| Records |
| Author |
Dubois, F.; Giraldeau, L.-A.; Hamilton, I.M.; Grant, J.W.A.; Lefebvre, L. |
| Title |
Distraction sneakers decrease the expected level of aggression within groups: a game-theoretic model |
Type  |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2004 |
Publication |
The American Naturalist |
Abbreviated Journal |
Am Nat |
| Volume |
164 |
Issue |
2 |
Pages |
E32-45 |
| Keywords |
*Aggression; Animals; Behavior, Animal/*physiology; Columbidae/*physiology; Competitive Behavior; Cooperative Behavior; *Game Theory; Hawks/*physiology; Models, Biological |
| Abstract |
Hawk-dove games have been extensively used to predict the conditions under which group-living animals should defend their resources against potential usurpers. Typically, game-theoretic models on aggression consider that resource defense may entail energetic and injury costs. However, intruders may also take advantage of owners who are busy fighting to sneak access to unguarded resources, imposing thereby an additional cost on the use of the escalated hawk strategy. In this article we modify the two-strategy hawk-dove game into a three-strategy hawk-dove-sneaker game that incorporates a distraction-sneaking tactic, allowing us to explore its consequences on the expected level of aggression within groups. Our model predicts a lower proportion of hawks and hence lower frequencies of aggressive interactions within groups than do previous two-strategy hawk-dove games. The extent to which distraction sneakers decrease the frequency of aggression within groups, however, depends on whether they search only for opportunities to join resources uncovered by other group members or for both unchallenged resources and opportunities to usurp. |
| Address |
Departement des Sciences Biologiques, Universite du Quebec a Montreal, Case postale 8888 Succursale Centre-Ville, Montreal, Quebec H3C 3P8, Canada. frede_dubois@yahoo.fr |
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English |
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Edition |
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| ISSN |
1537-5323 |
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| Notes |
PMID:15278850 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
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Serial |
2130 |
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| Author |
Dubois, F.; Giraldeau, L.-A. |
| Title |
The forager's dilemma: food sharing and food defense as risk-sensitive foraging options |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2003 |
Publication |
The American Naturalist |
Abbreviated Journal |
Am Nat |
| Volume |
162 |
Issue |
6 |
Pages |
768-779 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Competitive Behavior/*physiology; *Environment; Feeding Behavior/*physiology; *Game Theory; *Models, Biological; Population Density; Population Dynamics |
| Abstract |
Although many variants of the hawk-dove game predict the frequency at which group foraging animals should compete aggressively, none of them can explain why a large number of group foraging animals share food clumps without any overt aggression. One reason for this shortcoming is that hawk-dove games typically consider only a single contest, while most group foraging situations involve opponents that interact repeatedly over discovered food clumps. The present iterated hawk-dove game predicts that in situations that are analogous to a prisoner's dilemma, animals should share the resources without aggression, provided that the number of simultaneously available food clumps is sufficiently large and the number of competitors is relatively small. However, given that the expected gain of an aggressive animal is more variable than the gain expected by nonaggressive individuals, the predicted effect of the number of food items in a clump-clump richness-depends on whether only the mean or both the mean and variability associated with payoffs are considered. More precisely, the deterministic game predicts that aggression should increase with clump richness, whereas the stochastic risk-sensitive game predicts that the frequency of encounters resulting in aggression should peak at intermediate clump richnesses or decrease with increasing clump richness if animals show sensitivity to the variance or coefficient of variation, respectively. |
| Address |
Departement des Sciences Biologiques, Universite du Quebec a Montreal, Case postale 8888, Succursale Centre-Ville, Montreal, Quebec H3C 3P8, Canada. fdubois@u-bourgogne.fr |
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English |
Summary Language |
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| ISSN |
0003-0147 |
ISBN |
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Conference |
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| Notes |
PMID:14737714 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
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Serial |
2132 |
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| Author |
Bugnyar, T.; Heinrich, B. |
| Title |
Pilfering ravens, Corvus corax, adjust their behaviour to social context and identity of competitors |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2006 |
Publication |
Animal Cognition |
Abbreviated Journal |
Anim. Cogn. |
| Volume |
9 |
Issue |
4 |
Pages |
369-376 |
| Keywords |
Adaptation, Psychological; Animals; *Behavior, Animal; *Competitive Behavior; Crows/*physiology; *Deception; Feeding Behavior; Female; Male; Social Behavior; *Social Environment |
| Abstract |
Like other corvids, food-storing ravens protect their caches from being pilfered by conspecifics by means of aggression and by re-caching. In the wild and in captivity, potential pilferers rarely approach caches until the storers have left the cache vicinity. When storers are experimentally prevented from leaving, pilferers first search at places other than the cache sites. These behaviours raise the possibility that ravens are capable of withholding intentions and providing false information to avoid provoking the storers' aggression for cache protection. Alternatively, birds may refrain from pilfering to avoid conflicts with dominants. Here we examined whether ravens adjust their pilfer tactics according to social context and type of competitors. We allowed birds that had witnessed a conspecific making caches to pilfer those caches either in private, together with the storer, or together with a conspecific bystander that had not created the caches (non-storer) but had seen them being made. Compared to in-private trials, ravens delayed approaching the caches only in the presence of storers. Furthermore, they quickly engaged in searching away from the caches when together with dominant storers but directly approached the caches when together with dominant non-storers. These findings demonstrate that ravens selectively alter their pilfer behaviour with those individuals that are likely to defend the caches (storers) and support the interpretation that they are deceptively manipulating the others' behaviour. |
| Address |
Department of Biology, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT 05405, USA. thomas.bugnyar@univie.ac.at |
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English |
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Abbreviated Series Title |
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Edition |
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| ISSN |
1435-9448 |
ISBN |
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Medium |
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Conference |
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| Notes |
PMID:16909235 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2449 |
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| Author |
Fujita, K.; Kuroshima, H.; Masuda, T. |
| Title |
Do tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) spontaneously deceive opponents? A preliminary analysis of an experimental food-competition contest between monkeys |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2002 |
Publication |
Animal Cognition |
Abbreviated Journal |
Anim. Cogn. |
| Volume |
5 |
Issue |
1 |
Pages |
19-25 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Cebus/*psychology; *Competitive Behavior; *Deception; Dominance-Subordination; Feeding Behavior/*psychology; Female; Male; Predatory Behavior; Social Behavior |
| Abstract |
A new laboratory procedure which allows the study of deceptive behavior in nonhuman primates is described. Pairs of tufted capuchin monkeys faced each other in a food-competition contest. Two feeder boxes were placed between the monkeys. A piece of food was placed in one of the boxes. The subordinate individual was able to see the food and to open the box to obtain the bait. A dominant male was unable to see the food or to open the box but was able to take the food once the box was opened by the subordinate. In experiment 1, two of four subordinate monkeys spontaneously started to open the unbaited box first with increasing frequency. Experiment 2 confirmed that this “deceptive” act was not due to a drop in the rate of reinforcement caused by the usurping dominant male, under the situation in which food sometimes automatically dropped from the opened box. In experiment 3, two subordinate monkeys were rerun in the same situation as experiment 1. One of them showed some recovery of the “deceptive” act but the other did not; instead the latter tended to position himself on the side where there was no food before he started to open the box. Although the results do not clearly indicate spontaneous deception, we suggest that operationally defined spontaneous deceptive behaviors in monkeys can be analyzed with experimental procedures such as those used here. |
| Address |
Department of Psychology, Graduate School of Letters, Kyoto University, Yoshida-honmachi, Sakyo, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan. fujita@psy.bun.kyoto-u.ac.jp |
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English |
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Edition |
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| ISSN |
1435-9448 |
ISBN |
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Medium |
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Conference |
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| Notes |
PMID:11957398 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2614 |
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| Author |
Mallavarapu, S.; Stoinski, T.S.; Bloomsmith, M.A.; Maple, T.L. |
| Title |
Postconflict behavior in captive western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2006 |
Publication |
American journal of primatology |
Abbreviated Journal |
Am. J. Primatol. |
| Volume |
68 |
Issue |
8 |
Pages |
789-801 |
| Keywords |
Animals; *Behavior, Animal; *Competitive Behavior; Conflict (Psychology); Female; Gorilla gorilla/*physiology/psychology; Male; Time Factors |
| Abstract |
Postconflict (PC) behaviors, including reconciliation and consolation, have been observed in many primate and several nonprimate species. Using the PC-matched control (MC) method, PC behavior was examined in two groups (n=13) of captive western lowland gorillas, a species for which no conflict resolution data have been published. Analyses of 223 conflicts showed significantly more affiliation between former opponents after a conflict when compared to control periods, indicating reconciliation. Results also showed significantly more affiliation between the victim and a third-party after a conflict, indicating consolation. Both solicited and unsolicited consolation were observed. The majority of the affiliative interactions observed for both reconciliation and consolation were social proximity, which suggests that unlike most nonhuman primates, proximity, rather than physical contact, may be the main mechanism for resolving conflicts in western lowland gorillas. PC behavior was not uniform throughout the groups, but rather varied according to dyad type. |
| Address |
Zoo Atlanta, Atlanta, Georgia 30315, USA. smallavarapu@zooatlanta.org |
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English |
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Edition |
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| ISSN |
0275-2565 |
ISBN |
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| Notes |
PMID:16847973 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
refbase @ user @ |
Serial |
2873 |
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