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Hirata, S. (2007). A note on the responses of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) to live self-images on television monitors. Behav. Process., 75(1), 85–90.
Abstract: The majority of studies on self-recognition in animals have been conducted using a mirror as the test device; little is known, however, about the responses of non-human primates toward their own images in media other than mirrors. This study provides preliminary data on the reactions of 10 chimpanzees to live self-images projected on two television monitors, each connected to a different video camera. Chimpanzees could see live images of their own faces, which were approximately life-sized, on one monitor. On the other monitor, they could see live images of their whole body, which were approximately one-fifth life-size, viewed diagonally from behind. In addition, several objects were introduced into the test situation. Out of 10 chimpanzees tested, 2 individuals performed self-exploratory behaviors while watching their own images on the monitors. One of these two chimpanzees successively picked up two of the provided objects in front of a monitor, and watched the images of these objects on the monitor. The results indicate that these chimpanzees were able to immediately recognize live images of themselves or objects on the monitors, even though several features of these images differed from those of their previous experience with mirrors.
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Heschl, A., & Burkart, J. (2006). A new mark test for mirror self-recognition in non-human primates. Primates, 47(3), 187–198.
Abstract: For 30 years Gallup's (Science 167:86-87, 1970) mark test, which consists of confronting a mirror-experienced test animal with its own previously altered mirror image, usually a color mark on forehead, eyebrow or ear, has delivered valuable results about the distribution of visual self-recognition in non-human primates. Chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans and, less frequently, gorillas can learn to correctly understand the reflection of their body in a mirror. However, the standard version of the mark test is good only for positively proving the existence of self-recognition. Conclusive statements about the lack of self-recognition are more difficult because of the methodological constraints of the test. This situation has led to a persistent controversy about the power of Gallup's original technique. We devised a new variant of the test which permits more unequivocal decisions about both the presence and absence of self-recognition. This new procedure was tested with marmoset monkeys (Callithrix jacchus), following extensive training with mirror-related tasks to facilitate performance in the standard mark test. The results show that a slightly altered mark test with a new marking substance (chocolate cream) can help to reliably discriminate between true negative results, indicating a real lack of ability to recognize oneself in a mirror, from false negative results that are due to methodological particularities of the standard test. Finally, an evolutionary hypothesis is put forward as to why many primates can use a mirror instrumentally – i.e. know how to use it for grasping at hidden objects – while failing in the decisive mark test.
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de Waal, F. B. M., Dindo, M., Freeman, C. A., & Hall, M. J. (2005). The monkey in the mirror: hardly a stranger. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 102(32), 11140–11147.
Abstract: It is widely assumed that monkeys see a stranger in the mirror, whereas apes and humans recognize themselves. In this study, we question the former assumption by using a detailed comparison of how monkeys respond to mirrors versus live individuals. Eight adult female and six adult male brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) were exposed twice to three conditions: (i) a familiar same-sex partner, (ii) an unfamiliar same-sex partner, and (iii) a mirror. Females showed more eye contact and friendly behavior and fewer signs of anxiety in front of a mirror than they did when exposed to an unfamiliar partner. Males showed greater ambiguity, but they too reacted differently to mirrors and strangers. Discrimination between conditions was immediate, and blind coders were able to tell the difference between monkeys under the three conditions. Capuchins thus seem to recognize their reflection in the mirror as special, and they may not confuse it with an actual conspecific. Possibly, they reach a level of self-other distinction intermediate between seeing their mirror image as other and recognizing it as self.
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Schwartz, B. L., & Evans, S. (2001). Episodic memory in primates. Am. J. Primatol., 55(2), 71–85.
Abstract: Episodic memory refers to a system of memory with the capacity to recollect specific events from an individual's life. Some psychologists have suggested that episodic memory is a uniquely human phenomenon. We challenge that idea and present evidence that great apes and other primates may possess episodic-like memory. We review criteria developed to assess episodic-like memory in nonhumans, and how they apply to primates. In particular, we discuss the criteria of Clayton et al. [2001], who stated that episodic-like memory is based on the retrieval of multiple and integrated components of an event. We then review eight studies examining memory in great apes and apply the Clayton et al. criteria to each of them. We summarize the evidence that is compatible with the existence of episodic-like memory, although none of the data completely satisfy the Clayton et al. criteria. Morover, feelings of pastness and feelings of confidence, which mark episodic memory in humans, have not been empirically addressed in nonhuman primates. Future studies should be directed at these aspects of memory in primates. We speculate on the functional significance of episodic memory in nonhuman primates.
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Morton, D. B. (2000). Self-consciousness and animal suffering. Biologist (London), 47(2), 77–80.
Abstract: Animals with relatively highly developed brains are likely to experience some degree of self-awareness and the ability to think. As well as being interesting in its own right, self-consciousness matters from an ethical point of view, since it can give rise to forms of suffering above and beyond the immediate physical sensations of pain or distress. This article surveys the evidence for animal self-consciousness and its implications for animal welfare.
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Gallup, G. G. J. (1997). On the rise and fall of self-conception in primates. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 818, 72–82.
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Parker, S. T. (1997). A general model for the adaptive function of self-knowledge in animals and humans. Conscious Cogn, 6(1), 75–86.
Abstract: This article offers a general definition of self-knowledge that embraces all forms and levels of self-knowledge in animals and humans. It is hypothesized that various levels of self-knowledge constitute an ordinal scale such that each species in a lineage displays the forms of self-knowledge found in related species as well as new forms it and its sister species may have evolved. Likewise, it is hypothesized that these various forms of levels of self-knowledge develop in the sequence in which they evolved. Finally, a general hypothesis for the functional significance of self-knowledge is proposed along with subhypotheses regarding the adaptive significance of various levels of self-knowledge in mammals including human and nonhuman primates. The general hypothesis is that self-knowledge serves as a standard for assessing the qualities of conspecifics compared to those of the self. Such assessment is crucial to deciding among alternative reproductive and subsistence strategies. The qualities that are assessed, which vary across taxa, range from the size and strength of the self to its mathematical or musical abilities. This so-called assessment model of self-knowledge is based on evolutionary biological models for social selection and the role of assessment in animal communication.
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Bermudez, J. L. (1996). The moral significance of birth. Ethics, 106(2), 378–403.
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Hauser, M. D., Kralik, J., Botto-Mahan, C., Garrett, M., & Oser, J. (1995). Self-recognition in primates: phylogeny and the salience of species-typical features. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 92(23), 10811–10814.
Abstract: Self-recognition has been explored in nonlinguistic organisms by recording whether individuals touch a dye-marked area on visually inaccessible parts of their face while looking in a mirror or inspect parts of their body while using the mirror's reflection. Only chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and humans over the age of approximately 2 years consistently evidence self-directed mirror-guided behavior without experimenter training. To evaluate the inferred phylogenetic gap between hominoids and other animals, a modified dye-mark test was conducted with cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus), a New World monkey species. The white hair on the tamarins' head was color-dyed, thereby significantly altering a visually distinctive species-typical feature. Only individuals with dyed hair and prior mirror exposure touched their head while looking in the mirror. They looked longer in the mirror than controls, and some individuals used the mirror to observe visually inaccessible body parts. Prior failures to pass the mirror test may have been due to methodological problems, rather than to phylogenetic differences in the capacity for self-recognition. Specifically, an individual's sensitivity to experimentally modified parts of its body may depend crucially on the relative saliency of the modified part (e.g., face versus hair). Moreover, and in contrast to previous claims, we suggest that the mirror test may not be sufficient for assessing the concept of self or mental state attribution in nonlinguistic organisms.
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Loveland, K. A. (1995). Self-recognition in the bottlenose dolphin: ecological considerations. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 254–257.
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