| Records |
| Author |
Shettleworth, S.J. |
| Title |
Memory and hippocampal specialization in food-storing birds: challenges for research on comparative cognition |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2003 |
Publication |
Brain, behavior and evolution |
Abbreviated Journal |
Brain Behav Evol |
| Volume |
62 |
Issue |
2 |
Pages |
108-116 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Birds/*physiology; Cognition/*physiology; Color Perception/physiology; Feeding Behavior/*physiology; Hippocampus/*physiology; Memory/*physiology; Species Specificity |
| Abstract |
The three-way association among food-storing behavior, spatial memory, and hippocampal enlargement in some species of birds is widely cited as an example of a new 'cognitive ecology' or 'neuroecology.' Whether this relationship is as strong as it first appears and whether it might be evidence for an adaptive specialization of memory and hippocampus in food-storers have recently been the subject of some controversy [Bolhuis and Macphail, 2001; Macphail and Bolhuis, 2001]. These critiques are based on misconceptions about the nature of adaptive specializations in cognition, misconceptions about the uniformity of results to be expected from applying the comparative method to data from a wide range of species, and a narrow view of what kinds of cognitive adaptations are theoretically interesting. New analyses of why food-storers (black-capped chickadees, Poecile Atricapilla) respond preferentially to spatial over color cues when both are relevant in a memory task show that this reflects a relative superiority of spatial memory as compared to memory for color rather than exceptional spatial attention or spatial discrimination ability. New studies of chickadees from more or less harsh winter climates also support the adaptive specialization hypothesis and suggest that within-species comparisons may be especially valuable for unraveling details of the relationships among ecology, memory, and brain in food-storing species. |
| Address |
Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ont., M5S 3G3, Canada. shettle@psych.utoronto.ca |
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0006-8977 |
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PMID:12937349 |
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no |
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refbase @ user @ |
Serial |
367 |
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| Author |
Pepperberg, I.M. |
| Title |
In search of king Solomon's ring: cognitive and communicative studies of Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus) |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2002 |
Publication |
Brain, behavior and evolution |
Abbreviated Journal |
Brain Behav Evol |
| Volume |
59 |
Issue |
1-2 |
Pages |
54-67 |
| Keywords |
*Animal Communication; Animals; Attention/physiology; Cognition/*physiology; Cues; Form Perception/physiology; Humans; Intelligence; Learning/physiology; Male; Models, Psychological; Parrots/*physiology; Psychomotor Performance/physiology; Reward; Social Behavior |
| Abstract |
During the past 24 years, I have used a modeling technique (M/R procedure) to train Grey parrots to use an allospecific code (English speech) referentially; I then use the code to test their cognitive abilities. The oldest bird, Alex, labels more than 50 different objects, 7 colors, 5 shapes, quantities to 6, 3 categories (color, shape, material) and uses 'no', 'come here', wanna go X' and 'want Y' (X and Y are appropriate location or item labels). He combines labels to identify, request, comment upon or refuse more than 100 items and to alter his environment. He processes queries to judge category, relative size, quantity, presence or absence of similarity/difference in attributes, and show label comprehension. He semantically separates labeling from requesting. He thus exhibits capacities once presumed limited to humans or nonhuman primates. Studies on this and other Greys show that parrots given training that lacks some aspect of input present in M/R protocols (reference, functionality, social interaction) fail to acquire referential English speech. Examining how input affects the extent to which parrots acquire an allospecific code may elucidate mechanisms of other forms of exceptional learning: learning unlikely in the normal course of development but that can occur under certain conditions. |
| Address |
The MIT Media Lab, Cambridge, Mass. 02139, USA. impepper@media.mit.edu |
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0006-8977 |
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PMID:12097860 |
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no |
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refbase @ user @ |
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579 |
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| Author |
Marino, L. |
| Title |
Convergence of complex cognitive abilities in cetaceans and primates |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2002 |
Publication |
Brain, Behavior and Evolution |
Abbreviated Journal |
Brain Behav Evol |
| Volume |
59 |
Issue |
1-2 |
Pages |
21-32 |
| Keywords |
Animal Communication; Animals; Brain/physiology; Cerebral Cortex/physiology; Cetacea/*physiology; Cognition/*physiology; *Evolution; Humans; Intelligence; Primates/*physiology |
| Abstract |
What examples of convergence in higher-level complex cognitive characteristics exist in the animal kingdom? In this paper I will provide evidence that convergent intelligence has occurred in two distantly related mammalian taxa. One of these is the order Cetacea (dolphins, whales and porpoises) and the other is our own order Primates, and in particular the suborder anthropoid primates (monkeys, apes, and humans). Despite a deep evolutionary divergence, adaptation to physically dissimilar environments, and very different neuroanatomical organization, some primates and cetaceans show striking convergence in social behavior, artificial 'language' comprehension, and self-recognition ability. Taken together, these findings have important implications for understanding the generality and specificity of those processes that underlie cognition in different species and the nature of the evolution of intelligence. |
| Address |
Neuroscience and Behavioral Biology Program, Emory University, Atlanta, Ga. 30322, USA. lmarino@emory.edu |
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0006-8977 |
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| Notes |
PMID:12097858 |
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no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
4158 |
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| Author |
Acuna, B.D.; Sanes, J.N.; Donoghue, J.P. |
| Title |
Cognitive mechanisms of transitive inference |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2002 |
Publication |
Experimental brain research. Experimentelle Hirnforschung. Experimentation cerebrale |
Abbreviated Journal |
Exp Brain Res |
| Volume |
146 |
Issue |
1 |
Pages |
1-10 |
| Keywords |
Adolescent; Adult; Attention/*physiology; Cognition/*physiology; Female; Humans; Learning/physiology; Linear Models; Male; Photic Stimulation; Psychomotor Performance/physiology; Reaction Time/physiology |
| Abstract |
We examined how the brain organizes interrelated facts during learning and how the facts are subsequently manipulated in a transitive inference (TI) paradigm (e.g., if A<B and B<C, then A<C). This task determined features such as learned facts and behavioral goals, but the learned facts could be organized in any of several ways. For example, if one learns a list by operating on paired items, the pairs may be stored individually as separate facts and reaction time (RT) should decrease with learning. Alternatively, the pairs may be stored as a single, unified list, which may yield a different RT pattern. We characterized RT patterns that occurred as participants learned, by trial and error, the predetermined order of 11 shapes. The task goal was to choose the shape occurring closer to the end of the list, and feedback about correctness was provided during this phase. RT increased even as its variance decreased during learning, suggesting that the learnt knowledge became progressively unified into a single representation, requiring more time to manipulate as participants acquired relational knowledge. After learning, non-adjacent (NA) list items were presented to examine how participants reasoned in a TI task. The task goal also required choosing from each presented pair the item occurring closer to the list end, but without feedback. Participants could solve the TI problems by applying formal logic to the previously learnt pairs of adjacent items; alternatively, they could manipulate a single, unified representation of the list. Shorter RT occurred for NA pairs having more intervening items, supporting the hypothesis that humans employ unified mental representations during TI. The response pattern does not support mental logic solutions of applying inference rules sequentially, which would predict longer RT with more intervening items. We conclude that the brain organizes information in such a way that reflects the relations among the items, even if the facts were learned in an arbitrary order, and that this representation is subsequently used to make inferences. |
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Department of Neuroscience, Box 1953, Brown Medical School, Providence, RI 02912, USA |
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0014-4819 |
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| Notes |
PMID:12192572 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
refbase @ user @ |
Serial |
602 |
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| Author |
Allen, C. |
| Title |
Assessing animal cognition: ethological and philosophical perspectives |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1998 |
Publication |
Journal of Animal Science |
Abbreviated Journal |
J. Anim Sci. |
| Volume |
76 |
Issue |
1 |
Pages |
42-47 |
| Keywords |
Agriculture; Animal Welfare; Animals; Animals, Domestic/physiology/*psychology; Behavior, Animal/*physiology; Cognition/*physiology; *Ethology; *Philosophy; Research |
| Abstract |
Developments in the scientific and philosophical study of animal cognition and mentality are of great importance to animal scientists who face continued public scrutiny of the treatment of animals in research and agriculture. Because beliefs about animal minds, animal cognition, and animal consciousness underlie many people's views about the ethical treatment of nonhuman animals, it has become increasingly difficult for animal scientists to avoid these issues. Animal scientists may learn from ethologists who study animal cognition and mentality from an evolutionary and comparative perspective and who are at the forefront of the development of naturalistic and laboratory techniques of observation and experimentation that are capable of revealing the cognitive and mental properties of nonhuman animals. Despite growing acceptance of the ethological study of animal cognition, there are critics who dispute the scientific validity of the field, especially when the topic is animal consciousness. Here, a proper understanding of developments in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science can help to place cognitive studies on a firm methodological and philosophical foundation. Ultimately, this is an interdisciplinary task, involving scientists and philosophers. Animal scientists are well-positioned to contribute to the study of animal cognition because they typically have access to a large pool of potential research subjects whose habitats are more controlled than in most field studies while being more natural than most laboratory psychology experiments. Despite some formidable questions remaining for analysis, the prospects for progress in assessing animal cognition are bright. |
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Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, College Station 77843-4237, USA |
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0021-8812 |
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| Notes |
PMID:9464883 |
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no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2750 |
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| Author |
Bennett, A.T. |
| Title |
Do animals have cognitive maps? |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1996 |
Publication |
The Journal of Experimental Biology |
Abbreviated Journal |
J Exp Biol |
| Volume |
199 |
Issue |
Pt 1 |
Pages |
219-224 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Humans; Space Perception/*physiology; Visual Pathways |
| Abstract |
Drawing on studies of humans, rodents, birds and arthropods, I show that 'cognitive maps' have been used to describe a wide variety of spatial concepts. There are, however, two main definitions. One, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, is that a cognitive map is a powerful memory of landmarks which allows novel short-cutting to occur. The other, sensu Gallistel, is that a cognitive map is any representation of space held by an animal. Other definitions with quite different meanings are also summarised. I argue that no animal has been conclusively shown to have a cognitive map, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, because simpler explanations of the crucial novel short-cutting results are invariably possible. Owing to the repeated inability of experimenters to eliminate these simpler explanations over at least 15 years, and the confusion caused by the numerous contradictory definitions of a cognitive map, I argue that the cognitive map is no longer a useful hypothesis for elucidating the spatial behaviour of animals and that use of the term should be avoided. |
| Address |
Department of Pure Mathematics, University of Adelaide, Australia |
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English |
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0022-0949 |
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| Notes |
PMID:8576693 |
Approved |
no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2756 |
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| Author |
Gallistel, C.R.; Cramer, A.E. |
| Title |
Computations on metric maps in mammals: getting oriented and choosing a multi-destination route |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1996 |
Publication |
The Journal of Experimental Biology |
Abbreviated Journal |
J Exp Biol |
| Volume |
199 |
Issue |
Pt 1 |
Pages |
211-217 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Brain/physiology; Cercopithecus aethiops; Cognition/*physiology; Humans; Mammals/*physiology; Movement; Orientation/*physiology; Rats; Space Perception; Visual Pathways/*physiology |
| Abstract |
The capacity to construct a cognitive map is hypothesized to rest on two foundations: (1) dead reckoning (path integration); (2) the perception of the direction and distance of terrain features relative to the animal. A map may be constructed by combining these two sources of positional information, with the result that the positions of all terrain features are represented in the coordinate framework used for dead reckoning. When animals need to become reoriented in a mapped space, results from rats and human toddlers indicate that they focus exclusively on the shape of the perceived environment, ignoring non-geometric features such as surface colors. As a result, in a rectangular space, they are misoriented half the time even when the two ends of the space differ strikingly in their appearance. In searching for a hidden object after becoming reoriented, both kinds of subjects search on the basis of the object's mapped position in the space rather than on the basis of its relationship to a goal sign (e.g. a distinctive container or nearby marker), even though they have demonstrably noted the relationship between the goal and the goal sign. When choosing a multidestination foraging route, vervet monkeys look at least three destinations ahead, even though they are only capable of keeping a maximum of six destinations in mind at once. |
| Address |
Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles 90095, USA |
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English |
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0022-0949 |
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| Notes |
PMID:8576692 |
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no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2757 |
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| Author |
Griffin, D.R. |
| Title |
Animals know more than we used to think |
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2001 |
Publication |
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America |
Abbreviated Journal |
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. |
| Volume |
98 |
Issue |
9 |
Pages |
4833-4834 |
| Keywords |
Animal Communication; Animals; Attention/physiology; Brain/physiology; Choice Behavior/physiology; Cognition/*physiology; Humans; Macaca mulatta/physiology/*psychology; Memory/*physiology; Optic Disk/physiology; Psychological Tests |
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0027-8424 |
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| Notes |
PMID:11320232 |
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no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2823 |
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| Author |
Hampton, R.R. |
| Title |
Rhesus monkeys know when they remember |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2001 |
Publication |
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America |
Abbreviated Journal |
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. |
| Volume |
98 |
Issue |
9 |
Pages |
5359-5362 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Choice Behavior/physiology; Cognition/*physiology; Cues; Food Preferences/psychology; Macaca mulatta/*physiology/*psychology; Male; Memory/*physiology; Probability; Psychological Tests; Reproducibility of Results; Sensitivity and Specificity |
| Abstract |
Humans are consciously aware of some memories and can make verbal reports about these memories. Other memories cannot be brought to consciousness, even though they influence behavior. This conspicuous difference in access to memories is central in taxonomies of human memory systems but has been difficult to document in animal studies, suggesting that some forms of memory may be unique to humans. Here I show that rhesus macaque monkeys can report the presence or absence of memory. Although it is probably impossible to document subjective, conscious properties of memory in nonverbal animals, this result objectively demonstrates an important functional parallel with human conscious memory. Animals able to discern the presence and absence of memory should improve accuracy if allowed to decline memory tests when they have forgotten, and should decline tests most frequently when memory is attenuated experimentally. One of two monkeys examined unequivocally met these criteria under all test conditions, whereas the second monkey met them in all but one case. Probe tests were used to rule out “cueing” by a wide variety of environmental and behavioral stimuli, leaving detection of the absence of memory per se as the most likely mechanism underlying the monkeys' abilities to selectively decline memory tests when they had forgotten. |
| Address |
Section on the Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, Laboratory of Neuropsychology, National Institute of Mental Health, Building 49, Room 1B-80, Bethesda, MD 20892, USA. robert@ln.nimh.nih.gov |
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0027-8424 |
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| Notes |
PMID:11274360 |
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no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2824 |
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| Author |
Terrace, H.S. |
| Title |
Chunking by a pigeon in a serial learning task |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1987 |
Publication |
Nature |
Abbreviated Journal |
Nature |
| Volume |
325 |
Issue |
7000 |
Pages |
149-151 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Columbidae/*physiology; Feedback; Learning/*physiology; Male |
| Abstract |
A basic principle of human memory is that lists that can be organized into memorable 'chunks' are easier to remember. Memory span is limited to a roughly constant number of chunks and is to a large extent independent of the amount of informaton contained in each chunk. Depending on the ingenuity of the code used to integrate discrete items into chunks, one can substantially increase the number of items that can be recalled correctly. Newly developed paradigms for studying memory in non-verbal organisms allow comparison of the abilities of human and non-human subjects to memorize lists. Here I present two types of evidence that pigeons 'chunk' 5-element lists whose components (colours and achromatic geometric forms) are clustered into distinct groups. Those lists were learned twice as rapidly as a homogeneous list of colours or heterogeneous lists in which the elements are not clustered. The pigeons were also tested for knowledge of the order of two elements drawn from the 5-element lists. They responded in the correct order only to those subsets that contained a chunk boundary. Thus chunking can be studied profitably in animal subjects; the cognitive processes that allow an organism to form chunks do no presuppose linguistic competence. |
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0028-0836 |
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| Notes |
PMID:3808071 |
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no |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2792 |
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