| Records |
Author  |
Van Doorn G.S.; Hengeveld G.M.; Weissing F.J. |
| Title |
The Evolution of Social Dominance I: Two-player Models |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2003 |
Publication |
Behavior |
Abbreviated Journal |
Behavior |
| Volume |
140 |
Issue |
10 |
Pages |
1305-1332 |
| Keywords |
|
| Abstract |
A difference in dominance rank is an often-used cue to resolve conflicts between two animals without escalated fights. At the group level, adherence to a dominance convention efficiently reduces the costs associated with conflicts, but from an individual's point of view, it is difficult to explain why a low ranking individual should accept its subordinate status. This is especially true if, as suggested by several authors, dominance not necessarily reflects differences in fighting ability but rather results from arbitrary historical asymmetries. According to this idea, rank differentiation emerges from behavioural strategies, referred to as winner and loser effects, in which winners of previous conflicts are more likely to win the current conflict, whereas the losers of previous conflicts are less likely to do so. In order to investigate whether dominance, based on such winner and loser effects, can be evolutionarily stable, we analyse a game theoretical model. The model focuses on an extreme case in which there are no differences in fighting ability between individuals at all. The only asymmetries that may arise between individuals are generated by the outcome of previous conflicts. By means of numerical analysis, we find alternative evolutionarily stable strategies, which all utilize these asymmetries for conventional conflict resolution. One class of these strategies is based on winner and loser effects, thus generating evolutionarily stable dominance relations even in the absence of differences in resource holding potential. |
| Address |
|
| Corporate Author |
|
Thesis |
|
| Publisher |
|
Place of Publication |
|
Editor |
|
| Language |
|
Summary Language |
|
Original Title |
|
| Series Editor |
|
Series Title |
|
Abbreviated Series Title |
|
| Series Volume |
|
Series Issue |
|
Edition |
|
| ISSN |
|
ISBN |
|
Medium |
|
| Area |
|
Expedition |
|
Conference |
|
| Notes |
|
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
5105 |
| Permanent link to this record |
| |
|
| |
| Author |
Van Doorn G.S.; Hengeveld G.M.; Weissing F.J. |
| Title |
The Evolution of Social Dominance II: Multi-Player Models |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2003 |
Publication |
Behavior |
Abbreviated Journal |
Behavior |
| Volume |
140 |
Issue |
10 |
Pages |
1333-1358 |
| Keywords |
|
| Abstract |
The social hierarchies observed in natural systems often show a high degree of transitivity. Transitive hierarchies do not only require rank differentiation within pairs of individuals but also a higher level ordering of relations within the group. Several authors have suggested that the formation of linear hierarchies at the group level is an emergent property of individual behavioural rules, referred to as winner and loser effects. Winner and loser effects occur if winners of previous conflicts are more likely to escalate the current conflict, whereas the losers of previous conflicts are less likely to do so. According to this idea, an individual's position in a hierarchy may not necessarily reflect its fighting ability, but may rather result from arbitrary historical asymmetries, in particular the history of victories and defeats. However, if this is the case, it is difficult to explain from an evolutionary perspective why a low ranking individual should accept its subordinate status. Here we present a game theoretical model to investigate whether winner and loser effects giving rise to transitive hierarchies can evolve and under which conditions they are evolutionarily stable. The main version of the model focuses on an extreme case in which there are no intrinsic differences in fighting ability between individuals. The only asymmetries that may arise between individuals are generated by the outcome of previous conflicts. We show that, at evolutionary equilibrium, these asymmetries can be utilized for conventional conflict resolution. Several evolutionarily stable strategies are based on winner and loser effects and these strategies give rise to transitive hierarchies. |
| Address |
|
| Corporate Author |
|
Thesis |
|
| Publisher |
|
Place of Publication |
|
Editor |
|
| Language |
|
Summary Language |
|
Original Title |
|
| Series Editor |
|
Series Title |
|
Abbreviated Series Title |
|
| Series Volume |
|
Series Issue |
|
Edition |
|
| ISSN |
|
ISBN |
|
Medium |
|
| Area |
|
Expedition |
|
Conference |
|
| Notes |
|
Approved |
no |
| Call Number |
Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
Serial |
5106 |
| Permanent link to this record |
