Harman, F. S., Nicol, C. J., Marin, H. E., Ward, J. M., Gonzalez, F. J., & Peters, J. M. (2004). Peroxisome proliferator-activated receptor-delta attenuates colon carcinogenesis. Nat Med, 10(5), 481–483.
Abstract: Peroxisome proliferator-activated receptor-delta (PPAR-delta; also known as PPAR-beta) is expressed at high levels in colon tumors, but its contribution to colon cancer is unclear. We examined the role of PPAR-delta in colon carcinogenesis using PPAR-delta-deficient (Ppard(-/-)) mice. In both the Min mutant and chemically induced mouse models, colon polyp formation was significantly greater in mice nullizygous for PPAR-delta. In contrast to previous reports suggesting that activation of PPAR-delta potentiates colon polyp formation, here we show that PPAR-delta attenuates colon carcinogenesis.
|
Paz-y-Miño C. G., Bond, A. B., Kamil, A. C., & Balda, R. P. (2004). Pinyon jays use transitive inference to predict social dominance. Nature, 430(7001), 778–781.
Abstract: Living in large, stable social groups is often considered to favour the evolution of enhanced cognitive abilities, such as recognizing group members, tracking their social status and inferring relationships among them. An individual's place in the social order can be learned through direct interactions with others, but conflicts can be time-consuming and even injurious. Because the number of possible pairwise interactions increases rapidly with group size, members of large social groups will benefit if they can make judgments about relationships on the basis of indirect evidence. Transitive reasoning should therefore be particularly important for social individuals, allowing assessment of relationships from observations of interactions among others. Although a variety of studies have suggested that transitive inference may be used in social settings, the phenomenon has not been demonstrated under controlled conditions in animals. Here we show that highly social pinyon jays (Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus) draw sophisticated inferences about their own dominance status relative to that of strangers that they have observed interacting with known individuals. These results directly demonstrate that animals use transitive inference in social settings and imply that such cognitive capabilities are widespread among social species.
|
Shettleworth, S. J. (2004). Cognitive science: rank inferred by reason. Nature, 430(7001), 732–733.
|
Fenton, B., & Ratcliffe, J. (2004). Animal behaviour: eavesdropping on bats. Nature, 429(6992), 612–613.
|
Proudman, C., Pinchbeck, G., Clegg, P., & French, N. (2004). Equine welfare: risk of horses falling in the Grand National. Nature, 428(6981), 385–386.
Abstract: As in other competitive sports, the famous Grand National steeplechase, which is held at Aintree in the United Kingdom and is watched by 600 million people worldwide, sometimes results in injury. By analysing data from the past 15 Grand National races (consisting of 560 starts by horses), we are able to identify several factors that are significantly associated with failure to complete the race: no previous experience of the course and its unique obstacles, unfavourable ground conditions (too soft or too hard), a large number of runners, and the length of the odds ('starting price'). We also find that there is an increased risk of falling at the first fence and at the jump known as Becher's Brook, which has a ditch on the landing side. Our findings indicate ways in which the Grand National could be made safer for horses and illustrate how epidemiological analysis might contribute to preventing injury in competitive sport.
|
Brosnan, S. F., & De Waal, F. B. M. (2003). Monkeys reject unequal pay. Nature, 425(6955), 297–299.
Abstract: During the evolution of cooperation it may have become critical for individuals to compare their own efforts and pay-offs with those of others. Negative reactions may occur when expectations are violated. One theory proposes that aversion to inequity can explain human cooperation within the bounds of the rational choice model, and may in fact be more inclusive than previous explanations. Although there exists substantial cultural variation in its particulars, this 'sense of fairness' is probably a human universal that has been shown to prevail in a wide variety of circumstances. However, we are not the only cooperative animals, hence inequity aversion may not be uniquely human. Many highly cooperative nonhuman species seem guided by a set of expectations about the outcome of cooperation and the division of resources. Here we demonstrate that a nonhuman primate, the brown capuchin monkey (Cebus apella), responds negatively to unequal reward distribution in exchanges with a human experimenter. Monkeys refused to participate if they witnessed a conspecific obtain a more attractive reward for equal effort, an effect amplified if the partner received such a reward without any effort at all. These reactions support an early evolutionary origin of inequity aversion.
|
Johnson, D. D. P., Stopka, P., & Knights, S. (2003). Sociology: The puzzle of human cooperation. Nature, 421(6926), 911–2; discussion 912.
|
Adolphs, R. (2003). Cognitive neuroscience of human social behaviour. Nat Rev Neurosci, 4(3), 165–178.
Abstract: We are an intensely social species--it has been argued that our social nature defines what makes us human, what makes us conscious or what gave us our large brains. As a new field, the social brain sciences are probing the neural underpinnings of social behaviour and have produced a banquet of data that are both tantalizing and deeply puzzling. We are finding new links between emotion and reason, between action and perception, and between representations of other people and ourselves. No less important are the links that are also being established across disciplines to understand social behaviour, as neuroscientists, social psychologists, anthropologists, ethologists and philosophers forge new collaborations.
|
Conradt, L., & Roper, T. J. (2003). Group decision-making in animals. Nature, 421(6919), 155–158.
Abstract: Groups of animals often need to make communal decisions, for example about which activities to perform, when to perform them and which direction to travel in; however, little is known about how they do so. Here, we model the fitness consequences of two possible decision-making mechanisms: 'despotism' and 'democracy'. We show that under most conditions, the costs to subordinate group members, and to the group as a whole, are considerably higher for despotic than for democratic decisions. Even when the despot is the most experienced group member, it only pays other members to accept its decision when group size is small and the difference in information is large. Democratic decisions are more beneficial primarily because they tend to produce less extreme decisions, rather than because each individual has an influence on the decision per se. Our model suggests that democracy should be widespread and makes quantitative, testable predictions about group decision-making in non-humans.
|
Rands, S. A., Cowlishaw, G., Pettifor, R. A., Rowcliffe, J. M., & Johnstone, R. A. (2003). Spontaneous emergence of leaders and followers in foraging pairs. Nature, 423(6938), 432–434.
Abstract: Animals that forage socially often stand to gain from coordination of their behaviour. Yet it is not known how group members reach a consensus on the timing of foraging bouts. Here we demonstrate a simple process by which this may occur. We develop a state-dependent, dynamic game model of foraging by a pair of animals, in which each individual chooses between resting or foraging during a series of consecutive periods, so as to maximize its own individual chances of survival. We find that, if there is an advantage to foraging together, the equilibrium behaviour of both individuals becomes highly synchronized. As a result of this synchronization, differences in the energetic reserves of the two players spontaneously develop, leading them to adopt different behavioural roles. The individual with lower reserves emerges as the 'pace-maker' who determines when the pair should forage, providing a straightforward resolution to the problem of group coordination. Moreover, the strategy that gives rise to this behaviour can be implemented by a simple 'rule of thumb' that requires no detailed knowledge of the state of other individuals.
|