| Records |
| Author |
Allen, C. |
| Title |
Assessing animal cognition: ethological and philosophical perspectives |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1998 |
Publication |
Journal of Animal Science |
Abbreviated Journal |
J. Anim Sci. |
| Volume |
76 |
Issue |
1 |
Pages |
42-47 |
| Keywords |
Agriculture; Animal Welfare; Animals; Animals, Domestic/physiology/*psychology; Behavior, Animal/*physiology; Cognition/*physiology; *Ethology; *Philosophy; Research |
Abstract  |
Developments in the scientific and philosophical study of animal cognition and mentality are of great importance to animal scientists who face continued public scrutiny of the treatment of animals in research and agriculture. Because beliefs about animal minds, animal cognition, and animal consciousness underlie many people's views about the ethical treatment of nonhuman animals, it has become increasingly difficult for animal scientists to avoid these issues. Animal scientists may learn from ethologists who study animal cognition and mentality from an evolutionary and comparative perspective and who are at the forefront of the development of naturalistic and laboratory techniques of observation and experimentation that are capable of revealing the cognitive and mental properties of nonhuman animals. Despite growing acceptance of the ethological study of animal cognition, there are critics who dispute the scientific validity of the field, especially when the topic is animal consciousness. Here, a proper understanding of developments in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science can help to place cognitive studies on a firm methodological and philosophical foundation. Ultimately, this is an interdisciplinary task, involving scientists and philosophers. Animal scientists are well-positioned to contribute to the study of animal cognition because they typically have access to a large pool of potential research subjects whose habitats are more controlled than in most field studies while being more natural than most laboratory psychology experiments. Despite some formidable questions remaining for analysis, the prospects for progress in assessing animal cognition are bright. |
| Address |
Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, College Station 77843-4237, USA |
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| Language |
English |
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Edition |
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| ISSN |
0021-8812 |
ISBN |
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Conference |
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| Notes |
PMID:9464883 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2750 |
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| Author |
Hare, B.; Plyusnina, I.; Ignacio, N.; Schepina, O.; Stepika, A.; Wrangham, R.; Trut, L. |
| Title |
Social cognitive evolution in captive foxes is a correlated by-product of experimental domestication |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2005 |
Publication |
Current biology : CB |
Abbreviated Journal |
Curr Biol |
| Volume |
15 |
Issue |
3 |
Pages |
226-230 |
| Keywords |
Animals; *Animals, Domestic; Cognition/*physiology; *Cues; *Evolution; Foxes/*physiology; *Selection (Genetics); Social Behavior; Species Specificity |
| Abstract |
Dogs have an unusual ability for reading human communicative gestures (e.g., pointing) in comparison to either nonhuman primates (including chimpanzees) or wolves . Although this unusual communicative ability seems to have evolved during domestication , it is unclear whether this evolution occurred as a result of direct selection for this ability, as previously hypothesized , or as a correlated by-product of selection against fear and aggression toward humans--as is the case with a number of morphological and physiological changes associated with domestication . We show here that fox kits from an experimental population selectively bred over 45 years to approach humans fearlessly and nonaggressively (i.e., experimentally domesticated) are not only as skillful as dog puppies in using human gestures but are also more skilled than fox kits from a second, control population not bred for tame behavior (critically, neither population of foxes was ever bred or tested for their ability to use human gestures) . These results suggest that sociocognitive evolution has occurred in the experimental foxes, and possibly domestic dogs, as a correlated by-product of selection on systems mediating fear and aggression, and it is likely the observed social cognitive evolution did not require direct selection for improved social cognitive ability. |
| Address |
Department of Anthropology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. hare@eva.mpg.de |
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English |
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Series Title |
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Abbreviated Series Title |
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Series Issue |
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Edition |
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| ISSN |
0960-9822 |
ISBN |
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Medium |
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Expedition |
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Conference |
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| Notes |
PMID:15694305 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
refbase @ user @ |
Serial |
594 |
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| Author |
Hare, B.; Tomasello, M. |
| Title |
Human-like social skills in dogs? |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2005 |
Publication |
Trends in Cognitive Sciences |
Abbreviated Journal |
Trends. Cognit. Sci. |
| Volume |
9 |
Issue |
9 |
Pages |
439-444 |
| Keywords |
*Animal Communication; Animals; *Behavior, Animal; Cognition/*physiology; Dogs; *Evolution; Humans; *Social Behavior |
| Abstract |
Domestic dogs are unusually skilled at reading human social and communicative behavior--even more so than our nearest primate relatives. For example, they use human social and communicative behavior (e.g. a pointing gesture) to find hidden food, and they know what the human can and cannot see in various situations. Recent comparisons between canid species suggest that these unusual social skills have a heritable component and initially evolved during domestication as a result of selection on systems mediating fear and aggression towards humans. Differences in chimpanzee and human temperament suggest that a similar process may have been an important catalyst leading to the evolution of unusual social skills in our own species. The study of convergent evolution provides an exciting opportunity to gain further insights into the evolutionary processes leading to human-like forms of cooperation and communication. |
| Address |
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, Leipzig, Germany. hare@eva.mpg.de |
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English |
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Series Issue |
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Edition |
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| ISSN |
1364-6613 |
ISBN |
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Medium |
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Expedition |
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Conference |
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| Notes |
PMID:16061417 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
refbase @ user @ |
Serial |
546 |
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| Author |
Bennett, A.T. |
| Title |
Do animals have cognitive maps? |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1996 |
Publication |
The Journal of Experimental Biology |
Abbreviated Journal |
J Exp Biol |
| Volume |
199 |
Issue |
Pt 1 |
Pages |
219-224 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Humans; Space Perception/*physiology; Visual Pathways |
| Abstract |
Drawing on studies of humans, rodents, birds and arthropods, I show that 'cognitive maps' have been used to describe a wide variety of spatial concepts. There are, however, two main definitions. One, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, is that a cognitive map is a powerful memory of landmarks which allows novel short-cutting to occur. The other, sensu Gallistel, is that a cognitive map is any representation of space held by an animal. Other definitions with quite different meanings are also summarised. I argue that no animal has been conclusively shown to have a cognitive map, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, because simpler explanations of the crucial novel short-cutting results are invariably possible. Owing to the repeated inability of experimenters to eliminate these simpler explanations over at least 15 years, and the confusion caused by the numerous contradictory definitions of a cognitive map, I argue that the cognitive map is no longer a useful hypothesis for elucidating the spatial behaviour of animals and that use of the term should be avoided. |
| Address |
Department of Pure Mathematics, University of Adelaide, Australia |
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English |
Summary Language |
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Original Title |
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Series Issue |
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Edition |
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| ISSN |
0022-0949 |
ISBN |
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Medium |
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Expedition |
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Conference |
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| Notes |
PMID:8576693 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2756 |
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| Author |
Pepperberg, I.M. |
| Title |
In search of king Solomon's ring: cognitive and communicative studies of Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus) |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2002 |
Publication |
Brain, behavior and evolution |
Abbreviated Journal |
Brain Behav Evol |
| Volume |
59 |
Issue |
1-2 |
Pages |
54-67 |
| Keywords |
*Animal Communication; Animals; Attention/physiology; Cognition/*physiology; Cues; Form Perception/physiology; Humans; Intelligence; Learning/physiology; Male; Models, Psychological; Parrots/*physiology; Psychomotor Performance/physiology; Reward; Social Behavior |
| Abstract |
During the past 24 years, I have used a modeling technique (M/R procedure) to train Grey parrots to use an allospecific code (English speech) referentially; I then use the code to test their cognitive abilities. The oldest bird, Alex, labels more than 50 different objects, 7 colors, 5 shapes, quantities to 6, 3 categories (color, shape, material) and uses 'no', 'come here', wanna go X' and 'want Y' (X and Y are appropriate location or item labels). He combines labels to identify, request, comment upon or refuse more than 100 items and to alter his environment. He processes queries to judge category, relative size, quantity, presence or absence of similarity/difference in attributes, and show label comprehension. He semantically separates labeling from requesting. He thus exhibits capacities once presumed limited to humans or nonhuman primates. Studies on this and other Greys show that parrots given training that lacks some aspect of input present in M/R protocols (reference, functionality, social interaction) fail to acquire referential English speech. Examining how input affects the extent to which parrots acquire an allospecific code may elucidate mechanisms of other forms of exceptional learning: learning unlikely in the normal course of development but that can occur under certain conditions. |
| Address |
The MIT Media Lab, Cambridge, Mass. 02139, USA. impepper@media.mit.edu |
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English |
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Abbreviated Series Title |
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Series Issue |
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Edition |
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| ISSN |
0006-8977 |
ISBN |
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Medium |
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Expedition |
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Conference |
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| Notes |
PMID:12097860 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
refbase @ user @ |
Serial |
579 |
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| Author |
Heschl, A.; Burkart, J. |
| Title |
A new mark test for mirror self-recognition in non-human primates |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2006 |
Publication |
Primates |
Abbreviated Journal |
Primates |
| Volume |
47 |
Issue |
3 |
Pages |
187-198 |
| Keywords |
Animals; *Behavior, Animal; Callithrix/*physiology; Cognition/*physiology; Discrimination (Psychology)/physiology; Female; Male; Photic Stimulation; *Self Concept |
| Abstract |
For 30 years Gallup's (Science 167:86-87, 1970) mark test, which consists of confronting a mirror-experienced test animal with its own previously altered mirror image, usually a color mark on forehead, eyebrow or ear, has delivered valuable results about the distribution of visual self-recognition in non-human primates. Chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans and, less frequently, gorillas can learn to correctly understand the reflection of their body in a mirror. However, the standard version of the mark test is good only for positively proving the existence of self-recognition. Conclusive statements about the lack of self-recognition are more difficult because of the methodological constraints of the test. This situation has led to a persistent controversy about the power of Gallup's original technique. We devised a new variant of the test which permits more unequivocal decisions about both the presence and absence of self-recognition. This new procedure was tested with marmoset monkeys (Callithrix jacchus), following extensive training with mirror-related tasks to facilitate performance in the standard mark test. The results show that a slightly altered mark test with a new marking substance (chocolate cream) can help to reliably discriminate between true negative results, indicating a real lack of ability to recognize oneself in a mirror, from false negative results that are due to methodological particularities of the standard test. Finally, an evolutionary hypothesis is put forward as to why many primates can use a mirror instrumentally – i.e. know how to use it for grasping at hidden objects – while failing in the decisive mark test. |
| Address |
Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research, Adolf Lorenz Gasse 2, 3422, Altenberg, Austria. adolf.heschl@uni-graz.at |
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Place of Publication |
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English |
Summary Language |
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Abbreviated Series Title |
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Series Issue |
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Edition |
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| ISSN |
0032-8332 |
ISBN |
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Conference |
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| Notes |
PMID:16432640 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2810 |
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| Author |
Wasserman, E.A.; Gagliardi, J.L.; Cook, B.R.; Kirkpatrick-Steger, K.; Astley, S.L.; Biederman, I. |
| Title |
The pigeon's recognition of drawings of depth-rotated stimuli |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1996 |
Publication |
Journal of Experimental Psychology. Animal Behavior Processes |
Abbreviated Journal |
J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process |
| Volume |
22 |
Issue |
2 |
Pages |
205-221 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Columbidae; Discrimination (Psychology); Form Perception/*physiology; Learning/*physiology; Photic Stimulation; Rotation |
| Abstract |
Four experiments used a four-choice discrimination learning paradigm to explore the pigeon's recognition of line drawings of four objects (an airplane, a chair, a desk lamp, and a flashlight) that were rotated in depth. The pigeons reliably generalized discriminative responding to pictorial stimuli over all untrained depth rotations, despite the bird's having been trained at only a single depth orientation. These generalization gradients closely resembled those found in prior research that used other stimulus dimensions. Increasing the number of different vantage points in the training set from one to three broadened the range of generalized testing performance, with wider spacing of the training orientations more effectively broadening generalized responding. Template and geon theories of visual recognition are applied to these empirical results. |
| Address |
Department of Psychology, University of Iowa, Iowa City 52242-1407, USA. ed-wasserman@uiowa.educ |
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English |
Summary Language |
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Abbreviated Series Title |
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Series Issue |
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Edition |
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| ISSN |
0097-7403 |
ISBN |
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Medium |
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Expedition |
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Conference |
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| Notes |
PMID:8618103 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2780 |
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| Author |
Hampton, R.R. |
| Title |
Rhesus monkeys know when they remember |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2001 |
Publication |
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America |
Abbreviated Journal |
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. |
| Volume |
98 |
Issue |
9 |
Pages |
5359-5362 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Choice Behavior/physiology; Cognition/*physiology; Cues; Food Preferences/psychology; Macaca mulatta/*physiology/*psychology; Male; Memory/*physiology; Probability; Psychological Tests; Reproducibility of Results; Sensitivity and Specificity |
| Abstract |
Humans are consciously aware of some memories and can make verbal reports about these memories. Other memories cannot be brought to consciousness, even though they influence behavior. This conspicuous difference in access to memories is central in taxonomies of human memory systems but has been difficult to document in animal studies, suggesting that some forms of memory may be unique to humans. Here I show that rhesus macaque monkeys can report the presence or absence of memory. Although it is probably impossible to document subjective, conscious properties of memory in nonverbal animals, this result objectively demonstrates an important functional parallel with human conscious memory. Animals able to discern the presence and absence of memory should improve accuracy if allowed to decline memory tests when they have forgotten, and should decline tests most frequently when memory is attenuated experimentally. One of two monkeys examined unequivocally met these criteria under all test conditions, whereas the second monkey met them in all but one case. Probe tests were used to rule out “cueing” by a wide variety of environmental and behavioral stimuli, leaving detection of the absence of memory per se as the most likely mechanism underlying the monkeys' abilities to selectively decline memory tests when they had forgotten. |
| Address |
Section on the Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, Laboratory of Neuropsychology, National Institute of Mental Health, Building 49, Room 1B-80, Bethesda, MD 20892, USA. robert@ln.nimh.nih.gov |
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English |
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Series Issue |
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Edition |
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| ISSN |
0027-8424 |
ISBN |
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Expedition |
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Conference |
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| Notes |
PMID:11274360 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2824 |
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| Author |
Cerutti, D.T.; Staddon, J.E.R. |
| Title |
Immediacy versus anticipated delay in the time-left experiment: a test of the cognitive hypothesis |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2004 |
Publication |
Journal of Experimental Psychology. Animal Behavior Processes |
Abbreviated Journal |
J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process |
| Volume |
30 |
Issue |
1 |
Pages |
45-57 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Choice Behavior/*physiology; Cognition/*physiology; Columbidae; Male; Models, Psychological; Psychological Theory; *Reinforcement (Psychology); *Reinforcement Schedule; Time Perception/*physiology |
| Abstract |
In the time-left experiment (J. Gibbon & R. M. Church, 1981), animals are said to compare an expectation of a fixed delay to food, for one choice, with a decreasing delay expectation for the other, mentally representing both upcoming time to food and the difference between current time and upcoming time (the cognitive hypothesis). The results of 2 experiments support a simpler view: that animals choose according to the immediacies of reinforcement for each response at a time signaled by available time markers (the temporal control hypothesis). It is not necessary to assume that animals can either represent or subtract representations of times to food to explain the results of the time-left experiment. |
| Address |
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708-1050, USA. cerutti@psych.duke.edu |
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English |
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Edition |
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0097-7403 |
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Conference |
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| Notes |
PMID:14709114 |
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
2768 |
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| Author |
Paz-y-Miño C. G.; Bond, A.B.; Kamil, A.C.; Balda, R.P. |
| Title |
Pinyon jays use transitive inference to predict social dominance |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2004 |
Publication |
Nature |
Abbreviated Journal |
Nature |
| Volume |
430 |
Issue |
7001 |
Pages |
778-781 |
| Keywords |
Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Group Structure; Male; *Social Dominance; Songbirds/*physiology |
| Abstract |
Living in large, stable social groups is often considered to favour the evolution of enhanced cognitive abilities, such as recognizing group members, tracking their social status and inferring relationships among them. An individual's place in the social order can be learned through direct interactions with others, but conflicts can be time-consuming and even injurious. Because the number of possible pairwise interactions increases rapidly with group size, members of large social groups will benefit if they can make judgments about relationships on the basis of indirect evidence. Transitive reasoning should therefore be particularly important for social individuals, allowing assessment of relationships from observations of interactions among others. Although a variety of studies have suggested that transitive inference may be used in social settings, the phenomenon has not been demonstrated under controlled conditions in animals. Here we show that highly social pinyon jays (Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus) draw sophisticated inferences about their own dominance status relative to that of strangers that they have observed interacting with known individuals. These results directly demonstrate that animals use transitive inference in social settings and imply that such cognitive capabilities are widespread among social species. |
| Address |
Center for Avian Cognition, School of Biological Sciences, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska 68588, USA |
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English |
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Series Issue |
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Edition |
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| ISSN |
1476-4687 |
ISBN |
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| Notes |
PMID:15306809 |
Approved |
no |
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refbase @ user @; Equine Behaviour @ team @ room B 3.029 |
Serial |
352 |
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