awareness; *Behavior, Animal; Child Psychology; Child, Preschool; *Cognition; Consciousness; Evolution; Humans; Infant; Language; Pan troglodytes; Philosophy; Psychological Theory; Species Specificity |
| Abstract |
An answer to the question of animal awareness depends on evidence, not intuition, anecdote, or debate. This paper examines some of the problems inherent in an analysis of animal awareness, and whether animals might be aware of being aware is offered as a more meaningful distinction. A framework is presented which can be used to make a determination about the extent to which other species have experiences similar to ours based on their ability to make inferences and attributions about mental states in others. The evidence from both humans and animals is consistent with the idea that the capacity to use experience to infer the experience of others is a byproduct of self-awareness. |
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English |
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0149-7634 |
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| Notes |
PMID:4080281 |
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no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2808 |
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| Author |
Pennisi, E. |
| Title |
Are out primate cousins 'conscious'? |
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| Year |
1999 |
Publication |
Science (New York, N.Y.) |
Abbreviated Journal |
Science |
| Volume |
284 |
Issue |
5423 |
Pages |
2073-2076 |
| Keywords |
Animals; *Behavior, Animal; Cebus; *Consciousness; Empathy; Humans; Instinct; Intelligence; Learning; *Mental Processes; Pan troglodytes; *Primates |
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0036-8075 |
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PMID:10409060 |
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no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2843 |
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| Author |
Kirkwood, J.K. |
| Title |
Animal minds and animal welfare |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2000 |
Publication |
The Veterinary Record |
Abbreviated Journal |
Vet. Rec. |
| Volume |
146 |
Issue |
11 |
Pages |
327 |
| Keywords |
*Animal Welfare; Animals; Animals, Domestic/*psychology; *Cognition; Consciousness; Veterinary Medicine/standards |
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0042-4900 |
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PMID:10766123 |
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no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2856 |
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| Author |
Griffin, D.R. |
| Title |
From cognition to consciousness |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1998 |
Publication |
Animal Cognition |
Abbreviated Journal |
Anim. Cogn. |
| Volume |
1 |
Issue |
1 |
Pages |
3-16 |
| Keywords |
Animal minds – Cognitive ethology – Cognition – Consciousness |
| Abstract |
This paper proposes an extension of scientific horizons in the study of animal behavior and cognition to include conscious experiences. From this perspective animals are best appreciated as actors rather than passive objects. A major adaptive function of their central nervous systems may be simple, but conscious and rational, thinking about alternative actions and choosing those the animal believes will get what it wants, or avoid what it dislikes or fears. Versatile adjustment of behavior in response to unpredictable challenges provides strongly suggestive evidence of simple but conscious thinking. And especially significant objective data about animal thoughts and feelings are already available, once communicative signals are recognized as evidence of the subjective experiences they often convey to others. The scientific investigation of human consciousness has undergone a renaissance in the 1990s, as exemplified by numerous symposia, books and two new journals. The neural correlates of cognition appear to be basically similar in all central nervous systems. Therefore other species equipped with very similar neurons, synapses, and glia may well be conscious. Simple perceptual and rational conscious thinking may be at least as important for small animals as for those with large enough brains to store extensive libraries of behavioral rules. Perhaps only in “megabrains” is most of the information processing unconscious. |
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no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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3088 |
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| Author |
Panksepp, J. |
| Title |
Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2005 |
Publication |
Consciousness and Cognition |
Abbreviated Journal |
Conscious Cogn |
| Volume |
14 |
Issue |
1 |
Pages |
30-80 |
| Keywords |
Affect/*physiology; Animals; Bonding, Human-Pet; Brain/*physiology; Consciousness/*physiology; Fear; Humans; Limbic System/physiology; Social Behavior; Species Specificity; Unconscious (Psychology) |
| Abstract |
The position advanced in this paper is that the bedrock of emotional feelings is contained within the evolved emotional action apparatus of mammalian brains. This dual-aspect monism approach to brain-mind functions, which asserts that emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamics of brain systems that generate instinctual emotional behaviors, saves us from various conceptual conundrums. In coarse form, primary process affective consciousness seems to be fundamentally an unconditional “gift of nature” rather than an acquired skill, even though those systems facilitate skill acquisition via various felt reinforcements. Affective consciousness, being a comparatively intrinsic function of the brain, shared homologously by all mammalian species, should be the easiest variant of consciousness to study in animals. This is not to deny that some secondary processes (e.g., awareness of feelings in the generation of behavioral choices) cannot be evaluated in animals with sufficiently clever behavioral learning procedures, as with place-preference procedures and the analysis of changes in learned behaviors after one has induced re-valuation of incentives. Rather, the claim is that a direct neuroscientific study of primary process emotional/affective states is best achieved through the study of the intrinsic (“instinctual”), albeit experientially refined, emotional action tendencies of other animals. In this view, core emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamic attractor landscapes of a variety of extended trans-diencephalic, limbic emotional action systems-including SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST, CARE, PANIC, and PLAY. Through a study of these brain systems, the neural infrastructure of human and animal affective consciousness may be revealed. Emotional feelings are instantiated in large-scale neurodynamics that can be most effectively monitored via the ethological analysis of emotional action tendencies and the accompanying brain neurochemical/electrical changes. The intrinsic coherence of such emotional responses is demonstrated by the fact that they can be provoked by electrical and chemical stimulation of specific brain zones-effects that are affectively laden. For substantive progress in this emerging research arena, animal brain researchers need to discuss affective brain functions more openly. Secondary awareness processes, because of their more conditional, contextually situated nature, are more difficult to understand in any neuroscientific detail. In other words, the information-processing brain functions, critical for cognitive consciousness, are harder to study in other animals than the more homologous emotional/motivational affective state functions of the brain. |
| Address |
Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403, USA. jpankse@bgnet.bgsu.ed |
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English |
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1053-8100 |
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| Notes |
PMID:15766890 |
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no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
4159 |
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