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Author Dudchenko, P.A.; Davidson, M.
Title Rats use a sense of direction to alternate on T-mazes located in adjacent rooms Type Journal Article
Year 2002 Publication Animal Cognition Abbreviated Journal Anim. Cogn.
Volume 5 Issue 2 Pages 115-118
Keywords Animals; *Cognition; Male; *Maze Learning; Rats; Rats, Inbred Strains; Space Perception
Abstract Lister hooded rats were trained on a forced-sample T-maze alternation task in an environment lacking spatial landmarks. An early study of spontaneous alternation on the T-maze had shown that rats use a “spatial sense” to select alternate maze arms across mazes. As this phenomenon may provide a useful tool for studying the neural substrates of a directional sense, we wished to confirm this finding on a different version of the T-maze task, with well-trained animals. We found that rats successfully selected the appropriate maze arm when the choice phase of the task was presented on a second maze, oriented in the same direction, and located in an adjacent room. However, choice performance fell to chance level when the second maze was oriented 90 degrees relative to the first. This result suggests that the rats do not simply alternate turns across the two environments, but rather that they rely on a sense of direction that is carried across environments.
Address Department of Psychology, University of Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA, UK. p.a.dudchenko@stir.ac.uk
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1435-9448 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:12150036 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2608
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Author Dunbar, R.
Title Evolution of the social brain Type Journal Article
Year 2003 Publication Science Abbreviated Journal Science
Volume 302 Issue 5648 Pages 1160-1161
Keywords Animals; Animals, Wild; *Cognition; Endorphins/physiology; *Evolution; Female; Grooming; Hierarchy, Social; Language; Neocortex/anatomy & histology/physiology; Papio/physiology/*psychology; *Reproduction; *Social Behavior; Social Dominance; Social Support; Vocalization, Animal
Abstract
Address School of Biological Sciences, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 7ZB, UK. rimd@liv.ac.uk
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1095-9203 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:14615522 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 548
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Author Duncan, I.J.; Petherick, J.C.
Title The implications of cognitive processes for animal welfare Type Journal Article
Year 1991 Publication Journal of Animal Science Abbreviated Journal J. Anim Sci.
Volume 69 Issue 12 Pages 5017-5022
Keywords *Animal Welfare; Animals; Animals, Domestic/*psychology; *Cognition
Abstract In general, codes that have been designed to safeguard the welfare of animals emphasize the importance of providing an environment that will ensure good health and a normal physiological and physical state, that is, they emphasize the animals' physical needs. If mental needs are mentioned, they are always relegated to secondary importance. The argument is put forward here that animal welfare is dependent solely on the cognitive needs of the animals concerned. In general, if these cognitive needs are met, they will protect the animals' physical needs. It is contended that in the few cases in which they do not safeguard the physical needs, it does not matter from a welfare point of view. The human example is given of being ill. It is argued that welfare is only adversely affected when a person feels ill, knows that he or she is ill, or even thinks that he or she is ill, all of which processes are cognitive ones. The implications for welfare of animals possessing certain cognitive abilities are discussed. For example, the extent to which animals are aware of their internal state while performing behavior known to be indicative of so-called states of suffering, such as fear, frustration, and pain, will determine how much they are actually suffering. With careful experimentation it may be possible to determine how negative they feel these states to be. Similarly, the extent to which animals think about items or events absent from their immediate environment will determine how frustrated they are in the absence of the real item or event but in the presence of the cognitive representation.
Address University of Guelph, Canada
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0021-8812 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:1808195 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2753
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Author Epstein, R.
Title Animal cognition as the praxist views it Type Journal Article
Year 1985 Publication Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews Abbreviated Journal Neurosci Biobehav Rev
Volume 9 Issue 4 Pages 623-630
Keywords Animals; *Behavior, Animal; Behavioral Sciences/*trends; Behaviorism; *Cognition; Columbidae; History, 18th Century; History, 19th Century; Humans; Models, Psychological; Problem Solving; Psychological Theory; Psychology/history/trends
Abstract The distinction between psychology and praxics provides a clear answer to the question of animal cognition. As Griffin and others have noted, the kinds of behavioral phenomena that lead psychologists to speak of cognition in humans are also observed in nonhuman animals, and therefore those who are convinced of the legitimacy of psychology should not hesitate to speak of and to attempt to study animal cognition. The behavior of organisms is also a legitimate subject matter, and praxics, the study of behavior, has led to significant advances in our understanding of the kinds of behaviors that lead psychologists to speak of cognition. Praxics is a biological science; the attempt by students of behavior to appropriate psychology has been misguided. Generativity theory is an example of a formal theory of behavior that has proved useful both in the engineering of intelligent performances in nonhuman animals and in the prediction of intelligent performances in humans.
Address
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0149-7634 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:3909017 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2809
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Author Friedrich, A.M.; Clement, T.S.; Zentall, T.R.
Title Functional equivalence in pigeons involving a four-member class Type Journal Article
Year 2004 Publication Behavioural processes Abbreviated Journal Behav. Process.
Volume 67 Issue 3 Pages 395-403
Keywords Animals; *Association Learning; *Behavior, Animal; *Cognition; Columbidae; *Concept Formation
Abstract Research suggests that animals are capable of forming functional equivalence relations or stimulus classes of the kind usually demonstrated by humans (e.g., the class defined by an object and the word for that object). In pigeons, such functional equivalences are typically established using many-to-one matching-to-sample in which two samples are associated with one comparison stimulus and two different samples are associated with the other. Evidence for the establishment of functional equivalences between samples associated with the same comparison comes from transfer tests. In Experiment 1, we found that pigeons can form a single class consisting of four members (many-to-one matching) when the alternative class has only one member (one-to-one matching). In Experiment 2, we ruled out the possibility that the pigeons acquired the hybrid one-to-one/many-to-one task by developing a single-code/default coding strategy as earlier research suggested that it might. Thus, pigeons can develop a functional class consisting of as many as four members, with the alternative class consisting of a single member.
Address Department of Psychology, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506-0044, USA
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0376-6357 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:15518989 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 228
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Author Funk, M.S.
Title Problem solving skills in young yellow-crowned parakeets (Cyanoramphus auriceps) Type Journal Article
Year 2002 Publication Animal Cognition Abbreviated Journal Anim. Cogn.
Volume 5 Issue 3 Pages 167-176
Keywords Animals; *Cognition; *Discrimination Learning; Female; Motor Skills; *Parakeets; Play and Playthings; *Problem Solving; Social Behavior
Abstract Despite the long divergent evolutionary history of birds and mammals, early avian and primate cognitive development have many convergent features. Some of these features were investigated with a series of tasks designed to assess human infant development. The tasks were presented to young parakeets to assess their means-end problem solving abilities. Examples of these early skills are: attaining and playing with objects, retrieving rewards through use of a stick or rake, or by pulling in rewards on supports or on the ends of strings. Twelve such tasks were presented to 11 young yellow-crowned parakeets ( Cyanoramphus auriceps) to investigate their natural abilities; there was no attempt to train them to do those tasks that they did not spontaneously perform. Six of the birds were parent-raised and five were hand-raised. The birds completed 9 of the 12 tasks, demonstrating all the Piagetian sensorimotor circular reactions, but they failed to hand-watch (“claw-watch”), to stack objects, or to fill a container. Their ordinality on the tasks differed from that of human infants in that locomotion to obtain objects occurred earlier in the avian sequence of development and the mid-level tasks were performed by the two groups of avian subjects in a mixed order perhaps indicating that these abilities may not emerge in any particular order for these birds as they supposedly do for human infants. The hand-raised group needed fewer sessions to complete these means-end tasks.
Address Department of Anthropology, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, USA. mdfunk@northwestern.edu
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1435-9448 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:12357289 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2596
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Author Gallup, G.G.J.
Title Do minds exist in species other than our own? Type Journal Article
Year 1985 Publication Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews Abbreviated Journal Neurosci Biobehav Rev
Volume 9 Issue 4 Pages 631-641
Keywords Animals; Awareness; *Behavior, Animal; Child Psychology; Child, Preschool; *Cognition; Consciousness; Evolution; Humans; Infant; Language; Pan troglodytes; Philosophy; Psychological Theory; Species Specificity
Abstract An answer to the question of animal awareness depends on evidence, not intuition, anecdote, or debate. This paper examines some of the problems inherent in an analysis of animal awareness, and whether animals might be aware of being aware is offered as a more meaningful distinction. A framework is presented which can be used to make a determination about the extent to which other species have experiences similar to ours based on their ability to make inferences and attributions about mental states in others. The evidence from both humans and animals is consistent with the idea that the capacity to use experience to infer the experience of others is a byproduct of self-awareness.
Address
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0149-7634 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:4080281 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2808
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Author Halsey, L.G.; Bezerra, B.M.; Souto, A.S.
Title Can wild common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) solve the parallel strings task? Type Journal Article
Year 2006 Publication Animal Cognition Abbreviated Journal Anim. Cogn.
Volume 9 Issue 3 Pages 229-233
Keywords Animals; Animals, Laboratory; Animals, Wild; Attention; Callithrix/*psychology; *Cognition; *Concept Formation; Female; Male; *Pattern Recognition, Visual; *Problem Solving
Abstract Patterned string tasks are a test of perceptual capacity and the understanding of means-end connections. Primates can solve complex forms of this task in laboratories. However, this may not indicate the level of such cognition that is commonly employed in the wild, where decision-making time is often short and distractions such as predator avoidance and competition between conspecifics are often prevalent. The current study tests whether wild common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) can successfully complete the simplest form of the patterned string task, parallel strings, while in their natural environment. Although 12 out of 13 marmosets could successfully complete the task, in previous laboratory-based studies on primates, the errors at this task by all primate species tested were consistently lower than in the present study. This is probably explained by the added difficulties imposed by the natural setting of the task in the present study, exemplified by a significant increase in observed vigilance behaviour by subject animals prior to attempts at the task that were unsuccessful. The undertaking of such tasks by common marmosets in situ probably provides a more reasonable representation of the levels of cognitive capacity expressed by this species in the wild than do laboratory-based studies of the task.
Address School of Biosciences, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK. l.g.halsey@bham.ac.uk
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1435-9448 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:16541239 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2473
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Author Hare, B.; Brown, M.; Williamson, C.; Tomasello, M.
Title The domestication of social cognition in dogs Type Journal Article
Year 2002 Publication Science (New York, N.Y.) Abbreviated Journal Science
Volume 298 Issue 5598 Pages 1634-1636
Keywords Animals; *Animals, Domestic; *Behavior, Animal; *Cognition; *Cues; *Dogs; Food; Humans; Memory; Pan troglodytes; *Social Behavior; Species Specificity; Vision; Wolves
Abstract Dogs are more skillful than great apes at a number of tasks in which they must read human communicative signals indicating the location of hidden food. In this study, we found that wolves who were raised by humans do not show these same skills, whereas domestic dog puppies only a few weeks old, even those that have had little human contact, do show these skills. These findings suggest that during the process of domestication, dogs have been selected for a set of social-cognitive abilities that enable them to communicate with humans in unique ways.
Address Department of Anthropology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. bhare@fas.harvard.edu
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1095-9203 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:12446914 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 595
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Author Hauser, M.D.; Kralik, J.; Botto-Mahan, C.; Garrett, M.; Oser, J.
Title Self-recognition in primates: phylogeny and the salience of species-typical features Type Journal Article
Year 1995 Publication Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Abbreviated Journal Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
Volume 92 Issue 23 Pages 10811-10814
Keywords Animals; *Behavior, Animal; *Cognition; Discrimination (Psychology); Exploratory Behavior; Female; Hair Color; Male; Phylogeny; Psychology, Comparative; Research Design; Saguinus/*psychology; *Self Concept; Species Specificity; Touch; *Visual Perception
Abstract Self-recognition has been explored in nonlinguistic organisms by recording whether individuals touch a dye-marked area on visually inaccessible parts of their face while looking in a mirror or inspect parts of their body while using the mirror's reflection. Only chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and humans over the age of approximately 2 years consistently evidence self-directed mirror-guided behavior without experimenter training. To evaluate the inferred phylogenetic gap between hominoids and other animals, a modified dye-mark test was conducted with cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus), a New World monkey species. The white hair on the tamarins' head was color-dyed, thereby significantly altering a visually distinctive species-typical feature. Only individuals with dyed hair and prior mirror exposure touched their head while looking in the mirror. They looked longer in the mirror than controls, and some individuals used the mirror to observe visually inaccessible body parts. Prior failures to pass the mirror test may have been due to methodological problems, rather than to phylogenetic differences in the capacity for self-recognition. Specifically, an individual's sensitivity to experimentally modified parts of its body may depend crucially on the relative saliency of the modified part (e.g., face versus hair). Moreover, and in contrast to previous claims, we suggest that the mirror test may not be sufficient for assessing the concept of self or mental state attribution in nonlinguistic organisms.
Address Department of Anthropology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0027-8424 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:7479889 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2825
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