| Abstract |
I begin with a rather unpromising dispute that Nozick once had with Ian Hacking in the pages of the London Review of Books, in which both vied with one another in their enthusiasm to repudiate the thesis that some human people or peoples are closer than others to animality. I shall attempt to show that one can build, on the basis of Nozick’s discussion of rationality, a defense of the view that the capacity for language places human rationality out of reach of a comparison with animals. The difference rests, paradoxi–cally, on the human capacity for irrationality. Irrationality depends on the capacity for language, which allows the detachment of explicit thoughts from their underlying dynamic implementation; these, in turn, condition the essential disputability of principles of rationality. That is what places every human potentially—if not actually—on the other side of an unbridge–able gulf that separates us from other animals. |
