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Dugatkin, L.A.; Mesterton-Gibbons, M.; Houston, A.I. |
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Title |
Beyond the prisoner's dilemma: Toward models to discriminate among mechanisms of cooperation in nature |
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1992 |
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Trends Evol. Ecol. |
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7 |
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202-205 |
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The iterated prisoner's dilemma game, or IPD, has now established itself as the orthodox paradigm for theoretical investigations of the evolution of cooperation; but its scope is restricted to reciprocity, which is only one of three categories of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Even within that category, a cooperative encounter has in general three phases, and the IPD has nothing to say about two of them. To distinguish among mechanisms of cooperation in nature, future theoretical work on the evolution of cooperation must distance itself from economics and develop games as a refinement of ethology's comparative approach. |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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4843 |
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Hasenjager, M.J.; Dugatkin, L.A. |
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Social Network Analysis in Behavioral Ecology |
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Animal personalities; Animal social networks; Collective behavior; Cooperation; Dynamic networks; Emergent properties; Network theory; Social behavior; Social learning; Social structure |
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Abstract In recent years, behavioral ecologists have embraced social network analysis (SNA) in order to explore the structure of animal societies and the functional consequences of that structure. We provide a conceptual introduction to the field that focuses on historical developments, as well as on novel insights generated by recent work. First, we discuss major advances in the analysis of nonhuman societies, culminating in the use of SNA by behavioral ecologists. Next, we discuss how network-based approaches have enhanced our understanding of social structure and behavior over the past decade, focusing on: (1) information transmission, (2) collective behaviors, (3) animal personality, and (4) cooperation. These behaviors and phenomena possess several features—e.g., indirect effects, emergent properties—that network analysis is well equipped to handle. Finally, we highlight recent developments in SNA that are allowing behavioral ecologists to address increasingly sophisticated questions regarding the structure and function of animal sociality. |
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Academic Press |
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Advances in the Study of Behavior |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ Hasenjager |
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5863 |
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Dugatkin, L.A.; Perlin, M.; Atlas, R. |
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Title |
The Evolution of Group-beneficial Traits in the Absence of Between-group Selection |
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2003 |
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Journal of Theoretical Biology |
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J. Theor. Biol. |
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220 |
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1 |
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67-74 |
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One specific prediction emerging from trait-group models of natural selection is that when individuals possess traits that benefit other group members, natural selection will favor “cheating” (i.e. not possessing the group-beneficial trait) within groups. Cheating is selected within groups because it allows individuals to avoid bearing the relative costs typically associated with group-beneficial traits, but to still reap the benefits associated with the acts of other group members. Selection between groups favors traits that benefit other group members. The relative strength of within- and between-group selection then determines the equilibrium frequency of those who produce group-beneficial traits and those that do not. Here we demonstrate that individual-level selection, that is selection within groups can also produce an intermediate frequency of such group-beneficial traits by frequency-dependent selection. The models we develop are general in nature, but were inspired by the evolution of antibiotic resistance in bacteria. The theory developed here is distinct from prior work that relies on reciprocity or kinship per'se to achieve cooperation and altruism among group members. |
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refbase @ user @ |
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491 |
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Dugatkin, L.A.; Mesterton-Gibbons, M. |
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Title |
Cooperation among unrelated individuals: reciprocal altruism, by-product mutualism and group selection in fishes |
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Year |
1996 |
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Biosystems |
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Biosystems |
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37 |
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1-2 |
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19-30 |
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By-product mutualism; Cooperative behavior; Fish; Reciprocal altruism; Trait-group selection |
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Cooperation among unrelated individuals can evolve not only via reciprocal altruism but also via trait-group selection or by-product mutualism (or some combination of all three categories). Therefore the (iterated) prisoner's dilemma is an insufficient paradigm for studying the evolution of cooperation. We replace this game by the cooperator's dilemma, which is more versatile because it enables all three categories of cooperative behavior to be examined within the framework of a single theory. Controlled studies of cooperation among fish provide examples of each category of cooperation. Specifically, we describe reciprocal altruism among simultaneous hermaphrodites that swap egg parcels, group-selected cooperation among fish that inspect dangerous predators and by-product mutualism in the cooperative foraging of coral-reef fish. |
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refbase @ user @ |
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481 |
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Crowley, P.H.; Provencher, L.; Sloane, S.; Dugatkin, L.A.; Spohn, B.; Rogers, L.; Alfieri, M. |
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Title |
Evolving cooperation: the role of individual recognition |
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Journal Article |
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1996 |
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Biosystems |
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Biosystems |
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37 |
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1-2 |
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49-66 |
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Game theory; Genetic algorithms; Individual recognition; Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma; Reciprocal altruism |
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To evaluate the role of individual recognition in the evolution of cooperation, we formulated and analyzed a genetic algorithm model (EvCo) for playing the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game. Strategies compete against each other during each generation, and successful strategies contribute more of their attributes to the next generation. Each strategy is encoded on a `chromosome' that plays the IPD, responding to the sequences of most recent responses by the interacting individuals (chromosomes). The analysis reported in this paper considered different memory capabilities (one to five previous interactions), pairing continuities (pairs of individuals remain together for about one, two, five, or 1000 consecutive interactions), and types of individual recognition (recognition capability was maximal, nil, or allowed to evolve between these limits). Analysis of the results focused on the frequency of mutual cooperation in pairwise interactions (a good indicator of overall success in the IPD) and on the extent to which previous responses by the focal individual and its partner were associated with the partner's identity (individual recognition). Results indicated that a fixed, substantial amount of individual recognition could maintain high levels of mutual cooperation even at low pairing continuities, and a significant but limited capability for individual recognition evolved under selection. Recognition generally increased mutual cooperation more when the recent responses of individuals other than the current partner were ignored. Titrating recognition memory under selection using a fitness cost suggested that memory of the partner's previous responses was more valuable than memory of the focal's previous responses. The dynamics produced to date by EvCo are a step toward understanding the evolution of social networks, for which additional benefits associated with group interactions must be incorporated. |
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refbase @ user @ |
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483 |
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Dugatkin, L.A. |
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Title |
Animal cooperation among unrelated individuals |
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2002 |
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Die Naturwissenschaften |
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Naturwissenschaften |
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89 |
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12 |
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533-541 |
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Animals; Phylogeny; *Social Behavior; Species Specificity |
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The evolution of cooperation has long been a topic near and dear to the hearts of behavioral and evolutionary ecologists. Cooperative behaviors run the gamut from fairly simple to very complicated and there are a myriad of ways to study cooperation. Here I shall focus on three paths that have been delineated in the study of intraspecific cooperation among unrelated individuals: reciprocity, byproduct mutualism, and group selection. In each case, I attempt to delineate the theory underlying each of these paths and then provide examples from the empirical literature. In addition, I shall briefly touch upon some recent work that has attempted to examine (or re-examine) the role of cognition and phylogeny in the study of cooperative behavior. While empirical and theoretical work has made significant strides in the name of better understanding the evolution and maintenance of cooperative behavior in animals, much work remains for the future. “From the point of view of the moralist, the animal world is on about the same level as the gladiator's show. The creatures are fairly well treated, and set to fight; whereby the strongest, the swiftest and the cunningest live to fight another day. The spectator has no need to turn his thumb down, as no quarter is given em leader the weakest and the stupidest went to the wall, while the toughest and the shrewdest, those who were best fitted to cope with their circumstances, but not the best in any other way, survived. Life was a continuous free fight, and em leader a war of each against all was the normal state of existence.” (Huxley 1888) |
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Department of Biology, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY 40292, USA. lee.dugatkin@louisville.edu |
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0028-1042 |
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PMID:12536274 |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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2797 |
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Dugatkin, L.A.; Godin, J.G. |
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Reversal of female mate choice by copying in the guppy (Poecilia reticulata) |
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1992 |
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Proceedings. Biological sciences / The Royal Society |
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Proc Biol Sci |
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249 |
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1325 |
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179-184 |
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Acclimatization; Animals; *Choice Behavior; Female; Male; Poecilia; *Sexual Behavior, Animal |
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Ever since Fisher (1958) formalized models of sexual selection, female mate choice has been assumed to be a genetically determined trait. Females, however, may also use social cues to select mates. One such cue might be the mate choice of conspecifics. Here we report the first direct evidence that a female's preference for a particular male can in fact be reversed by social cues. In our experiments using the Trinidadian guppy (Poecilia reticulata), this reversal was mediated by mate-copying opportunities, such that a female (the 'focal' female) is given the opportunity to choose between two males, followed by a period in which she observes a second female (the 'model' female) displaying a preference for the male she herself did not prefer initially. When allowed to choose between the same males a second time, compared with control tests, a significant proportion of focal females reversed their mate choice and copied the preference of the model female. These results provide strong evidence for the role of non-genetic factors in sexual selection and underlie the need for new models of sexual selection that explicitly incorporate both genetic and cultural aspects of mate choice. |
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Department of Biology, Mount Allison University, Sackville, New Brunswick, Canada |
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0962-8452 |
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PMID:1360679 |
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1824 |
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Dugatkin, L.A. |
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Title |
Breaking up fights between others: a model of intervention behaviour |
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1998 |
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Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences |
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Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B |
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265 |
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1394 |
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433-437 |
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To examine when and why animals break up fights between others in their group, I modelled whether ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ effects might be one element driving the evolution of intervention behaviour. I considered one particular type of intervention: when the intervener simply breaks up fights between two others, but does not favour either party in so doing. When victories at time T + 1 are more likely given a victory at time T (i.e. winner effects), intervention is often favoured. Intervention is favoured in these circumstances because the intervening party in essence stops others from ‘getting on a roll’ and climbing up any hierarchy that exists. However, when loser effects alone are at work (defeats at time T + 1 are more likely given a defeat at time T), breaking up fights between others is never selected. If both winner and loser effects are operating simultaneously, then the likelihood of intervention behaviour evolving is a function of the relative strength of these two effects. The greater the winner effect relative to the loser effect, the more likely intervention behaviour is to evolve. |
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10.1098/rspb.1998.0313 |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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5240 |
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Johnstone, R.A.; Dugatkin, L.A. |
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Coalition formation in animals and the nature of winner and loser effects |
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2000 |
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Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences |
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Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. |
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267 |
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1438 |
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17-21 |
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Coalition formation has been documented in a diverse array of taxa, yet there has been little formal analysis of polyadic interactions such as coalitions. Here, we develop an optimality model which examines the role of winner and loser effects in shaping coalition formation. We demonstrate that the predicted patterns of alliances are strongly dependent on the way in which winner and loser effects change with contestant strength. When winner and loser effects decrease with the resource-holding power (RHP) of the combatants, coalitions will be favoured between the strongest members of a group, but not between the weakest. If, in contrast, winner and loser effects increase with RHP, exactly the opposite predictions emerge. All other things being equal, intervention is more likely to prove worthwhile when the beneficiary of the aid is weaker (and its opponent is stronger), because the beneficiary is then less likely to win without help. Consequently, intervention is more probable when the impact of victory on the subsequent performance of a combatant increases with that individual's strength because this selects for intervention in favour of weaker combatants. The published literature on hierarchy formation does not reveal how winner and loser effects actually change with contestant strength and we therefore hope that our model will spur others to collect such data; in this light we suggest an experiment which will help to elucidate the nature of winner and loser effects and their impact on coalition formation in animals. |
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* aggression * dominance * hierarchy * intervention * reciprocity |
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10.1098/rspb.2000.0960 |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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5290 |
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Earley, R.L.; Dugatkin, L.A. |
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Eavesdropping on visual cues in green swordtail (Xiphophorus helleri) fights: a case for networking |
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2002 |
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Proceedings. Biological sciences / The Royal Society |
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Proc Biol Sci |
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269 |
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1494 |
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943-952 |
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*Aggression; Animals; *Behavior, Animal; *Cyprinodontiformes; Female; Male |
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Aggressive contests probably occur in networking environments where information about fighting ability is conveyed both to an opponent and to individuals peripheral to the fight itself, the bystanders. Our primary aim was to investigate the relative influences of eavesdropping and prior social experience on the dynamics of aggressive contests in Xiphophorus helleri. A bystander's ability to witness an encounter was manipulated using clear, one-way mirror, and opaque partitions. After watching (or not watching) the initial contest, the bystander encountered either the winner or loser of the bout. Treatment comparisons of bystander-winner or bystander-loser contest dynamics indicated the presence or absence of winner, loser, or eavesdropping effects. Winner and loser effects had negligible influences on bystander contest dynamics. Eavesdropping significantly reduced the bystander's propensity to initiate aggression, escalate, and win against seen winners regardless of whether the watched bout had escalated or not. Though eavesdropping had relatively little effect on bystander-loser contest dynamics, bystanders were less prone to initiate aggression and win against losers that had escalated in the witnessed bout. Thus, bystanders appear to preferentially retain and utilize information gained about potentially dangerous opponents (winners or persistent losers). Our data lend clear support for the importance of eavesdropping in visually based aggressive signalling systems. |
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Department of Biology, Life Science, Room 139, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY 40292, USA. rlearl01@athena.louisville.edu |
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0962-8452 |
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PMID:12028778 |
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refbase @ user @ |
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498 |
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