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Author Sarter, M.
Title Animal cognition: defining the issues Type Journal Article
Year 2004 Publication Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews Abbreviated Journal Neurosci Biobehav Rev
Volume 28 Issue (up) 7 Pages 645-650
Keywords Animals; Behavior, Animal/*physiology; Cognition/*physiology; Humans; *Models, Animal; Psychopharmacology/methods; Reproducibility of Results
Abstract The assessment of cognitive functions in rodents represents a critical experimental variable in many research fields, ranging from the basic cognitive neurosciences to psychopharmacology and neurotoxicology. The increasing use of animal behavioral tests as 'assays' for the assessment of effects on learning and memory has resulted in a considerable heterogeneity of data, particularly in the field of behavioral and psycho pharmacology. The limited predictive validity of changes in behavioral performance observed in standard animal tests of learning and memory indicates that a renewed effort to scrutinize the validity of these tests is warranted. In humans, levels of processing (effortful vs. automatic) and categories of information (procedural vs. episodic/declarative) are important variables of cognitive operations. The design of tasks that assess the recall of 'episodic' or 'declarative' information appears to represent a particular challenge for research using laboratory rodents. For example, the hypothesis that changes in inspection time for a previously encountered place or object are based on the recall of declarative/episodic information requires substantiation. In order to generalize findings on the effects of neuronal or pharmacological manipulations on learning and memory, obtained from one species and one task, to other species and other tasks, the mediating role of important sets of variables which influence learning and memory (e.g. attentional, affective) needs to be determined. Similar to the view that a neuronal manipulation (e.g. a lesion) represents a theory of the condition modeled (e.g. a degenerative disorder), an animal behavioral task represents a theory of the behavioral/cognitive process of interest. Therefore, the test of hypotheses regarding the validity of procedures used to assess cognitive functions in animals is an inherent part of the research process.
Address Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, 4032 East Hall, 525 E. University Avenue, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1109, USA. msarter@umich.edu
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0149-7634 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:15555674 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2804
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Author Terrace, H.S.
Title Chunking by a pigeon in a serial learning task Type Journal Article
Year 1987 Publication Nature Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume 325 Issue (up) 7000 Pages 149-151
Keywords Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Columbidae/*physiology; Feedback; Learning/*physiology; Male
Abstract A basic principle of human memory is that lists that can be organized into memorable 'chunks' are easier to remember. Memory span is limited to a roughly constant number of chunks and is to a large extent independent of the amount of informaton contained in each chunk. Depending on the ingenuity of the code used to integrate discrete items into chunks, one can substantially increase the number of items that can be recalled correctly. Newly developed paradigms for studying memory in non-verbal organisms allow comparison of the abilities of human and non-human subjects to memorize lists. Here I present two types of evidence that pigeons 'chunk' 5-element lists whose components (colours and achromatic geometric forms) are clustered into distinct groups. Those lists were learned twice as rapidly as a homogeneous list of colours or heterogeneous lists in which the elements are not clustered. The pigeons were also tested for knowledge of the order of two elements drawn from the 5-element lists. They responded in the correct order only to those subsets that contained a chunk boundary. Thus chunking can be studied profitably in animal subjects; the cognitive processes that allow an organism to form chunks do no presuppose linguistic competence.
Address
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Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0028-0836 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:3808071 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2792
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Author Paz-y-Miño C. G.; Bond, A.B.; Kamil, A.C.; Balda, R.P.
Title Pinyon jays use transitive inference to predict social dominance Type Journal Article
Year 2004 Publication Nature Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume 430 Issue (up) 7001 Pages 778-781
Keywords Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Group Structure; Male; *Social Dominance; Songbirds/*physiology
Abstract Living in large, stable social groups is often considered to favour the evolution of enhanced cognitive abilities, such as recognizing group members, tracking their social status and inferring relationships among them. An individual's place in the social order can be learned through direct interactions with others, but conflicts can be time-consuming and even injurious. Because the number of possible pairwise interactions increases rapidly with group size, members of large social groups will benefit if they can make judgments about relationships on the basis of indirect evidence. Transitive reasoning should therefore be particularly important for social individuals, allowing assessment of relationships from observations of interactions among others. Although a variety of studies have suggested that transitive inference may be used in social settings, the phenomenon has not been demonstrated under controlled conditions in animals. Here we show that highly social pinyon jays (Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus) draw sophisticated inferences about their own dominance status relative to that of strangers that they have observed interacting with known individuals. These results directly demonstrate that animals use transitive inference in social settings and imply that such cognitive capabilities are widespread among social species.
Address Center for Avian Cognition, School of Biological Sciences, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska 68588, USA
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1476-4687 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:15306809 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @; Equine Behaviour @ team @ room B 3.029 Serial 352
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Author Shettleworth, S.J.
Title Cognitive science: rank inferred by reason Type Journal Article
Year 2004 Publication Nature Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume 430 Issue (up) 7001 Pages 732-733
Keywords Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Group Structure; Male; *Social Dominance; Songbirds/*physiology
Abstract
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ISSN 1476-4687 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:15306792 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 365
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Author Grosenick, L.; Clement, T.S.; Fernald, R.D.
Title Fish can infer social rank by observation alone Type Journal Article
Year 2007 Publication Nature Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume 445 Issue (up) 7126 Pages 429-432
Keywords Aggression/physiology; Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Female; Fishes/*physiology; Learning/*physiology; Male; Models, Biological; *Social Dominance; Territoriality
Abstract Transitive inference (TI) involves using known relationships to deduce unknown ones (for example, using A > B and B > C to infer A > C), and is thus essential to logical reasoning. First described as a developmental milestone in children, TI has since been reported in nonhuman primates, rats and birds. Still, how animals acquire and represent transitive relationships and why such abilities might have evolved remain open problems. Here we show that male fish (Astatotilapia burtoni) can successfully make inferences on a hierarchy implied by pairwise fights between rival males. These fish learned the implied hierarchy vicariously (as 'bystanders'), by watching fights between rivals arranged around them in separate tank units. Our findings show that fish use TI when trained on socially relevant stimuli, and that they can make such inferences by using indirect information alone. Further, these bystanders seem to have both spatial and featural representations related to rival abilities, which they can use to make correct inferences depending on what kind of information is available to them. Beyond extending TI to fish and experimentally demonstrating indirect TI learning in animals, these results indicate that a universal mechanism underlying TI is unlikely. Rather, animals probably use multiple domain-specific representations adapted to different social and ecological pressures that they encounter during the course of their natural lives.
Address Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 94305, USA. logang@stanford.edu
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ISSN 1476-4687 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:17251980 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 600
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Author Hare, B.; Tomasello, M.
Title Human-like social skills in dogs? Type Journal Article
Year 2005 Publication Trends in Cognitive Sciences Abbreviated Journal Trends. Cognit. Sci.
Volume 9 Issue (up) 9 Pages 439-444
Keywords *Animal Communication; Animals; *Behavior, Animal; Cognition/*physiology; Dogs; *Evolution; Humans; *Social Behavior
Abstract Domestic dogs are unusually skilled at reading human social and communicative behavior--even more so than our nearest primate relatives. For example, they use human social and communicative behavior (e.g. a pointing gesture) to find hidden food, and they know what the human can and cannot see in various situations. Recent comparisons between canid species suggest that these unusual social skills have a heritable component and initially evolved during domestication as a result of selection on systems mediating fear and aggression towards humans. Differences in chimpanzee and human temperament suggest that a similar process may have been an important catalyst leading to the evolution of unusual social skills in our own species. The study of convergent evolution provides an exciting opportunity to gain further insights into the evolutionary processes leading to human-like forms of cooperation and communication.
Address Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, Leipzig, Germany. hare@eva.mpg.de
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Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1364-6613 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:16061417 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 546
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Author Griffin, D.R.
Title Animals know more than we used to think Type
Year 2001 Publication Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Abbreviated Journal Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
Volume 98 Issue (up) 9 Pages 4833-4834
Keywords Animal Communication; Animals; Attention/physiology; Brain/physiology; Choice Behavior/physiology; Cognition/*physiology; Humans; Macaca mulatta/physiology/*psychology; Memory/*physiology; Optic Disk/physiology; Psychological Tests
Abstract
Address
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Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0027-8424 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:11320232 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2823
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Author Hampton, R.R.
Title Rhesus monkeys know when they remember Type Journal Article
Year 2001 Publication Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Abbreviated Journal Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
Volume 98 Issue (up) 9 Pages 5359-5362
Keywords Animals; Choice Behavior/physiology; Cognition/*physiology; Cues; Food Preferences/psychology; Macaca mulatta/*physiology/*psychology; Male; Memory/*physiology; Probability; Psychological Tests; Reproducibility of Results; Sensitivity and Specificity
Abstract Humans are consciously aware of some memories and can make verbal reports about these memories. Other memories cannot be brought to consciousness, even though they influence behavior. This conspicuous difference in access to memories is central in taxonomies of human memory systems but has been difficult to document in animal studies, suggesting that some forms of memory may be unique to humans. Here I show that rhesus macaque monkeys can report the presence or absence of memory. Although it is probably impossible to document subjective, conscious properties of memory in nonverbal animals, this result objectively demonstrates an important functional parallel with human conscious memory. Animals able to discern the presence and absence of memory should improve accuracy if allowed to decline memory tests when they have forgotten, and should decline tests most frequently when memory is attenuated experimentally. One of two monkeys examined unequivocally met these criteria under all test conditions, whereas the second monkey met them in all but one case. Probe tests were used to rule out “cueing” by a wide variety of environmental and behavioral stimuli, leaving detection of the absence of memory per se as the most likely mechanism underlying the monkeys' abilities to selectively decline memory tests when they had forgotten.
Address Section on the Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, Laboratory of Neuropsychology, National Institute of Mental Health, Building 49, Room 1B-80, Bethesda, MD 20892, USA. robert@ln.nimh.nih.gov
Corporate Author Thesis
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0027-8424 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:11274360 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2824
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Author Bennett, A.T.
Title Do animals have cognitive maps? Type Journal Article
Year 1996 Publication The Journal of Experimental Biology Abbreviated Journal J Exp Biol
Volume 199 Issue (up) Pt 1 Pages 219-224
Keywords Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Humans; Space Perception/*physiology; Visual Pathways
Abstract Drawing on studies of humans, rodents, birds and arthropods, I show that 'cognitive maps' have been used to describe a wide variety of spatial concepts. There are, however, two main definitions. One, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, is that a cognitive map is a powerful memory of landmarks which allows novel short-cutting to occur. The other, sensu Gallistel, is that a cognitive map is any representation of space held by an animal. Other definitions with quite different meanings are also summarised. I argue that no animal has been conclusively shown to have a cognitive map, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, because simpler explanations of the crucial novel short-cutting results are invariably possible. Owing to the repeated inability of experimenters to eliminate these simpler explanations over at least 15 years, and the confusion caused by the numerous contradictory definitions of a cognitive map, I argue that the cognitive map is no longer a useful hypothesis for elucidating the spatial behaviour of animals and that use of the term should be avoided.
Address Department of Pure Mathematics, University of Adelaide, Australia
Corporate Author Thesis
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0022-0949 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:8576693 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2756
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Author Gallistel, C.R.; Cramer, A.E.
Title Computations on metric maps in mammals: getting oriented and choosing a multi-destination route Type Journal Article
Year 1996 Publication The Journal of Experimental Biology Abbreviated Journal J Exp Biol
Volume 199 Issue (up) Pt 1 Pages 211-217
Keywords Animals; Brain/physiology; Cercopithecus aethiops; Cognition/*physiology; Humans; Mammals/*physiology; Movement; Orientation/*physiology; Rats; Space Perception; Visual Pathways/*physiology
Abstract The capacity to construct a cognitive map is hypothesized to rest on two foundations: (1) dead reckoning (path integration); (2) the perception of the direction and distance of terrain features relative to the animal. A map may be constructed by combining these two sources of positional information, with the result that the positions of all terrain features are represented in the coordinate framework used for dead reckoning. When animals need to become reoriented in a mapped space, results from rats and human toddlers indicate that they focus exclusively on the shape of the perceived environment, ignoring non-geometric features such as surface colors. As a result, in a rectangular space, they are misoriented half the time even when the two ends of the space differ strikingly in their appearance. In searching for a hidden object after becoming reoriented, both kinds of subjects search on the basis of the object's mapped position in the space rather than on the basis of its relationship to a goal sign (e.g. a distinctive container or nearby marker), even though they have demonstrably noted the relationship between the goal and the goal sign. When choosing a multidestination foraging route, vervet monkeys look at least three destinations ahead, even though they are only capable of keeping a maximum of six destinations in mind at once.
Address Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles 90095, USA
Corporate Author Thesis
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Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0022-0949 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:8576692 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2757
Permanent link to this record