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Author van der Willigen, R.F.; Frost, B.J.; Wagner, H.
Title How owls structure visual information Type Journal Article
Year 2003 Publication Animal Cognition Abbreviated Journal Anim. Cogn.
Volume 6 Issue 1 Pages 39-55
Keywords Animals; *Cognition; Depth Perception; Discrimination Learning; Female; Male; *Strigiformes; *Visual Perception
Abstract Recent studies on perceptual organization in humans claim that the ability to represent a visual scene as a set of coherent surfaces is of central importance for visual cognition. We examined whether this surface representation hypothesis generalizes to a non-mammalian species, the barn owl ( Tyto alba). Discrimination transfer combined with random-dot stimuli provided the appropriate means for a series of two behavioural experiments with the specific aims of (1) obtaining psychophysical measurements of figure-ground segmentation in the owl, and (2) determining the nature of the information involved. In experiment 1, two owls were trained to indicate the presence or absence of a central planar surface (figure) among a larger region of random dots (ground) based on differences in texture. Without additional training, the owls could make the same discrimination when figure and ground had reversed luminance, or were camouflaged by the use of uniformly textured random-dot stereograms. In the latter case, the figure stands out in depth from the ground when positional differences of the figure in two retinal images are combined (binocular disparity). In experiment 2, two new owls were trained to distinguish three-dimensional objects from holes using random-dot kinematograms. These birds could make the same discrimination when information on surface segmentation was unexpectedly switched from relative motion to half-occlusion. In the latter case, stereograms were used that provide the impression of stratified surfaces to humans by giving unpairable image features to the eyes. The ability to use image features such as texture, binocular disparity, relative motion, and half-occlusion interchangeably to determine figure-ground relationships suggests that in owls, as in humans, the structuring of the visual scene critically depends on how indirect image information (depth order, occlusion contours) is allocated between different surfaces.
Address Institut fur Biologie II, RWTH Aachen, Kopernikusstrasse 16, 52074, Aachen, Germany. willigen@bio2.rwth-aachen.de
Corporate Author Thesis
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Language English Summary Language Original Title (up)
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1435-9448 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:12658534 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2582
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Author Kiltie, R.A.; Fan, J.; Laine, A.F.
Title A wavelet-based metric for visual texture discrimination with applications in evolutionary ecology Type Journal Article
Year 1995 Publication Mathematical Biosciences Abbreviated Journal Math Biosci
Volume 126 Issue 1 Pages 21-39
Keywords Animals; Carnivora; *Ecology; Equidae; *Evolution; Humans; Mathematics; Models, Biological; Moths; *Pattern Recognition, Visual; Pigmentation
Abstract Much work on natural and sexual selection is concerned with the conspicuousness of visual patterns (textures) on animal and plant surfaces. Previous attempts by evolutionary biologists to quantify apparency of such textures have involved subjective estimates of conspicuousness or statistical analyses based on transect samples. We present a method based on wavelet analysis that avoids subjectivity and that uses more of the information in image textures than transects do. Like the human visual system for texture discrimination, and probably like that of other vertebrates, this method is based on localized analysis of orientation and frequency components of the patterns composing visual textures. As examples of the metric's utility, we present analyses of crypsis for tigers, zebras, and peppered moth morphs.
Address Department of Zoology, University of Florida, Gainesville
Corporate Author Thesis
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Language English Summary Language Original Title (up)
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0025-5564 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:7696817 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2660
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Author Allen, C.
Title Assessing animal cognition: ethological and philosophical perspectives Type Journal Article
Year 1998 Publication Journal of Animal Science Abbreviated Journal J. Anim Sci.
Volume 76 Issue 1 Pages 42-47
Keywords Agriculture; Animal Welfare; Animals; Animals, Domestic/physiology/*psychology; Behavior, Animal/*physiology; Cognition/*physiology; *Ethology; *Philosophy; Research
Abstract Developments in the scientific and philosophical study of animal cognition and mentality are of great importance to animal scientists who face continued public scrutiny of the treatment of animals in research and agriculture. Because beliefs about animal minds, animal cognition, and animal consciousness underlie many people's views about the ethical treatment of nonhuman animals, it has become increasingly difficult for animal scientists to avoid these issues. Animal scientists may learn from ethologists who study animal cognition and mentality from an evolutionary and comparative perspective and who are at the forefront of the development of naturalistic and laboratory techniques of observation and experimentation that are capable of revealing the cognitive and mental properties of nonhuman animals. Despite growing acceptance of the ethological study of animal cognition, there are critics who dispute the scientific validity of the field, especially when the topic is animal consciousness. Here, a proper understanding of developments in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science can help to place cognitive studies on a firm methodological and philosophical foundation. Ultimately, this is an interdisciplinary task, involving scientists and philosophers. Animal scientists are well-positioned to contribute to the study of animal cognition because they typically have access to a large pool of potential research subjects whose habitats are more controlled than in most field studies while being more natural than most laboratory psychology experiments. Despite some formidable questions remaining for analysis, the prospects for progress in assessing animal cognition are bright.
Address Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, College Station 77843-4237, USA
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title (up)
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0021-8812 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:9464883 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2750
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Author Duncan, I.J.; Petherick, J.C.
Title The implications of cognitive processes for animal welfare Type Journal Article
Year 1991 Publication Journal of Animal Science Abbreviated Journal J. Anim Sci.
Volume 69 Issue 12 Pages 5017-5022
Keywords *Animal Welfare; Animals; Animals, Domestic/*psychology; *Cognition
Abstract In general, codes that have been designed to safeguard the welfare of animals emphasize the importance of providing an environment that will ensure good health and a normal physiological and physical state, that is, they emphasize the animals' physical needs. If mental needs are mentioned, they are always relegated to secondary importance. The argument is put forward here that animal welfare is dependent solely on the cognitive needs of the animals concerned. In general, if these cognitive needs are met, they will protect the animals' physical needs. It is contended that in the few cases in which they do not safeguard the physical needs, it does not matter from a welfare point of view. The human example is given of being ill. It is argued that welfare is only adversely affected when a person feels ill, knows that he or she is ill, or even thinks that he or she is ill, all of which processes are cognitive ones. The implications for welfare of animals possessing certain cognitive abilities are discussed. For example, the extent to which animals are aware of their internal state while performing behavior known to be indicative of so-called states of suffering, such as fear, frustration, and pain, will determine how much they are actually suffering. With careful experimentation it may be possible to determine how negative they feel these states to be. Similarly, the extent to which animals think about items or events absent from their immediate environment will determine how frustrated they are in the absence of the real item or event but in the presence of the cognitive representation.
Address University of Guelph, Canada
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Language English Summary Language Original Title (up)
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0021-8812 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:1808195 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2753
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Author Curtis, S.E.; Stricklin, W.R.
Title The importance of animal cognition in agricultural animal production systems: an overview Type Journal Article
Year 1991 Publication Journal of Animal Science Abbreviated Journal J. Anim Sci.
Volume 69 Issue 12 Pages 5001-5007
Keywords *Agriculture; Animal Population Groups/*psychology; *Animal Welfare; Animals; *Behavior, Animal; *Cognition; Heat; Helplessness, Learned; Housing, Animal/standards; Immobilization; Nesting Behavior; Pain/psychology/veterinary
Abstract To describe and then fulfill agricultural animals' needs, we must learn more about their fundamental psychological and behavioral processes. How does this animal feel? Is that animal suffering? Will we ever be able to know these things? Scientists specializing in animal cognition say that there are numerous problems but that they can be overcome. Recognition by scientists of the notion of animal awareness has been increasing in recent years, because of the work of Griffin and others. Feeling, thinking, remembering, and imagining are cognitive processes that are factors in the economic and humane production of agricultural animals. It has been observed that the animal welfare debate depends on two controversial questions: Do animals have subjective feelings? If they do, can we find indicators that reveal them? Here, indirect behavioral analysis approaches must be taken. Moreover, the linear additivity of several stressor effects on a variety of animal traits suggests that some single phenomenon is acting as a “clearinghouse” for many or all of the stresses acting on an animal at any given time, and this phenomenon might be psychological stress. Specific situations animals may encounter in agricultural production settings are discussed with respect to the animals' subjective feelings.
Address University of Illinois, Urbana 61801
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title (up)
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0021-8812 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:1808193 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2754
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Author Bennett, A.T.
Title Do animals have cognitive maps? Type Journal Article
Year 1996 Publication The Journal of Experimental Biology Abbreviated Journal J Exp Biol
Volume 199 Issue Pt 1 Pages 219-224
Keywords Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Humans; Space Perception/*physiology; Visual Pathways
Abstract Drawing on studies of humans, rodents, birds and arthropods, I show that 'cognitive maps' have been used to describe a wide variety of spatial concepts. There are, however, two main definitions. One, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, is that a cognitive map is a powerful memory of landmarks which allows novel short-cutting to occur. The other, sensu Gallistel, is that a cognitive map is any representation of space held by an animal. Other definitions with quite different meanings are also summarised. I argue that no animal has been conclusively shown to have a cognitive map, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, because simpler explanations of the crucial novel short-cutting results are invariably possible. Owing to the repeated inability of experimenters to eliminate these simpler explanations over at least 15 years, and the confusion caused by the numerous contradictory definitions of a cognitive map, I argue that the cognitive map is no longer a useful hypothesis for elucidating the spatial behaviour of animals and that use of the term should be avoided.
Address Department of Pure Mathematics, University of Adelaide, Australia
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title (up)
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0022-0949 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:8576693 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2756
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Author Gallistel, C.R.; Cramer, A.E.
Title Computations on metric maps in mammals: getting oriented and choosing a multi-destination route Type Journal Article
Year 1996 Publication The Journal of Experimental Biology Abbreviated Journal J Exp Biol
Volume 199 Issue Pt 1 Pages 211-217
Keywords Animals; Brain/physiology; Cercopithecus aethiops; Cognition/*physiology; Humans; Mammals/*physiology; Movement; Orientation/*physiology; Rats; Space Perception; Visual Pathways/*physiology
Abstract The capacity to construct a cognitive map is hypothesized to rest on two foundations: (1) dead reckoning (path integration); (2) the perception of the direction and distance of terrain features relative to the animal. A map may be constructed by combining these two sources of positional information, with the result that the positions of all terrain features are represented in the coordinate framework used for dead reckoning. When animals need to become reoriented in a mapped space, results from rats and human toddlers indicate that they focus exclusively on the shape of the perceived environment, ignoring non-geometric features such as surface colors. As a result, in a rectangular space, they are misoriented half the time even when the two ends of the space differ strikingly in their appearance. In searching for a hidden object after becoming reoriented, both kinds of subjects search on the basis of the object's mapped position in the space rather than on the basis of its relationship to a goal sign (e.g. a distinctive container or nearby marker), even though they have demonstrably noted the relationship between the goal and the goal sign. When choosing a multidestination foraging route, vervet monkeys look at least three destinations ahead, even though they are only capable of keeping a maximum of six destinations in mind at once.
Address Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles 90095, USA
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title (up)
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0022-0949 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:8576692 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2757
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Author Etienne, A.S.; Maurer, R.; Seguinot, V.
Title Path integration in mammals and its interaction with visual landmarks Type Journal Article
Year 1996 Publication The Journal of Experimental Biology Abbreviated Journal J Exp Biol
Volume 199 Issue Pt 1 Pages 201-209
Keywords Animals; Cognition/physiology; Cricetinae; Gerbillinae; Humans; Locomotion/*physiology; Mammals/*physiology; Mesocricetus; Mice; Proprioception/physiology; Rats; Visual Pathways/*physiology; Visual Perception/*physiology
Abstract During locomotion, mammals update their position with respect to a fixed point of reference, such as their point of departure, by processing inertial cues, proprioceptive feedback and stored motor commands generated during locomotion. This so-called path integration system (dead reckoning) allows the animal to return to its home, or to a familiar feeding place, even when external cues are absent or novel. However, without the use of external cues, the path integration process leads to rapid accumulation of errors involving both the direction and distance of the goal. Therefore, even nocturnal species such as hamsters and mice rely more on previously learned visual references than on the path integration system when the two types of information are in conflict. Recent studies investigate the extent to which path integration and familiar visual cues cooperate to optimize the navigational performance.
Address Laboratoire d'Ethologie, FPSE, Universite de Geneve, Carouge, Switzerland
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title (up)
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0022-0949 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:8576691 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2758
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Author Aust, U.; Huber, L.
Title Picture-object recognition in pigeons: evidence of representational insight in a visual categorization task using a complementary information procedure Type Journal Article
Year 2006 Publication Journal of Experimental Psychology. Animal Behavior Processes Abbreviated Journal J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process
Volume 32 Issue 2 Pages 190-195
Keywords Animals; Classification; *Cognition; Columbidae; *Discrimination Learning; *Form Perception; *Generalization (Psychology); Humans; Perceptual Closure; Photic Stimulation; Photography; *Recognition (Psychology)
Abstract Success in tasks requiring categorization of pictorial stimuli does not prove that a subject understands what the pictures stand for. The ability to achieve representational insight is by no means a trivial one because it exceeds mere detection of 2-D features present in both the pictorial images and their referents. So far, evidence for such an ability in nonhuman species is weak and inconclusive. Here, the authors report evidence of representational insight in pigeons. After being trained on pictures of incomplete human figures, the birds responded significantly more to pictures of the previously missing parts than to nonrepresentative stimuli, which demonstrates that they actually recognized the pictures' representational content.
Address Department for Behavior, Neurobiology and Cognition, University of Vienna, Austria. ulrike.aust@univie.ac.at
Corporate Author Thesis
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Language English Summary Language Original Title (up)
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0097-7403 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:16634663 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2759
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Author Washburn, D.A.; Smith, J.D.; Shields, W.E.
Title Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) immediately generalize the uncertain response Type Journal Article
Year 2006 Publication Journal of Experimental Psychology. Animal Behavior Processes Abbreviated Journal J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process
Volume 32 Issue 2 Pages 185-189
Keywords Adaptation, Psychological; Animals; *Cognition; *Discrimination Learning; *Generalization (Psychology); Macaca mulatta/*psychology; Male; *Uncertainty
Abstract Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) have learned, like humans, to use an uncertain response adaptively under test conditions that create uncertainty, suggesting a metacognitive process by which human and nonhuman primates may monitor their confidence and alter their behavior accordingly. In this study, 4 rhesus monkeys generalized their use of the uncertain response, without additional training, to 2 familiar tasks (2-choice discrimination learning and mirror-image matching to sample) that predictably and demonstrably produce uncertainty. The monkeys were significantly less likely to use the uncertain response on trials in which the answer might be known. These results indicate that monkeys, like humans, know when they do not know and that they can learn to use a symbol as a generalized means for indicating their uncertainty.
Address Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, 30303, USA. dwashhburn@gsu.edu
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title (up)
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0097-7403 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:16634662 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2760
Permanent link to this record