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Author Bering, J.M.
Title A critical review of the “enculturation hypothesis”: the effects of human rearing on great ape social cognition Type Journal Article
Year 2004 Publication Animal Cognition Abbreviated Journal Anim. Cogn.
Volume 7 Issue 4 Pages 201-212
Keywords Animals; *Cognition; *Culture; Hominidae/*psychology; Humans; *Imitative Behavior; Imprinting (Psychology); *Intention; Macaca; Psychological Theory; Social Behavior; *Social Environment; Species Specificity
Abstract (up) Numerous investigators have argued that early ontogenetic immersion in sociocultural environments facilitates cognitive developmental change in human-reared great apes more characteristic of Homo sapiens than of their own species. Such revamping of core, species-typical psychological systems might be manifest, according to this argument, in the emergence of mental representational competencies, a set of social cognitive skills theoretically consigned to humans alone. Human-reared great apes' capacity to engage in “true imitation,” in which both the means and ends of demonstrated actions are reproduced with fairly high rates of fidelity, and laboratory great apes' failure to do so, has frequently been interpreted as reflecting an emergent understanding of intentionality in the former. Although this epigenetic model of the effects of enculturation on social cognitive systems may be well-founded and theoretically justified in the biological literature, alternative models stressing behavioral as opposed to representational change have been largely overlooked. Here I review some of the controversy surrounding enculturation in great apes, and present an alternative nonmentalistic version of the enculturation hypothesis that can also account for enhanced imitative performance on object-oriented problem-solving tasks in human-reared animals.
Address Department of Psychology, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR 72701, USA. jbering@uark.edu
Corporate Author Thesis
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1435-9448 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:15004739 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2543
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Author Zucca, P.; Milos, N.; Vallortigara, G.
Title Piagetian object permanence and its development in Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius) Type Journal Article
Year 2007 Publication Animal Cognition Abbreviated Journal Anim. Cogn.
Volume 10 Issue 2 Pages 243-258
Keywords Animals; *Behavior, Animal; Birds/*physiology; *Cognition; *Cues
Abstract (up) Object permanence in Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius) was investigated using a complete version of the Uzgiris and Hunt scale 1. Nine hand-raised jays were studied, divided into two groups according to their different developmental stages (experiment 1, older jays: 2-3 months old, n = 4; experiment 2, younger jays: 15 days old, n = 5). In the first experiment, we investigated whether older jays could achieve piagetian stage 6 of object permanence. Tasks were administered in a fixed sequence (1-15) according to the protocols used in other avian species. The aim of the second experiment was to check whether testing very young jays before their development of “neophobia” could influence the achievement times of piagetian stages. Furthermore, in this experiment tasks were administered randomly to investigate whether the jays' achievement of stage 6 follows a fixed sequence related to the development of specific cognitive abilities. All jays tested in experiments 1 and 2 fully achieved piagetian stage 6 and no “A not B” errors were observed. Performance on visible displacement tasks was better than performance on invisible ones. The results of experiment 2 show that “neophobia” affected the response of jays in terms of achievement times; the older jays in experiment 1 took longer to pass all the tasks when compared with the younger, less neophobic, jays in experiment 2. With regard to the achieving order, jays followed a fixed sequence of acquisition in experiment 2, even if tasks were administered randomly, with the exception of one subject. The results of these experiments support the idea that piagetian stages of cognitive development exist in avian species and that they progress through relatively fixed sequences.
Address Department of Psychology, Laboratory of Animal Cognition and Comparative Neuroscience, Via S. Anastasio 12, 34100, Trieste, Italy. zucca@units.it
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1435-9448 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:17242935 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2423
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Author Halsey, L.G.; Bezerra, B.M.; Souto, A.S.
Title Can wild common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) solve the parallel strings task? Type Journal Article
Year 2006 Publication Animal Cognition Abbreviated Journal Anim. Cogn.
Volume 9 Issue 3 Pages 229-233
Keywords Animals; Animals, Laboratory; Animals, Wild; Attention; Callithrix/*psychology; *Cognition; *Concept Formation; Female; Male; *Pattern Recognition, Visual; *Problem Solving
Abstract (up) Patterned string tasks are a test of perceptual capacity and the understanding of means-end connections. Primates can solve complex forms of this task in laboratories. However, this may not indicate the level of such cognition that is commonly employed in the wild, where decision-making time is often short and distractions such as predator avoidance and competition between conspecifics are often prevalent. The current study tests whether wild common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) can successfully complete the simplest form of the patterned string task, parallel strings, while in their natural environment. Although 12 out of 13 marmosets could successfully complete the task, in previous laboratory-based studies on primates, the errors at this task by all primate species tested were consistently lower than in the present study. This is probably explained by the added difficulties imposed by the natural setting of the task in the present study, exemplified by a significant increase in observed vigilance behaviour by subject animals prior to attempts at the task that were unsuccessful. The undertaking of such tasks by common marmosets in situ probably provides a more reasonable representation of the levels of cognitive capacity expressed by this species in the wild than do laboratory-based studies of the task.
Address School of Biosciences, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK. l.g.halsey@bham.ac.uk
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1435-9448 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:16541239 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2473
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Author Mulcahy, N.J.; Call, J.
Title Apes save tools for future use Type Journal Article
Year 2006 Publication Science (New York, N.Y.) Abbreviated Journal Science
Volume 312 Issue 5776 Pages 1038-1040
Keywords Animals; Association Learning; *Cognition; *Evolution; *Mental Processes; *Pan paniscus; Pan troglodytes; *Pongo pygmaeus
Abstract (up) Planning for future needs, not just current ones, is one of the most formidable human cognitive achievements. Whether this skill is a uniquely human adaptation is a controversial issue. In a study we conducted, bonobos and orangutans selected, transported, and saved appropriate tools above baseline levels to use them 1 hour later (experiment 1). Experiment 2 extended these results to a 14-hour delay between collecting and using the tools. Experiment 3 showed that seeing the apparatus during tool selection was not necessary to succeed. These findings suggest that the precursor skills for planning for the future evolved in great apes before 14 million years ago, when all extant great ape species shared a common ancestor.
Address Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, D-04103 Leipzig, Germany
Corporate Author Thesis
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1095-9203 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:16709782 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 466
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Author Collier-Baker, E.; Davis, J.M.; Nielsen, M.; Suddendorf, T.
Title Do chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) understand single invisible displacement? Type Journal Article
Year 2006 Publication Animal Cognition Abbreviated Journal Anim. Cogn.
Volume 9 Issue 1 Pages 55-61
Keywords Animals; Behavior, Animal; *Cognition; Male; Pan troglodytes/*psychology; *Space Perception; *Spatial Behavior; Task Performance and Analysis; *Visual Perception
Abstract (up) Previous research suggests that chimpanzees understand single invisible displacement. However, this Piagetian task may be solvable through the use of simple search strategies rather than through mentally representing the past trajectory of an object. Four control conditions were thus administered to two chimpanzees in order to separate associative search strategies from performance based on mental representation. Strategies involving experimenter cue-use, search at the last or first box visited by the displacement device, and search at boxes adjacent to the displacement device were systematically controlled for. Chimpanzees showed no indications of utilizing these simple strategies, suggesting that their capacity to mentally represent single invisible displacements is comparable to that of 18-24-month-old children.
Address Early Cognitive Development Unit, School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland 4072, Australia. e.collier-baker@psy.uq.edu.au
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1435-9448 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:16163481 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2482
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Author van der Willigen, R.F.; Frost, B.J.; Wagner, H.
Title How owls structure visual information Type Journal Article
Year 2003 Publication Animal Cognition Abbreviated Journal Anim. Cogn.
Volume 6 Issue 1 Pages 39-55
Keywords Animals; *Cognition; Depth Perception; Discrimination Learning; Female; Male; *Strigiformes; *Visual Perception
Abstract (up) Recent studies on perceptual organization in humans claim that the ability to represent a visual scene as a set of coherent surfaces is of central importance for visual cognition. We examined whether this surface representation hypothesis generalizes to a non-mammalian species, the barn owl ( Tyto alba). Discrimination transfer combined with random-dot stimuli provided the appropriate means for a series of two behavioural experiments with the specific aims of (1) obtaining psychophysical measurements of figure-ground segmentation in the owl, and (2) determining the nature of the information involved. In experiment 1, two owls were trained to indicate the presence or absence of a central planar surface (figure) among a larger region of random dots (ground) based on differences in texture. Without additional training, the owls could make the same discrimination when figure and ground had reversed luminance, or were camouflaged by the use of uniformly textured random-dot stereograms. In the latter case, the figure stands out in depth from the ground when positional differences of the figure in two retinal images are combined (binocular disparity). In experiment 2, two new owls were trained to distinguish three-dimensional objects from holes using random-dot kinematograms. These birds could make the same discrimination when information on surface segmentation was unexpectedly switched from relative motion to half-occlusion. In the latter case, stereograms were used that provide the impression of stratified surfaces to humans by giving unpairable image features to the eyes. The ability to use image features such as texture, binocular disparity, relative motion, and half-occlusion interchangeably to determine figure-ground relationships suggests that in owls, as in humans, the structuring of the visual scene critically depends on how indirect image information (depth order, occlusion contours) is allocated between different surfaces.
Address Institut fur Biologie II, RWTH Aachen, Kopernikusstrasse 16, 52074, Aachen, Germany. willigen@bio2.rwth-aachen.de
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1435-9448 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:12658534 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2582
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Author Friedrich, A.M.; Clement, T.S.; Zentall, T.R.
Title Functional equivalence in pigeons involving a four-member class Type Journal Article
Year 2004 Publication Behavioural processes Abbreviated Journal Behav. Process.
Volume 67 Issue 3 Pages 395-403
Keywords Animals; *Association Learning; *Behavior, Animal; *Cognition; Columbidae; *Concept Formation
Abstract (up) Research suggests that animals are capable of forming functional equivalence relations or stimulus classes of the kind usually demonstrated by humans (e.g., the class defined by an object and the word for that object). In pigeons, such functional equivalences are typically established using many-to-one matching-to-sample in which two samples are associated with one comparison stimulus and two different samples are associated with the other. Evidence for the establishment of functional equivalences between samples associated with the same comparison comes from transfer tests. In Experiment 1, we found that pigeons can form a single class consisting of four members (many-to-one matching) when the alternative class has only one member (one-to-one matching). In Experiment 2, we ruled out the possibility that the pigeons acquired the hybrid one-to-one/many-to-one task by developing a single-code/default coding strategy as earlier research suggested that it might. Thus, pigeons can develop a functional class consisting of as many as four members, with the alternative class consisting of a single member.
Address Department of Psychology, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506-0044, USA
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0376-6357 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:15518989 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 228
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Author Washburn, D.A.; Smith, J.D.; Shields, W.E.
Title Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) immediately generalize the uncertain response Type Journal Article
Year 2006 Publication Journal of Experimental Psychology. Animal Behavior Processes Abbreviated Journal J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process
Volume 32 Issue 2 Pages 185-189
Keywords Adaptation, Psychological; Animals; *Cognition; *Discrimination Learning; *Generalization (Psychology); Macaca mulatta/*psychology; Male; *Uncertainty
Abstract (up) Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) have learned, like humans, to use an uncertain response adaptively under test conditions that create uncertainty, suggesting a metacognitive process by which human and nonhuman primates may monitor their confidence and alter their behavior accordingly. In this study, 4 rhesus monkeys generalized their use of the uncertain response, without additional training, to 2 familiar tasks (2-choice discrimination learning and mirror-image matching to sample) that predictably and demonstrably produce uncertainty. The monkeys were significantly less likely to use the uncertain response on trials in which the answer might be known. These results indicate that monkeys, like humans, know when they do not know and that they can learn to use a symbol as a generalized means for indicating their uncertainty.
Address Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, 30303, USA. dwashhburn@gsu.edu
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0097-7403 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:16634662 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2760
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Author Helton, W.S.
Title Animal expertise, conscious or not Type Journal Article
Year 2005 Publication Animal Cognition Abbreviated Journal Anim. Cogn.
Volume 8 Issue 2 Pages 67-74
Keywords Animals; *Behavior, Animal; *Cognition; *Consciousness; *Learning; Motor Skills; *Practice (Psychology)
Abstract (up) Rossano (Cognition 89:207, 2003) proposes expertise as an indicator of consciousness in humans and other animals. Since there is strong evidence that the development of expertise requires deliberate practice (Ericsson in The road to excellence: the acquisition of expert performance in the arts and sciences, sports and games 1996), and deliberate practice appears to be outside of the bounds of unconscious processing, then any signs of expertise development in an animal are indicators of consciousness. Rossano's argument may lead to an unsolvable debate about animal consciousness while causing researchers to overlook the underlying reality of animal expertise. This article provides evidence indicative of animals meeting each of the three definitions of expertise established in the scientific literature: expertise as a social construction, expertise as exceptional performance, and expertise as knowledge. In addition, cases of deliberate practice by non-human animals are offered. Acknowledging some animals as experts, regardless of consciousness, is warranted by the research findings and would prove useful in solving many issues remaining in the human expertise literature.
Address Department of Psychology, Wilmington College, Wilmington, OH 45177, USA, deak_helton@yahoo.com
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1435-9448 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:15365876 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2511
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Author Hauser, M.D.; Kralik, J.; Botto-Mahan, C.; Garrett, M.; Oser, J.
Title Self-recognition in primates: phylogeny and the salience of species-typical features Type Journal Article
Year 1995 Publication Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Abbreviated Journal Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
Volume 92 Issue 23 Pages 10811-10814
Keywords Animals; *Behavior, Animal; *Cognition; Discrimination (Psychology); Exploratory Behavior; Female; Hair Color; Male; Phylogeny; Psychology, Comparative; Research Design; Saguinus/*psychology; *Self Concept; Species Specificity; Touch; *Visual Perception
Abstract (up) Self-recognition has been explored in nonlinguistic organisms by recording whether individuals touch a dye-marked area on visually inaccessible parts of their face while looking in a mirror or inspect parts of their body while using the mirror's reflection. Only chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and humans over the age of approximately 2 years consistently evidence self-directed mirror-guided behavior without experimenter training. To evaluate the inferred phylogenetic gap between hominoids and other animals, a modified dye-mark test was conducted with cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus), a New World monkey species. The white hair on the tamarins' head was color-dyed, thereby significantly altering a visually distinctive species-typical feature. Only individuals with dyed hair and prior mirror exposure touched their head while looking in the mirror. They looked longer in the mirror than controls, and some individuals used the mirror to observe visually inaccessible body parts. Prior failures to pass the mirror test may have been due to methodological problems, rather than to phylogenetic differences in the capacity for self-recognition. Specifically, an individual's sensitivity to experimentally modified parts of its body may depend crucially on the relative saliency of the modified part (e.g., face versus hair). Moreover, and in contrast to previous claims, we suggest that the mirror test may not be sufficient for assessing the concept of self or mental state attribution in nonlinguistic organisms.
Address Department of Anthropology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Corporate Author Thesis
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0027-8424 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:7479889 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2825
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