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Author Grosenick, L.; Clement, T.S.; Fernald, R.D.
Title Fish can infer social rank by observation alone Type Journal Article
Year 2007 Publication Nature Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume (down) 445 Issue 7126 Pages 429-432
Keywords Aggression/physiology; Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Female; Fishes/*physiology; Learning/*physiology; Male; Models, Biological; *Social Dominance; Territoriality
Abstract Transitive inference (TI) involves using known relationships to deduce unknown ones (for example, using A > B and B > C to infer A > C), and is thus essential to logical reasoning. First described as a developmental milestone in children, TI has since been reported in nonhuman primates, rats and birds. Still, how animals acquire and represent transitive relationships and why such abilities might have evolved remain open problems. Here we show that male fish (Astatotilapia burtoni) can successfully make inferences on a hierarchy implied by pairwise fights between rival males. These fish learned the implied hierarchy vicariously (as 'bystanders'), by watching fights between rivals arranged around them in separate tank units. Our findings show that fish use TI when trained on socially relevant stimuli, and that they can make such inferences by using indirect information alone. Further, these bystanders seem to have both spatial and featural representations related to rival abilities, which they can use to make correct inferences depending on what kind of information is available to them. Beyond extending TI to fish and experimentally demonstrating indirect TI learning in animals, these results indicate that a universal mechanism underlying TI is unlikely. Rather, animals probably use multiple domain-specific representations adapted to different social and ecological pressures that they encounter during the course of their natural lives.
Address Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 94305, USA. logang@stanford.edu
Corporate Author Thesis
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1476-4687 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:17251980 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 600
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Author Paz-y-Miño C. G.; Bond, A.B.; Kamil, A.C.; Balda, R.P.
Title Pinyon jays use transitive inference to predict social dominance Type Journal Article
Year 2004 Publication Nature Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume (down) 430 Issue 7001 Pages 778-781
Keywords Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Group Structure; Male; *Social Dominance; Songbirds/*physiology
Abstract Living in large, stable social groups is often considered to favour the evolution of enhanced cognitive abilities, such as recognizing group members, tracking their social status and inferring relationships among them. An individual's place in the social order can be learned through direct interactions with others, but conflicts can be time-consuming and even injurious. Because the number of possible pairwise interactions increases rapidly with group size, members of large social groups will benefit if they can make judgments about relationships on the basis of indirect evidence. Transitive reasoning should therefore be particularly important for social individuals, allowing assessment of relationships from observations of interactions among others. Although a variety of studies have suggested that transitive inference may be used in social settings, the phenomenon has not been demonstrated under controlled conditions in animals. Here we show that highly social pinyon jays (Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus) draw sophisticated inferences about their own dominance status relative to that of strangers that they have observed interacting with known individuals. These results directly demonstrate that animals use transitive inference in social settings and imply that such cognitive capabilities are widespread among social species.
Address Center for Avian Cognition, School of Biological Sciences, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska 68588, USA
Corporate Author Thesis
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1476-4687 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:15306809 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @; Equine Behaviour @ team @ room B 3.029 Serial 352
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Author Shettleworth, S.J.
Title Cognitive science: rank inferred by reason Type Journal Article
Year 2004 Publication Nature Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume (down) 430 Issue 7001 Pages 732-733
Keywords Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Group Structure; Male; *Social Dominance; Songbirds/*physiology
Abstract
Address
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
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ISSN 1476-4687 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:15306792 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 365
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Author Terrace, H.S.
Title Chunking by a pigeon in a serial learning task Type Journal Article
Year 1987 Publication Nature Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume (down) 325 Issue 7000 Pages 149-151
Keywords Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Columbidae/*physiology; Feedback; Learning/*physiology; Male
Abstract A basic principle of human memory is that lists that can be organized into memorable 'chunks' are easier to remember. Memory span is limited to a roughly constant number of chunks and is to a large extent independent of the amount of informaton contained in each chunk. Depending on the ingenuity of the code used to integrate discrete items into chunks, one can substantially increase the number of items that can be recalled correctly. Newly developed paradigms for studying memory in non-verbal organisms allow comparison of the abilities of human and non-human subjects to memorize lists. Here I present two types of evidence that pigeons 'chunk' 5-element lists whose components (colours and achromatic geometric forms) are clustered into distinct groups. Those lists were learned twice as rapidly as a homogeneous list of colours or heterogeneous lists in which the elements are not clustered. The pigeons were also tested for knowledge of the order of two elements drawn from the 5-element lists. They responded in the correct order only to those subsets that contained a chunk boundary. Thus chunking can be studied profitably in animal subjects; the cognitive processes that allow an organism to form chunks do no presuppose linguistic competence.
Address
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ISSN 0028-0836 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:3808071 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2792
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Author Rizzolatti, G.; Fogassi, L.; Gallese, V.
Title Mirrors of the mind Type Journal Article
Year 2006 Publication Scientific American Abbreviated Journal Sci Am
Volume (down) 295 Issue 5 Pages 54-61
Keywords Animals; Brain/*physiology; Cognition/*physiology; Discrimination (Psychology)/physiology; Emotions/physiology; Humans; Imitative Behavior; Learning/*physiology; Mental Processes/*physiology; Motor Activity/physiology; Neurons/physiology; Recognition (Psychology); Sensation/physiology
Abstract
Address Neurosciences Department, University of Parma, Italy
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ISSN 0036-8733 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:17076084 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2829
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Author Barrett, L.; Henzi, P.
Title The social nature of primate cognition Type Journal Article
Year 2005 Publication Proceedings. Biological Sciences / The Royal Society Abbreviated Journal Proc Biol Sci
Volume (down) 272 Issue 1575 Pages 1865-1875
Keywords Animals; Brain/anatomy & histology/*physiology; Cognition/*physiology; *Evolution; Intelligence/*physiology; Primates/*physiology; *Social Behavior
Abstract The hypothesis that the enlarged brain size of the primates was selected for by social, rather than purely ecological, factors has been strongly influential in studies of primate cognition and behaviour over the past two decades. However, the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis, also known as the social brain hypothesis, tends to emphasize certain traits and behaviours, like exploitation and deception, at the expense of others, such as tolerance and behavioural coordination, and therefore presents only one view of how social life may shape cognition. This review outlines work from other relevant disciplines, including evolutionary economics, cognitive science and neurophysiology, to illustrate how these can be used to build a more general theoretical framework, incorporating notions of embodied and distributed cognition, in which to situate questions concerning the evolution of primate social cognition.
Address School of Biological Sciences, University of Liverpool, Crown Street, Liverpool L69 7ZB, UK. louiseb@liv.ac.uk
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ISSN 0962-8452 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:16191591 Approved no
Call Number Serial 2086
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Author Bennett, A.T.
Title Do animals have cognitive maps? Type Journal Article
Year 1996 Publication The Journal of Experimental Biology Abbreviated Journal J Exp Biol
Volume (down) 199 Issue Pt 1 Pages 219-224
Keywords Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Humans; Space Perception/*physiology; Visual Pathways
Abstract Drawing on studies of humans, rodents, birds and arthropods, I show that 'cognitive maps' have been used to describe a wide variety of spatial concepts. There are, however, two main definitions. One, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, is that a cognitive map is a powerful memory of landmarks which allows novel short-cutting to occur. The other, sensu Gallistel, is that a cognitive map is any representation of space held by an animal. Other definitions with quite different meanings are also summarised. I argue that no animal has been conclusively shown to have a cognitive map, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, because simpler explanations of the crucial novel short-cutting results are invariably possible. Owing to the repeated inability of experimenters to eliminate these simpler explanations over at least 15 years, and the confusion caused by the numerous contradictory definitions of a cognitive map, I argue that the cognitive map is no longer a useful hypothesis for elucidating the spatial behaviour of animals and that use of the term should be avoided.
Address Department of Pure Mathematics, University of Adelaide, Australia
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Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0022-0949 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:8576693 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2756
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Author Gallistel, C.R.; Cramer, A.E.
Title Computations on metric maps in mammals: getting oriented and choosing a multi-destination route Type Journal Article
Year 1996 Publication The Journal of Experimental Biology Abbreviated Journal J Exp Biol
Volume (down) 199 Issue Pt 1 Pages 211-217
Keywords Animals; Brain/physiology; Cercopithecus aethiops; Cognition/*physiology; Humans; Mammals/*physiology; Movement; Orientation/*physiology; Rats; Space Perception; Visual Pathways/*physiology
Abstract The capacity to construct a cognitive map is hypothesized to rest on two foundations: (1) dead reckoning (path integration); (2) the perception of the direction and distance of terrain features relative to the animal. A map may be constructed by combining these two sources of positional information, with the result that the positions of all terrain features are represented in the coordinate framework used for dead reckoning. When animals need to become reoriented in a mapped space, results from rats and human toddlers indicate that they focus exclusively on the shape of the perceived environment, ignoring non-geometric features such as surface colors. As a result, in a rectangular space, they are misoriented half the time even when the two ends of the space differ strikingly in their appearance. In searching for a hidden object after becoming reoriented, both kinds of subjects search on the basis of the object's mapped position in the space rather than on the basis of its relationship to a goal sign (e.g. a distinctive container or nearby marker), even though they have demonstrably noted the relationship between the goal and the goal sign. When choosing a multidestination foraging route, vervet monkeys look at least three destinations ahead, even though they are only capable of keeping a maximum of six destinations in mind at once.
Address Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles 90095, USA
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0022-0949 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:8576692 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2757
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Author Acuna, B.D.; Sanes, J.N.; Donoghue, J.P.
Title Cognitive mechanisms of transitive inference Type Journal Article
Year 2002 Publication Experimental brain research. Experimentelle Hirnforschung. Experimentation cerebrale Abbreviated Journal Exp Brain Res
Volume (down) 146 Issue 1 Pages 1-10
Keywords Adolescent; Adult; Attention/*physiology; Cognition/*physiology; Female; Humans; Learning/physiology; Linear Models; Male; Photic Stimulation; Psychomotor Performance/physiology; Reaction Time/physiology
Abstract We examined how the brain organizes interrelated facts during learning and how the facts are subsequently manipulated in a transitive inference (TI) paradigm (e.g., if A<B and B<C, then A<C). This task determined features such as learned facts and behavioral goals, but the learned facts could be organized in any of several ways. For example, if one learns a list by operating on paired items, the pairs may be stored individually as separate facts and reaction time (RT) should decrease with learning. Alternatively, the pairs may be stored as a single, unified list, which may yield a different RT pattern. We characterized RT patterns that occurred as participants learned, by trial and error, the predetermined order of 11 shapes. The task goal was to choose the shape occurring closer to the end of the list, and feedback about correctness was provided during this phase. RT increased even as its variance decreased during learning, suggesting that the learnt knowledge became progressively unified into a single representation, requiring more time to manipulate as participants acquired relational knowledge. After learning, non-adjacent (NA) list items were presented to examine how participants reasoned in a TI task. The task goal also required choosing from each presented pair the item occurring closer to the list end, but without feedback. Participants could solve the TI problems by applying formal logic to the previously learnt pairs of adjacent items; alternatively, they could manipulate a single, unified representation of the list. Shorter RT occurred for NA pairs having more intervening items, supporting the hypothesis that humans employ unified mental representations during TI. The response pattern does not support mental logic solutions of applying inference rules sequentially, which would predict longer RT with more intervening items. We conclude that the brain organizes information in such a way that reflects the relations among the items, even if the facts were learned in an arbitrary order, and that this representation is subsequently used to make inferences.
Address Department of Neuroscience, Box 1953, Brown Medical School, Providence, RI 02912, USA
Corporate Author Thesis
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0014-4819 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:12192572 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 602
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Author Griffin, D.R.
Title Animals know more than we used to think Type
Year 2001 Publication Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Abbreviated Journal Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
Volume (down) 98 Issue 9 Pages 4833-4834
Keywords Animal Communication; Animals; Attention/physiology; Brain/physiology; Choice Behavior/physiology; Cognition/*physiology; Humans; Macaca mulatta/physiology/*psychology; Memory/*physiology; Optic Disk/physiology; Psychological Tests
Abstract
Address
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
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ISSN 0027-8424 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:11320232 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2823
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