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Author McElreath, R.; Luttbeg, B.; Fogarty, S.P.; Brodin, T.; Sih, A.
Title Evolution of animal personalities Type Journal Article
Year 2007 Publication Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume 450 Issue 7167 Pages E5-E5
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ISSN 0028-0836 ISBN Medium
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Notes 10.1038/nature06326 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 4295
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Author Wolf, M.; van Doorn, G.S.; Leimar, O.; Weissing, F.J.
Title Wolf et al. reply Type Journal Article
Year 2007 Publication Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume 450 Issue 7167 Pages E5-E6
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Notes 10.1038/nature06327 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 4297
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Author Milinski, M.; Rockenbach, B.
Title Human behaviour: Punisher pays Type Journal Article
Year 2008 Publication Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume 452 Issue 7185 Pages 297-298
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Abstract The tendency of humans to punish perceived free-loaders, even at a cost to themselves, is an evolutionary puzzle: punishers perish, and those who benefit the most are those who have never punished at all.

Humans are champions of cooperation. Reciprocity – the idea that, if I help you this time, you'll help me next time1 – is a secret of our success.
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Notes 10.1038/452297a Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 4405
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Author Dreber, A.; Rand, D.G.; Fudenberg, D.; Nowak, M.A.
Title Winners don/'t punish Type Journal Article
Year 2008 Publication Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume 452 Issue 7185 Pages 348-351
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Abstract A key aspect of human behaviour is cooperation1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. We tend to help others even if costs are involved. We are more likely to help when the costs are small and the benefits for the other person significant. Cooperation leads to a tension between what is best for the individual and what is best for the group. A group does better if everyone cooperates, but each individual is tempted to defect. Recently there has been much interest in exploring the effect of costly punishment on human cooperation8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23. Costly punishment means paying a cost for another individual to incur a cost. It has been suggested that costly punishment promotes cooperation even in non-repeated games and without any possibility of reputation effects10. But most of our interactions are repeated and reputation is always at stake. Thus, if costly punishment is important in promoting cooperation, it must do so in a repeated setting. We have performed experiments in which, in each round of a repeated game, people choose between cooperation, defection and costly punishment. In control experiments, people could only cooperate or defect. Here we show that the option of costly punishment increases the amount of cooperation but not the average payoff of the group. Furthermore, there is a strong negative correlation between total payoff and use of costly punishment. Those people who gain the highest total payoff tend not to use costly punishment: winners don't punish. This suggests that costly punishment behaviour is maladaptive in cooperation games and might have evolved for other reasons.
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Notes 10.1038/nature06723 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 4406
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Author Clutton-Brock, T.H.
Title Primate social organisation and ecology Type Journal Article
Year 1974 Publication Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume 250 Issue 5467 Pages 539-542
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Abstract Attempts to relate interspecific differences in social organisation among primates to gross differences in habitat or diet type have been largely unsuccessful. This is probably partly because distantly related species have adapted to similar ecological situations in different ways and partly because much finer ecological differences are important.
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Notes 10.1038/250539a0 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 4730
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Author Behrens, T.E.J.; Hunt, L.T.; Woolrich, M.W.; Rushworth, M.F.S.
Title Associative learning of social value Type Journal Article
Year 2008 Publication Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume 456 Issue 7219 Pages 245-249
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Abstract Our decisions are guided by information learnt from our environment. This information may come via personal experiences of reward, but also from the behaviour of social partners1, 2. Social learning is widely held to be distinct from other forms of learning in its mechanism and neural implementation; it is often assumed to compete with simpler mechanisms, such as reward-based associative learning, to drive behaviour3. Recently, neural signals have been observed during social exchange reminiscent of signals seen in studies of associative learning4. Here we demonstrate that social information may be acquired using the same associative processes assumed to underlie reward-based learning. We find that key computational variables for learning in the social and reward domains are processed in a similar fashion, but in parallel neural processing streams. Two neighbouring divisions of the anterior cingulate cortex were central to learning about social and reward-based information, and for determining the extent to which each source of information guides behaviour. When making a decision, however, the information learnt using these parallel streams was combined within ventromedial prefrontal cortex. These findings suggest that human social valuation can be realized by means of the same associative processes previously established for learning other, simpler, features of the environment.
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Publisher Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved Place of Publication Editor
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Notes 10.1038/nature07538 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 4681
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Author Ohtsuki, H.; Iwasa, Y.; Nowak, M.A.
Title Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment Type Journal Article
Year 2009 Publication Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume 457 Issue 7225 Pages 79-82
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Abstract Indirect reciprocity1, 2, 3, 4, 5 is a key mechanism for the evolution of human cooperation. Our behaviour towards other people depends not only on what they have done to us but also on what they have done to others. Indirect reciprocity works through reputation5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17. The standard model of indirect reciprocity offers a binary choice: people can either cooperate or defect. Cooperation implies a cost for the donor and a benefit for the recipient. Defection has no cost and yields no benefit. Currently there is considerable interest in studying the effect of costly (or altruistic) punishment on human behaviour18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25. Punishment implies a cost for the punished person. Costly punishment means that the punisher also pays a cost. It has been suggested that costly punishment between individuals can promote cooperation. Here we study the role of costly punishment in an explicit model of indirect reciprocity. We analyse all social norms, which depend on the action of the donor and the reputation of the recipient. We allow errors in assigning reputation and study gossip as a mechanism for establishing coherence. We characterize all strategies that allow the evolutionary stability of cooperation. Some of those strategies use costly punishment; others do not. We find that punishment strategies typically reduce the average payoff of the population. Consequently, there is only a small parameter region where costly punishment leads to an efficient equilibrium. In most cases the population does better by not using costly punishment. The efficient strategy for indirect reciprocity is to withhold help for defectors rather than punishing them.
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Publisher Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved Place of Publication Editor
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Notes 10.1038/nature07601 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 4705
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Author Clayton, N.S.; Dickinson, A.
Title Episodic-like memory during cache recovery by scrub jays Type Journal Article
Year 1998 Publication Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume 395 Issue 6699 Pages 272-274
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Abstract The recollection of past experiences allows us to recall what a particular event was, and where and when it occurred1,2, a form of memory that is thought to be unique to humans3. It is known, however, that food-storing birds remember the spatial location4, 5, 6 and contents6, 7, 8, 9 of their caches. Furthermore, food-storing animals adapt their caching and recovery strategies to the perishability of food stores10, 11, 12, 13, which suggests that they are sensitive to temporal factors. Here we show that scrub jays (Aphelocoma coerulescens) remember 'when' food items are stored by allowing them to recover perishable 'wax worms' (wax-moth larvae) and non-perishable peanuts which they had previously cached in visuospatially distinct sites. Jays searched preferentially for fresh wax worms, their favoured food, when allowed to recover them shortly after caching. However, they rapidly learned to avoid searching for worms after a longer interval during which the worms had decayed. The recovery preference of jays demonstrates memory of where and when particular food items were cached, thereby fulfilling the behavioural criteria for episodic-like memory in non-human animals.
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Notes 10.1038/26216 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 4788
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Author Couzin, I.D.; Krause, J.; Franks, N.R.; Levin, S.A.
Title Effective leadership and decision-making in animal groups on the move Type Journal Article
Year 2005 Publication Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume 433 Issue 7025 Pages 513-516
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Notes 10.1038/nature03236 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 4827
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Author Fehr, E.; Gachter, S.
Title Altruistic punishment in humans Type Journal Article
Year 2002 Publication Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume 415 Issue 6868 Pages 137-140
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Abstract Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
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Notes Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 4835
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