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Author Hayashi, M.; Matsuzawa, T.
Title (up) Cognitive development in object manipulation by infant chimpanzees Type Journal Article
Year 2003 Publication Animal Cognition Abbreviated Journal Anim. Cogn.
Volume 6 Issue 4 Pages 225-233
Keywords Age Factors; Animals; Child Development/physiology; Child, Preschool; Cognition/*physiology; Female; Growth; Humans; Imitative Behavior/physiology; Infant; Learning/*physiology; Male; Mothers/*psychology; Motor Skills/*physiology; Pan troglodytes/*growth & development/*psychology; Psychomotor Performance/*physiology; Species Specificity
Abstract This study focuses on the development of spontaneous object manipulation in three infant chimpanzees during their first 2 years of life. The three infants were raised by their biological mothers who lived among a group of chimpanzees. A human tester conducted a series of cognitive tests in a triadic situation where mothers collaborated with the researcher during the testing of the infants. Four tasks were presented, taken from normative studies of cognitive development of Japanese infants: inserting objects into corresponding holes in a box, seriating nesting cups, inserting variously shaped objects into corresponding holes in a template, and stacking up wooden blocks. The mothers had already acquired skills to perform these manipulation tasks. The infants were free to observe the mothers' manipulative behavior from immediately after birth. We focused on object-object combinations that were made spontaneously by the infant chimpanzees, without providing food reinforcement for any specific behavior that the infants performed. The three main findings can be summarized as follows. First, there was precocious appearance of object-object combination in infant chimpanzees: the age of onset (8-11 months) was comparable to that in humans (around 10 months old). Second, object-object combinations in chimpanzees remained at a low frequency between 11 and 16 months, then increased dramatically at the age of approximately 1.5 years. At the same time, the accuracy of these object-object combinations also increased. Third, chimpanzee infants showed inserting behavior frequently and from an early age but they did not exhibit stacking behavior during their first 2 years of life, in clear contrast to human data.
Address Section of Language and Intelligence, Primate Research Institute, Kyoto University, 41 Kanrin, Inuyama, 484-8506 Aichi, Japan. misato@pri.kyoto-u.ac.jp
Corporate Author Thesis
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1435-9448 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:12905079 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2559
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Author Macphail, E.M.
Title (up) Cognitive function in mammals: the evolutionary perspective Type Journal Article
Year 1996 Publication Brain research. Cognitive brain research Abbreviated Journal Brain Res Cogn Brain Res
Volume 3 Issue 3-4 Pages 279-290
Keywords Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Conditioning (Psychology)/*physiology; Evolution; Humans; Learning/*physiology; Task Performance and Analysis
Abstract The work of behavioural pharmacologists has concentrated on small animals, such as rodents and pigeons. The validity of extrapolation of their findings to humans depends upon the existence of parallels in both physiology and psychology between these animals and humans. This paper considers the question whether there are in fact substantial cognitive parallels between, first, different non-human groups of vertebrates and, second, non-humans and humans. Behavioural data from 'simple' tasks, such as habituation and conditioning, do not point to species differences among vertebrates. Using examples that concentrate on the performance of rodents and birds, it is argued that, similarly, data from more complex tasks (learning-set formation, transitive inference, and spatial memory serve as examples) reveal few if any cognitive differences amongst non-human vertebrates. This conclusion supports the notion that association formation may be the critical problem-solving process available to non-human animals; associative mechanisms are assumed to have evolved to detect causal links between events, and would therefore be relevant in all ecological niches. In agreement with this view, recent advances in comparative neurology show striking parallels in functional organisation of mammalian and avian telencephalon. Finally, it is argued that although the peculiarly human capacity for language marks a large cognitive contrast between humans and non-humans, there is good evidence-in particular, from work on implicit learning--that the learning mechanisms available to non--humans are present and do play an important role in human cognition.
Address Department of Psychology, University of York at Heslington, UK
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0926-6410 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:8806029 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 603
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Author Acuna, B.D.; Sanes, J.N.; Donoghue, J.P.
Title (up) Cognitive mechanisms of transitive inference Type Journal Article
Year 2002 Publication Experimental brain research. Experimentelle Hirnforschung. Experimentation cerebrale Abbreviated Journal Exp Brain Res
Volume 146 Issue 1 Pages 1-10
Keywords Adolescent; Adult; Attention/*physiology; Cognition/*physiology; Female; Humans; Learning/physiology; Linear Models; Male; Photic Stimulation; Psychomotor Performance/physiology; Reaction Time/physiology
Abstract We examined how the brain organizes interrelated facts during learning and how the facts are subsequently manipulated in a transitive inference (TI) paradigm (e.g., if A<B and B<C, then A<C). This task determined features such as learned facts and behavioral goals, but the learned facts could be organized in any of several ways. For example, if one learns a list by operating on paired items, the pairs may be stored individually as separate facts and reaction time (RT) should decrease with learning. Alternatively, the pairs may be stored as a single, unified list, which may yield a different RT pattern. We characterized RT patterns that occurred as participants learned, by trial and error, the predetermined order of 11 shapes. The task goal was to choose the shape occurring closer to the end of the list, and feedback about correctness was provided during this phase. RT increased even as its variance decreased during learning, suggesting that the learnt knowledge became progressively unified into a single representation, requiring more time to manipulate as participants acquired relational knowledge. After learning, non-adjacent (NA) list items were presented to examine how participants reasoned in a TI task. The task goal also required choosing from each presented pair the item occurring closer to the list end, but without feedback. Participants could solve the TI problems by applying formal logic to the previously learnt pairs of adjacent items; alternatively, they could manipulate a single, unified representation of the list. Shorter RT occurred for NA pairs having more intervening items, supporting the hypothesis that humans employ unified mental representations during TI. The response pattern does not support mental logic solutions of applying inference rules sequentially, which would predict longer RT with more intervening items. We conclude that the brain organizes information in such a way that reflects the relations among the items, even if the facts were learned in an arbitrary order, and that this representation is subsequently used to make inferences.
Address Department of Neuroscience, Box 1953, Brown Medical School, Providence, RI 02912, USA
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0014-4819 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:12192572 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 602
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Author Shettleworth, S.J.
Title (up) Cognitive science: rank inferred by reason Type Journal Article
Year 2004 Publication Nature Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume 430 Issue 7001 Pages 732-733
Keywords Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Group Structure; Male; *Social Dominance; Songbirds/*physiology
Abstract
Address
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1476-4687 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:15306792 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 365
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Author Gallistel, C.R.; Cramer, A.E.
Title (up) Computations on metric maps in mammals: getting oriented and choosing a multi-destination route Type Journal Article
Year 1996 Publication The Journal of Experimental Biology Abbreviated Journal J Exp Biol
Volume 199 Issue Pt 1 Pages 211-217
Keywords Animals; Brain/physiology; Cercopithecus aethiops; Cognition/*physiology; Humans; Mammals/*physiology; Movement; Orientation/*physiology; Rats; Space Perception; Visual Pathways/*physiology
Abstract The capacity to construct a cognitive map is hypothesized to rest on two foundations: (1) dead reckoning (path integration); (2) the perception of the direction and distance of terrain features relative to the animal. A map may be constructed by combining these two sources of positional information, with the result that the positions of all terrain features are represented in the coordinate framework used for dead reckoning. When animals need to become reoriented in a mapped space, results from rats and human toddlers indicate that they focus exclusively on the shape of the perceived environment, ignoring non-geometric features such as surface colors. As a result, in a rectangular space, they are misoriented half the time even when the two ends of the space differ strikingly in their appearance. In searching for a hidden object after becoming reoriented, both kinds of subjects search on the basis of the object's mapped position in the space rather than on the basis of its relationship to a goal sign (e.g. a distinctive container or nearby marker), even though they have demonstrably noted the relationship between the goal and the goal sign. When choosing a multidestination foraging route, vervet monkeys look at least three destinations ahead, even though they are only capable of keeping a maximum of six destinations in mind at once.
Address Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles 90095, USA
Corporate Author Thesis
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0022-0949 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:8576692 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2757
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Author Pickens, C.L.; Holland, P.C.
Title (up) Conditioning and cognition Type Journal Article
Year 2004 Publication Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews Abbreviated Journal Neurosci Biobehav Rev
Volume 28 Issue 7 Pages 651-661
Keywords Animals; Association Learning/physiology; Cognition/*physiology; Conditioning (Psychology)/*physiology; Discrimination Learning/physiology; Humans; Memory; Models, Psychological; Reinforcement (Psychology); Visual Perception/physiology
Abstract Animals' abilities to use internal representations of absent objects to guide adaptive behavior and acquire new information, and to represent multiple spatial, temporal, and object properties of complex events and event sequences, may underlie many aspects of human perception, memory, and symbolic thought. In this review, two classes of simple associative learning tasks that address these core cognitive capacities are discussed. The first set, including reinforcer revaluation and mediated learning procedures, address the power of Pavlovian conditioned stimuli to gain access, through learning, to representations of upcoming events. The second set of investigations concern the construction of complex stimulus representations, as illustrated in studies of contextual learning, the conjunction of explicit stimulus elements in configural learning procedures, and recent studies of episodic-like memory. The importance of identifying both cognitive process and brain system bases of performance in animal models is emphasized.
Address Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Johns Hopkins University, 3400 North Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218, USA
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0149-7634 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:15555675 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2803
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Author Marino, L.
Title (up) Convergence of complex cognitive abilities in cetaceans and primates Type Journal Article
Year 2002 Publication Brain, Behavior and Evolution Abbreviated Journal Brain Behav Evol
Volume 59 Issue 1-2 Pages 21-32
Keywords Animal Communication; Animals; Brain/physiology; Cerebral Cortex/physiology; Cetacea/*physiology; Cognition/*physiology; *Evolution; Humans; Intelligence; Primates/*physiology
Abstract What examples of convergence in higher-level complex cognitive characteristics exist in the animal kingdom? In this paper I will provide evidence that convergent intelligence has occurred in two distantly related mammalian taxa. One of these is the order Cetacea (dolphins, whales and porpoises) and the other is our own order Primates, and in particular the suborder anthropoid primates (monkeys, apes, and humans). Despite a deep evolutionary divergence, adaptation to physically dissimilar environments, and very different neuroanatomical organization, some primates and cetaceans show striking convergence in social behavior, artificial 'language' comprehension, and self-recognition ability. Taken together, these findings have important implications for understanding the generality and specificity of those processes that underlie cognition in different species and the nature of the evolution of intelligence.
Address Neuroscience and Behavioral Biology Program, Emory University, Atlanta, Ga. 30322, USA. lmarino@emory.edu
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0006-8977 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:12097858 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 4158
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Author Bennett, A.T.
Title (up) Do animals have cognitive maps? Type Journal Article
Year 1996 Publication The Journal of Experimental Biology Abbreviated Journal J Exp Biol
Volume 199 Issue Pt 1 Pages 219-224
Keywords Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Humans; Space Perception/*physiology; Visual Pathways
Abstract Drawing on studies of humans, rodents, birds and arthropods, I show that 'cognitive maps' have been used to describe a wide variety of spatial concepts. There are, however, two main definitions. One, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, is that a cognitive map is a powerful memory of landmarks which allows novel short-cutting to occur. The other, sensu Gallistel, is that a cognitive map is any representation of space held by an animal. Other definitions with quite different meanings are also summarised. I argue that no animal has been conclusively shown to have a cognitive map, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, because simpler explanations of the crucial novel short-cutting results are invariably possible. Owing to the repeated inability of experimenters to eliminate these simpler explanations over at least 15 years, and the confusion caused by the numerous contradictory definitions of a cognitive map, I argue that the cognitive map is no longer a useful hypothesis for elucidating the spatial behaviour of animals and that use of the term should be avoided.
Address Department of Pure Mathematics, University of Adelaide, Australia
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0022-0949 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:8576693 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2756
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Author Overli, O.; Sorensen, C.; Pulman, K.G.T.; Pottinger, T.G.; Korzan, W.; Summers, C.H.; Nilsson, G.E.
Title (up) Evolutionary background for stress-coping styles: relationships between physiological, behavioral, and cognitive traits in non-mammalian vertebrates Type Journal Article
Year 2007 Publication Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews Abbreviated Journal Neurosci Biobehav Rev
Volume 31 Issue 3 Pages 396-412
Keywords Adaptation, Psychological/*physiology; Animals; Behavior, Animal/*physiology; Biogenic Monoamines/physiology; Brain/physiology; Cognition/*physiology; Evolution; Glucocorticoids/*physiology; Individuality; Lizards; Oncorhynchus mykiss; Social Dominance; Stress, Psychological/*psychology
Abstract Reactions to stress vary between individuals, and physiological and behavioral responses tend to be associated in distinct suites of correlated traits, often termed stress-coping styles. In mammals, individuals exhibiting divergent stress-coping styles also appear to exhibit intrinsic differences in cognitive processing. A connection between physiology, behavior, and cognition was also recently demonstrated in strains of rainbow trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss) selected for consistently high or low cortisol responses to stress. The low-responsive (LR) strain display longer retention of a conditioned response, and tend to show proactive behaviors such as enhanced aggression, social dominance, and rapid resumption of feed intake after stress. Differences in brain monoamine neurochemistry have also been reported in these lines. In comparative studies, experiments with the lizard Anolis carolinensis reveal connections between monoaminergic activity in limbic structures, proactive behavior in novel environments, and the establishment of social status via agonistic behavior. Together these observations suggest that within-species diversity of physiological, behavioral and cognitive correlates of stress responsiveness is maintained by natural selection throughout the vertebrate sub-phylum.
Address Department of Animal and Aquacultural Sciences, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, P.O. Box 5003, N-1432 As, Norway. oyvind.overli@umb.no
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0149-7634 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:17182101 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2801
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Author Grosenick, L.; Clement, T.S.; Fernald, R.D.
Title (up) Fish can infer social rank by observation alone Type Journal Article
Year 2007 Publication Nature Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume 445 Issue 7126 Pages 429-432
Keywords Aggression/physiology; Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Female; Fishes/*physiology; Learning/*physiology; Male; Models, Biological; *Social Dominance; Territoriality
Abstract Transitive inference (TI) involves using known relationships to deduce unknown ones (for example, using A > B and B > C to infer A > C), and is thus essential to logical reasoning. First described as a developmental milestone in children, TI has since been reported in nonhuman primates, rats and birds. Still, how animals acquire and represent transitive relationships and why such abilities might have evolved remain open problems. Here we show that male fish (Astatotilapia burtoni) can successfully make inferences on a hierarchy implied by pairwise fights between rival males. These fish learned the implied hierarchy vicariously (as 'bystanders'), by watching fights between rivals arranged around them in separate tank units. Our findings show that fish use TI when trained on socially relevant stimuli, and that they can make such inferences by using indirect information alone. Further, these bystanders seem to have both spatial and featural representations related to rival abilities, which they can use to make correct inferences depending on what kind of information is available to them. Beyond extending TI to fish and experimentally demonstrating indirect TI learning in animals, these results indicate that a universal mechanism underlying TI is unlikely. Rather, animals probably use multiple domain-specific representations adapted to different social and ecological pressures that they encounter during the course of their natural lives.
Address Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 94305, USA. logang@stanford.edu
Corporate Author Thesis
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1476-4687 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:17251980 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 600
Permanent link to this record