Schuck-Paim, C., & Kacelnik, A. (2002). Rationality in risk-sensitive foraging choices by starlings. Anim. Behav., 64(6), 869–879.
Abstract: Normative models of choice usually predict preferences between alternatives by computing their value according to some criterion, then identifying the alternative with greatest value. An important consequence of this procedure is captured in the economic concept of rationality, defined through a number of principles that are necessary for the existence of an ordinal scale of value upon which organisms base their choices. Violations of these principles, such as some recently reported breaches of transitivity and regularity in birds and honeybees, have strong implications for the understanding of decision mechanisms in humans and nonhumans alike. We investigated rationality in risky choice using European starlings, Sturnus vulgaris. Birds had to choose between two or three food sources, each associated with a different variance in delay to reward. In three experiments, starlings were strongly risk prone, showing regular and consistent preferences in binary and trinary choices. Preferences also satisfied weak and strong stochastic transitivity. Our results extend the generality of previous research in risk-sensitive foraging to situations where more than two alternatives are present and suggest that violations of rationality in risk-sensitive choices may be expressed only under restricted sets of conditions. Copyright 2002 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Kacelnik, A., & Marsh, B. (2002). Cost can increase preference in starlings. Anim. Behav., 63(2), 245–250.
Abstract: We used European starlings, Sturnus vulgaris, to investigate the relationship between the cost paid to obtain food rewards and preference between stimuli associated with the resulting rewards. In no-choice trials either 16 1-m flights (high effort) or four 1-m flights (low effort) gave access to differently coloured keys. Pecking at these keys resulted in identical food rewards. When subjects were given choices between the coloured keys in choice trials without having paid any effort, the majority preferred the coloured key that was paired with the higher level of work in no-choice trials. We relate our findings to results in animal behaviour, psychology and economics, and give a theoretical account that has implications for phenomena variously recognized as the `sunk cost fallacy' (the tendency to invest more in something after much has already been invested), `work ethics' (valuing an option more as a result of physical effort), `cognitive dissonance' (making mental effort to overlook or re-evaluate information that does not accord with a dominant internal representation) and the `Concorde Fallacy' (the readiness to forego more fitness for something that has been responsible for greater fitness compromise in the past).
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Bugnyar, T., & Kotrschal, K. (2002). Observational learning and the raiding of food caches in ravens, Corvus corax: is it `tactical' deception? Anim. Behav., 64(2), 185–195.
Abstract: Group-foraging ravens scatter-hoard when they are competing for food and, to some extent, also raid the caches made by others. We investigated the effects of observational spatial memory on individual caching and raiding tactics. With captive ravens, we found visual observation was essential for locating and raiding the caches of conspecifics. Both captive and free-ranging ravens, food cachers as well as potential cache raiders, responded to each other's presence. Cachers withdrew from conspecifics and most often placed their caches behind structures, obstructing the view of potential observers. Raiders watched inconspicuously and kept at a distance to cachers close to their cache sites. In response to the presence of potential raiders or because of their initial movements towards caches, the cachers frequently interrupted caching, changed cache sites, or recovered their food items. These results suggest that ravens, regardless of whether they act as cachers or raiders, are capable of withholding information about their intentions and, hence, manipulate the other bird's attention either to prevent or to achieve social-learning opportunities. Such interactions may qualify as `tactical' deception and may have created a considerable pressure selecting for social cognition in ravens. Copyright 2002 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Hauser MD, Pearson H, & Seelig D. (2002). Ontogeny of tool use in cottontop tamarins, Saguinus oedipus: innate recognition of functionally relevant features. Anim. Behav., 64, 299.
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Hauser MD, Santos LR, Spaepen GM, & Pearson HE. (2002). Problem solving, inhibition and domain-specific experience: experiments on cotton-top tamarins, Saguinus oedipus. Anim. Behav., 64, 387.
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Shettleworth, S. J. (2001). Animal cognition and animal behaviour. Anim. Behav., 61(2), 277–286.
Abstract: Cognitive processes such as perception, learning, memory and decision making play an important role in mate choice, foraging and many other behaviours. In this review, I summarize a few key ideas about animal cognition developed in a recent book (Shettleworth 1998, Cognition, Evolution and Behaviour) and briefly review some areas in which interdisciplinary research on animal cognition is currently proving especially productive. Cognition, broadly defined, includes all ways in which animals take in information through the senses, process, retain and decide to act on it. Studying animal cognition does not entail any particular position on whether or to what degree animals are conscious. Neither does it entail rejecting behaviourism in that one of the greatest challenges in studing animal cognition is to formulate clear behavioural criteria for inferring specific mental processes. Tests of whether or not apparently goal-directed behaviour is controlled by a representation of its goal, episodic-like memory in birds, and deceptive behaviour in monkeys provide examples. Functional modelling has been integrated with analyses of cognitive mechanisms in a number of areas, including studies of communication, models of how predator learning and attention affect the evolution of conspicuous and cryptic prey, tests of the relationship betweeen ecological demands on spatial cognition and brain evolution, and in research on social learning. Rather than a `new field' of cognitive ecology, such interdisciplinary research on animal cognition exemplifies a revival of interest in proximate mechanisms of behaviour.
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Feh, C. (2001). Alliances between stallions are more than just multimale groups: reply to Linklater & Cameron (2000). Anim. Behav., 61, F27–F30.
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Hare, B., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2001). Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know? Anim. Behav., 61(1), 139–151.
Abstract: We conducted three experiments on social problem solving by chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes. In each experiment a subordinate and a dominant individual competed for food, which was placed in various ways on the subordinate's side of two opaque barriers. In some conditions dominants had not seen the food hidden, or food they had seen hidden was moved elsewhere when they were not watching (whereas in control conditions they saw the food being hidden or moved). At the same time, subordinates always saw the entire baiting procedure and could monitor the visual access of their dominant competitor as well. If subordinates were sensitive to what dominants did or did not see during baiting, they should have preferentially approached and retrieved the food that dominants had not seen hidden or moved. This is what they did in experiment 1 when dominants were either uninformed or misinformed about the food's location. In experiment 2 subordinates recognized, and adjusted their behaviour accordingly, when the dominant individual who witnessed the hiding was replaced with another dominant individual who had not witnessed it, thus demonstrating their ability to keep track of precisely who has witnessed what. In experiment 3 subordinates did not choose consistently between two pieces of hidden food, one of which dominants had seen hidden and one of which they had not seen hidden. However, their failure in this experiment was likely to be due to the changed nature of the competition under these circumstances and not to a failure of social-cognitive skills. These findings suggest that at least in some situations (i.e. competition with conspecifics) chimpanzees know what conspecifics have and have not seen (do and do not know), and that they use this information to devise effective social-cognitive strategies. Copyright 2001 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.
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Tomasello, M., Hare, B., & Fogleman, T. (2001). The ontogeny of gaze following in chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, and rhesus macaques, Macaca mulatta. Anim. Behav., 61(2), 335–343.
Abstract: Primates follow the gaze direction of conspecifics to outside objects. We followed the ontogeny of this social-cognitive skill for two species: rhesus macaques and chimpanzees. In the first two experiments, using both a cross-sectional and a longitudinal design, we exposed individuals of different ages to a human looking in a specified direction. Rhesus infants first began reliably to follow the direction of this gaze at the end of the early infancy period, at about 5.5 months of age. Chimpanzees did not reliably follow human gaze until 3-4 years; this corresponds to the latter part of the late infancy period for this species. In the third experiment we exposed individuals of the same two species to a human repeatedly looking to the same location (with no special object at that location) to see if subjects would learn to ignore the looks. Only adults of the two species diminished their gaze-following behaviour over trials. This suggests that in the period between infancy and adulthood individuals of both species come to integrate their gaze-following skills with their more general social-cognitive knowledge about other animate beings and their behaviour, and so become able to deploy their gaze-following skills in a more flexible manner.
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Pongrácz, P., Miklósi, Á., Kubinyi, E., Gurobi, K., Topál, J., & Csányi, V. (2001). Social learning in dogs: the effect of a human demonstrator on the performance of dogs in a detour task. Anim. Behav., 62(6), 1109–1117.
Abstract: We recorded the behaviour of dogs in detour tests, in which an object (a favourite toy) or food was placed behind a V-shaped fence. Dogs were able to master this task; however, they did it more easily when they started from within the fence with the object placed outside it. Repeated detours starting from within the fence did not help the dogs to obtain the object more quickly if in a subsequent trial they started outside the fence with the object placed inside it. While six trials were not enough for the dogs to show significant improvement on their own in detouring the fence from outside, demonstration of this action by humans significantly improved the dogs' performance within two-three trials. Owners and strangers were equally effective as demonstrators. Our experiments show that dogs are able to rely on information provided by human action when confronted with a new task. While they did not copy the exact path of the human demonstrator, they easily adopted the detour behaviour shown by humans to reach their goal.
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