| Records |
| Author |
Dugatkin, L.A. |
| Title |
A comment on Lafleur et al.'s re-evaluation of mate-choice copying in guppies |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1998 |
Publication |
Animal Behaviour. |
Abbreviated Journal |
Anim. Behav. |
| Volume |
56 |
Issue |
2 |
Pages |
513-514 |
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1812 |
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| Author |
Dugatkin, L.A.; Alfieri, M. |
| Title |
Guppies and the TIT FOR TAT strategy: preference based on past interaction |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1991 |
Publication |
Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology |
Abbreviated Journal |
Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. |
| Volume |
28 |
Issue |
4 |
Pages |
243-246 |
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| Abstract |
The evolution of cooperation requires either (a) nonrandom interactions, such that cooperators preferentially interact with other cooperators, or (b) conditional behaviors, such that individuals act cooperatively primarily towards other cooperators. Although these conditions can be met without assuming sophisticated animal cognition, they are more likely to be met if animals can remember individuals with whom they have interacted, associate past interactions with these individuals, and base future behavior on this information. Here we show that guppies (Poecilia reticulata), in the context of predator inspection behavior, can identify and remember (for at least 4 h) the “more cooperative” among two conspecifics and subsequently choose to be near these individuals in future encounters. |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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3397 |
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| Author |
Wilson, D.S.; Dugatkin, L.A. |
| Title |
A reply to Lombardi & Hurlbert |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1996 |
Publication |
Animal Behaviour. |
Abbreviated Journal |
Anim. Behav. |
| Volume |
52 |
Issue |
2 |
Pages |
423-425 |
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refbase @ user @ |
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475 |
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| Author |
Dugatkin, L.A.; Wilson, D.S. |
| Title |
Choice experiments and cognition: a reply to Lamprecht & Hofer |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1994 |
Publication |
Animal Behaviour. |
Abbreviated Journal |
Anim. Behav. |
| Volume |
47 |
Issue |
6 |
Pages |
1459-1461 |
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refbase @ user @ |
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479 |
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Mesterton-Gibbons, M.; Dugatkin, L.A. |
| Title |
Cooperation and the Prisoner's Dilemma: towards testable models of mutualism versus reciprocity |
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Journal Article |
| Year |
1997 |
Publication |
Animal Behaviour. |
Abbreviated Journal |
Anim. Behav. |
| Volume |
54 |
Issue |
3 |
Pages |
551-557 |
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For the purpose of distinguishing between mutualism and reciprocity in nature, recent work on the evolution of cooperation has both oversimplifed and undersimplified the distinction between these two categories of cooperation. This article addresses the resulting issues of model testability, clarifies the role of time and argues that the category of `pseudo-reciprocity' is an unnecessary complication. |
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no |
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refbase @ user @ |
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480 |
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| Author |
Dugatkin, L.A.; Mesterton-Gibbons, M. |
| Title |
Cooperation among unrelated individuals: reciprocal altruism, by-product mutualism and group selection in fishes |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1996 |
Publication |
Biosystems |
Abbreviated Journal |
Biosystems |
| Volume |
37 |
Issue |
1-2 |
Pages |
19-30 |
| Keywords |
By-product mutualism; Cooperative behavior; Fish; Reciprocal altruism; Trait-group selection |
| Abstract |
Cooperation among unrelated individuals can evolve not only via reciprocal altruism but also via trait-group selection or by-product mutualism (or some combination of all three categories). Therefore the (iterated) prisoner's dilemma is an insufficient paradigm for studying the evolution of cooperation. We replace this game by the cooperator's dilemma, which is more versatile because it enables all three categories of cooperative behavior to be examined within the framework of a single theory. Controlled studies of cooperation among fish provide examples of each category of cooperation. Specifically, we describe reciprocal altruism among simultaneous hermaphrodites that swap egg parcels, group-selected cooperation among fish that inspect dangerous predators and by-product mutualism in the cooperative foraging of coral-reef fish. |
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no |
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refbase @ user @ |
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481 |
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| Author |
Dugatkin, L.A.; Hoglund, J. |
| Title |
Delayed breeding and the evolution of mate copying in lekking species |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1995 |
Publication |
Journal of Theoretical Biology |
Abbreviated Journal |
J. Theor. Biol. |
| Volume |
174 |
Issue |
3 |
Pages |
261-267 |
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Recent experimental evidence indicates that females may copy the mate choice of others. Here, we present a model for the evolution of mate copying strategies in lekking species. In the model, all females (copiers and non-copiers) assess male quality, but a copier's assessment of a male's quality increases after males have mated with other females. The model demonstrates that mate copying is favored when breeding late in the season has a relatively high cost. We hope that our results will spur empirical work quantifying the time constraints associated with breeding, thus allowing more direct tests of the model's predictions. |
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no |
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refbase @ user @ |
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482 |
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| Author |
Crowley, P.H.; Provencher, L.; Sloane, S.; Dugatkin, L.A.; Spohn, B.; Rogers, L.; Alfieri, M. |
| Title |
Evolving cooperation: the role of individual recognition |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1996 |
Publication |
Biosystems |
Abbreviated Journal |
Biosystems |
| Volume |
37 |
Issue |
1-2 |
Pages |
49-66 |
| Keywords |
Game theory; Genetic algorithms; Individual recognition; Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma; Reciprocal altruism |
| Abstract |
To evaluate the role of individual recognition in the evolution of cooperation, we formulated and analyzed a genetic algorithm model (EvCo) for playing the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game. Strategies compete against each other during each generation, and successful strategies contribute more of their attributes to the next generation. Each strategy is encoded on a `chromosome' that plays the IPD, responding to the sequences of most recent responses by the interacting individuals (chromosomes). The analysis reported in this paper considered different memory capabilities (one to five previous interactions), pairing continuities (pairs of individuals remain together for about one, two, five, or 1000 consecutive interactions), and types of individual recognition (recognition capability was maximal, nil, or allowed to evolve between these limits). Analysis of the results focused on the frequency of mutual cooperation in pairwise interactions (a good indicator of overall success in the IPD) and on the extent to which previous responses by the focal individual and its partner were associated with the partner's identity (individual recognition). Results indicated that a fixed, substantial amount of individual recognition could maintain high levels of mutual cooperation even at low pairing continuities, and a significant but limited capability for individual recognition evolved under selection. Recognition generally increased mutual cooperation more when the recent responses of individuals other than the current partner were ignored. Titrating recognition memory under selection using a fitness cost suggested that memory of the partner's previous responses was more valuable than memory of the focal's previous responses. The dynamics produced to date by EvCo are a step toward understanding the evolution of social networks, for which additional benefits associated with group interactions must be incorporated. |
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no |
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refbase @ user @ |
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483 |
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| Author |
Dugatkin, L.A. |
| Title |
Tit for Tat, by-product mutualism and predator inspection: a reply to Connor |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
1996 |
Publication |
Animal Behaviour. |
Abbreviated Journal |
Anim. Behav. |
| Volume |
51 |
Issue |
2 |
Pages |
455-457 |
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no |
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refbase @ user @ |
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487 |
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| Author |
Dugatkin, L.A.; Bekoff, M. |
| Title |
Play and the evolution of fairness: a game theory model |
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Journal Article |
| Year |
2003 |
Publication |
Behavioural Processes |
Abbreviated Journal |
Behav. Process. |
| Volume |
60 |
Issue |
3 |
Pages |
209-214 |
| Keywords |
Play; Fairness; Game theory |
| Abstract |
Bekoff [J. Consci. Stud. 8 (2001) 81] argued that mammalian social play is a useful behavioral phenotype on which to concentrate in order to learn more about the evolution of fairness. Here, we build a game theoretical model designed to formalize some of the ideas laid out by Bekoff, and to examine whether `fair' strategies can in fact be evolutionarily stable. The models we present examine fairness at two different developmental stages during an individual's ontogeny, and hence we create four strategies--fair at time 1/fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/fair at time 2. Our results suggest that when considering species where fairness can be expressed during two different developmental stages, acting fairly should be more common than never acting fairly. In addition, when no one strategy was evolutionarily stable, we found that all four strategies we model can coexist at evolutionary equilibrium. Even in the absence of an overwhelming database from which to test our model, the general predictions we make have significant implications for the evolution of fairness. |
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refbase @ user @ |
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488 |
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